Dr. Magnus Schoeller
Research & Funding
Accountability of Frontex in EU Border Management
Since its inception, Frontex has been confronted with harsh criticism for a lack of accountability, especially with regard to fundamental rights principles. At the same time, various EU institutions such as the European Parliament, the Ombudsman, the Court of Auditors, the Anti-Fraud Office OLAF as well as internal bodies like the Fundamental Rights Officer and the Consultative Forum have scrutinized Frontex in the light of numerous allegations. Despite the importance of these activities, little academic effort has been made to study the role of and interaction among the various accountability fora. In a project funded by the Austrian Science Fund, Peter Slominski (PI) and Magnus Schoeller address this research gap.
Leadership of powerful states is considered crucial to the success of regional integration. Since the European Union (EU) found itself in a ‘polycrisis’, many eyes have been on Germany. However, Germany had long been characterized by a ‘leadership avoidance reflex’. Moreover, even if Germany perceived itself as a leader in the EU, it would not be able to provide leadership equally in all EU policies, as such hegemony is precluded for structural and legitimacy reasons. Therefore, this project investigated, first, the extent to which German political elites perceived their country as a leading power in different EU policies. Second, the project asked under which conditions Germany actually performs a leading role. Methodologically, the project relied on a mixed-methods design by combining an elite survey with rigorous process-tracing based on a media analysis. The project was funded by the Austrian Academy of Sciences (2020-24) and led by Magnus Schoeller in the framework of an APART-GSK Fellowship at the University of Vienna. Project outcomes include articles in International Affairs and the Journal of European Public Policy as well as an EIF Working Paper.
Free Riders, Allies, or Veto-Players? The Role of Small Creditor States in the Euro Area
This two-year project (2018-20) was funded by the Austrian National Bank’s Anniversary Fund. The project investigated how small creditor states in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) – such as Austria, Estonia, or Finland – pursue their preferences in the shadow of German hegemony. Are they just free-riders or do they pursue their own agenda in the Eurozone? What strategies do they use to realize their interests, and why do they opt for some strategies instead of others? By comparing six small creditor states, the project, first, assessed their room for manoeuvre in EMU. Second, it generated knowledge about the preferences and behaviour of those member states that often remained understudied due to their size. Finally, the project evaluated the extent to which future EMU reform might depend on the preferences of small creditor states. Project outcomes include an article in the Journal of European Public Policy, a special issue of German Politics, an EIF Working Paper and an ÖGfE Policy Brief.
Governing Finance in Europe: A Centralisation of Rulemaking?
How do regulatory structures evolve in EU financial governance? Incorporating insights from a variety of disciplines, this project develops a comprehensive framework to investigate the dynamics leading to centralisation, decentralisation and fragmentation in EU financial regulation. As a result, the project provides a comprehensive and generalizable account of regulatory centralisation, thereby combining theoretical approaches from political science, law, sociology and economics. Empirically, the project analyses major EU legislative packages in financial regulation, including the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) and Capital Markets Union (CMU). The project is funded by the Swedish Research Council and its findings are published as a book edited by Adrienne Héritier and Magnus Schoeller.
Explaining Political Leadership: The Role of Germany and EU Institutions in Eurozone Crisis Management
Why and how do composite actors such as states or international organisations emerge as political leaders? And, once in charge, how do they influence policy or institutional change? What are the conditions for successful leadership? These questions become particularly relevant in times of crisis. Therefore, this research project develops a model of political leadership and applies it to powerful actors in Eurozone crisis management, such as Germany, the European Commission and the European Central Bank. The qualitative analysis draws on semi-structured interviews conducted in the German Ministry of Finance, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, and several Permanent Representations in Brussels. In addition to several articles, the findings of the project are published as a book with Palgrave Macmillan (Leadership in the Eurozone, 2019).
The European Parliament as a Driver of the EU’s Parliamentarization
Since the Treaty of Rome, every single treaty has empowered the European Parliament (EP) in the EU. While initially the EP had very limited competences, the Lisbon Treaty places the EP on equal footing with the Council in most policy areas. Moreover, in many policies, the EP’s current powers go far beyond what is specified in the treaties. Analysing why and how the EP was successful in expanding its formal and informal powers over time and across policies is at the core of this project. The research draws on an earlier study funded by the European Parliament, and is published as a monograph co-authored with Adrienne Héritier, Catherine Moury and Katharina Meissner (European Parliament Ascendant, 2019).
