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Support for Europe: Assessing the complexity of individual attitudes

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Abstract: Recent scholarly work has underlined the importance of being cautious about the notion of Euro-skepticism by putting stress on alternative concepts and measures. This theoretical and empirical contribution has enriched the debate on support for Europe and its potential multidimensionality. However, the fit between theoretical conceptualization and measured attitudes is still under-investigated. Do European citizens actually express different types of support? To what extent are these attitudes structured as we think? This paper investigates the different dimensions that individuals associate with "support for Europe" and whether it varies across national context. We test the empirical validity of three conceptualizations of support for Europe: (a) diffuse versus specific support, (b) identity versus diffuse support, (c) static versus dynamic perception of the European Union. To investigate these patterns, we relied on survey data from Eurobarometer. Methodologically, we use item-response theory modelling. This paper demonstrates that attitudes towards Europe are structured but in a less fine-grained manner than hypothesized in the literature. The distinction between diffuse and specific support is robust at the European scale as well as within each national context. Consequently, we provide an empirical tool to comparatively measure support in all member states. However it is not the case for the other dimensions of support, especially identity, and we advocate caution in using this variable as an explanatory variable.

Keywords: Public opinion; European identity; Europeanization; European public space; legitimacy; multilevel governance.

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Introduction

The Maastricht treaty accelerated the process of European institutional integration, bringing to reality and within public debate a new citizenship and a Single Market. Following this new path, an increasing amount of literature focuses on the citizens' perceptions of this process and, more broadly, of the European Union (EU) as a whole. The end of the 'permissive consensus' era (Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Inglehart, 1971; Moravcsik, 1991, Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; etc.) made the concept of Euroskepticism very popular (Taggart, 1998). In only a few years, this concept conquered a central theoretical position in the field of European

studies, from the analysis of party systems to public opinion and electoral studies. Euro-skepticism was originally created to describe the political parties' opposition to European integration, but was rapidly applied to define feelings and attitudes of aversion towards EU institutions. In particular, during the 1990s, the wide debate about the EU democratic deficit gave the concept of Euro-skepticism a central role in describing the gap between citizens and EU institutions (Rohrschneider, 2002; Karp et al., 2003). Despite this success, the strategy to synthesize all attitudes towards Europe with the concept of Euroskepticism has both theoretical and empirical limits.

In particular, the substantial uni-dimensionality of the concept revealed its impossibility to capture different dimensions of attitudes towards European integration and institutions (Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Hobolt and Brouard, 2010). As a result, some authors started a countertrend initiative to define different types of skepticism towards Europe and to describe their main elements. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001, 2004) distinguished between *hard* and *soft* Euro-skepticism, differentiating between an 'outright rejection' of European integration and a 'contingent' refusal targeting specific policies or institutional aspects of the EU. Following a similar path, Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) distinguished between political and instrumental Euro-skepticism. Political skepticism varies with policy domains: people support the EU when it deals with internationalized policies, while they are more skeptic about delegating decisions concerning the state's traditional competences. On the contrary, instrumental Euro-skepticism measures opinion about the perceived benefits of the country's membership to the EU. Other scholars began to research Euroskepticism in terms of support for the system, following the Eastonian (Easton, 1965, 1979) distinction between *diffuse* and *specific* support (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002; Fuchs et al., 2009; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970).

The multiplication of the dimensions of Euroskepticism represents an important step for a comprehensive definition of attitudes towards the EU and their multi-dimensionality. However, it generated two scientific paradoxes. The first one is a conceptual indeterminacy and the second is a scarcity of empirical tests. There is a vast literature on the causes of Euro-skeptic attitudes, but the concept is neither unanimously defined nor operationalized (Krouwel and Abts, 2007). As a result, different theories and analytical models are often in competition to explain a concept labelled in the same way, but substantially different.

The indeterminacy of the conceptual boundaries of Euro-skeptic attitudes, as well as the different indicators used to describe it, are not the only traceable limits in the literature. Quite often, the theoretical dimensions defined by authors remain without empirical tests.¹ It is therefore difficult to say to what extent typologies of Euro-skepticism and support for Europe are empirically observable. This paper aims at filling part of this empirical gap by assessing

¹ For some empirical tests on the dimensions of Euroskepticism for political parties, see Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008), Kopecky and Mudde (2002). For an empirical test of Euroskepticism applied to public opinion, see Krouwel and Abts (2007). For an extensive study of dimensions of attitudes towards Europe, see Scheuer (2005) and Boomgaarden et al. (2011).

how well theoretical typologies on support for Europe reflect real individual attitudes as they can be captured by survey data.

First of all, we will address the question of the multidimensionality of support for Europe: to what extent do European citizens' opinions reflect different kinds of support for the performance of the EU (i.e. specific support) and for the European political system itself (i.e. diffuse support)? Does the degree of multidimensionality of attitudes vary from one member state to another?

Second, we will investigate whether attitudes towards the political system (i.e. the EU) belong to the same dimension as individual attitudes toward the *collectivity* (or *community*), defined as the people participating "in a common political structure and a common set of political processes within a common territory" (Niedermayer and Westle, 1995: 41). This analysis represents a test of the widespread difference in the literature between support for the regime and support for the community (see Easton, 1975; Niedermayer and Westle, 1995). It particularly focuses on the concept of identity and its influence in the creation of a European public sphere (e.g. Risse-Kappen, 2010).

Finally, the analysis will assess whether there is a difference, within diffuse support, between dynamic evaluation (the process of European integration) and static evaluation (the EU as current political system). EU institutional design and history implies a continuous evolution that is commonly synthesized by the concept of European integration. Although public opinion studies about attitudes towards Europe went beyond people's judgments on European integration, little effort has been made to see how opinions on integration are related to support. To what extent is it possible to distinguish individual attitudes towards the process of integration (where Europe is going) from opinions about the EU? Does the integration process consist in a different dimension of support for Europe?

The article is structured as follows. In the following pages, we will first define the concept of support for Europe and its dimensions, moving from the research questions exposed above to the specific research hypotheses. We will then present the research design and the different steps of analysis. In the third section, we will describe our results and assess their implications. To conclude, we will highlight the theoretical and empirical implications of this special mini-issue by reviewing the complementary findings of the three contributions.

1. Beyond Euro-skepticism: The dimensions of support for Europe

Easton (1975) claimed that "support (is) upholding something by aid, countenance or adherence; the active promotion of the interests or cause of an object; defending something as valid, right, just or authoritative; or giving it assistance" (Easton, 1975: 436). It has a

behavioural dimension and an attitudinal one.² As a result, support implies (positive) evaluation, orientations and attitudes before factual behaviour. The opposite concept is *opposition*, defined as a “resistance or dissent, expressed in action or argument” (New Oxford American Dictionary).

Negative judgment, or opposition, partly overlaps with the meaning of skepticism. However, this term, more than a negative evaluation, implies a distance of the judicator from the object under scope or an opposition to an on-going process. It fits well the purpose of analysing attitudes towards European integration, but it has a limited power in describing negative attitudes toward policies and political systems as a whole. As a matter of fact, the use of the word *skepticism* in describing public opinion towards established authorities within nation states is very limited or absent. When the analysis aims to go beyond the on-going process of European integration and focus on the relation between European authorities and European citizens, it is necessary to use a more powerful concept that is able to represent general and specific attitudes towards the system. On this matter, the concept of support has proved to capture better than the concept of Euroskepticism the multidimensionality of people’s attitudes towards the European political system, its policies and collectivity (Fuchs, 2010).³ At the same time, support cannot be used directly in empirical analysis since its operationalization needs lower degrees of abstraction. A high number of theoretical and empirical contributions show that the broad concept of political support can be differentiated into different types and these types affect political authorities in different ways.

More specifically, Easton (1975) distinguished between *specific* and *diffuse* support. Specific support is an attitude (or a behaviour) produced by the evaluation of the authorities’ actions. Starting from their personal beliefs, preferences or interests, people evaluate the way the authorities act. Easton used a broad definition of authority that includes not only the government, but also a large set of political representative offices.⁴ In order to produce specific support in a political system, people must be able to identify political authorities, to associate their demands to authorities and to feel that they can affect authorities’ performances. Easton distinguished between two kinds of evaluation: *ad hoc* and *general*. In the first type, public opinion evaluates authorities according to the extent to which they met their demands. On the contrary, the second type targets the general performances and is not necessarily linked to specific activities (i.e. policies). It is important to note that even if the second type implies a general evaluation, we are still in the bulk of specific support: “the support is still of a specific kind since its extension or withdrawal is contingent on the authorities’ presumed behaviour” (Easton, 1975: 439).

² In Eastons’ words a “person is unlikely to support another in the senses mentioned here unless at the same time he is favorably disposed towards him” (Easton, 1975: 436).

³ For a contrary position, see Boomgaarden et al., 2011.

⁴ He defined the authorities as “those who are responsible to the day-to-day actions taken in the name of a political system” (Easton, 1975: 437).

Diffuse support, does not focus on the evaluation of performances but of the system as a whole; in Easton's words: "what an object is or represents not what it does" (Easton, 1975: 444). As a result, diffuse support is more durable and deals with the existence of the political system as a whole. It should be operationalized through the concepts of trust and legitimacy and, on the whole, it represents "an allegiance, attachment or loyalty to governing institutions" (Gabel, 1998: 17). As a result, specific (or utilitarian) support is contingent while diffuse (or affective) support is more durable, relatively independent from the performance and able to ensure a "stable environment for the governance" (Gabel, 1998:17). Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) introduced the terms *utilitarian* and *affective*, emphasizing the distinction between support due to rational calculation (the evaluation of the cost/benefit ratio) and emotional orientations towards Europe. Scharpf (1999) referred to *input* and *output* legitimacy of the EU in order to distinguish the judgments of EU policies (i.e. outcome) from its principles, values and people's affection (i.e. input). Although these definitions use different terminologies, they do not seem to differ substantively in their meanings (Inglehart, Rabier and Reif, 1987). For this reason, the present research focuses on the original Eastonian categories of *diffuse* and *specific* support.

Diffuse support is conceptualized in a more complex way than specific support and is used in a majority of studies in the field. Attitudes towards the authorities are not the only component of diffuse support. According to Easton, along with support for the political system, it is necessary to consider the "sense or feeling of community among its (political system) members" (Easton 1965: 176). *Collectivity* and *community* overlap with the concept of *identity*.⁵ This concept has acquired, in the last two decades, a central position in the debate on European integration, and has grown apart from the dimension of diffuse support, becoming one of the main *explanatory factors* of support for Europe (see for instance Hooghe and Marks, 2004; McLaren, 2006). At the same time, despite the large literature focusing on it, there are only few empirical tests of whether identity indeed scores on a different dimension than support. Discussion about identity focused principally on the negative effects of national identity towards European integration (Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2002, 2004, 2007; Hooghe and Marks, 2004). When the analysis turned to European identity, some authors found a relationship between the degree of belonging to Europe and support for integration (Fuchs and Klingemann, 2011).

This gap between theory and operationalization has been investigated more recently by Boomgarden, et al. (2011). They moved European identity from the explanatory factors to the different dimensions of support (i.e. dependent variables). They did this coherently with the theoretical arguments that consider European identity as part of attitudes towards Europe (Easton, 1965). Their results, based on Dutch political attitudes, show that European identity is part of attitudes towards Europe, but distinct from the other dimension of diffuse support (i.e. support for the political system). The question is definitely challenging both at the theoretical and empirical level: is European identity part of support for Europe or rather an

⁵ "A sense of we-feeling, common consciousness or group identification" (Easton, 1975: 447).

explanation for such support? Theoretically, European identity is part of diffuse support and for this reason it should not be used as an explanatory factor. At the same time, if European identity loads on a different dimension, we cannot reject that it affects other dimensions of support. Empirically speaking, the issue is of great importance because if identity cannot be separated from diffuse support, then using it as an independent variable carries a high risk of multicollinearity and spurious results.

Most of the past literature on public opinions towards the EU focused on how people perceived the process of European integration. Since the end of the 1990s, many scholars have realized that the EU is not only an evolving object, but also a reality at a given moment. Both Easton and successive contributors to the theory of support under-evaluated the differences between the evolution of the system and the current authorities. This was largely understandable since democratic states do not often make substantial institutional evolutions. On the contrary, the EU is an evolving system that, in the last two decades, has seen deep changes in its institutional setting. The distinction between the dynamic and the static component of the EU system is not often considered in the literature, assuming implicitly that support for the EU leans on the same dimension as the support for its evolution. McLaren distinguishes the “specific project of the European Union”, which means European integration (EI), from the “European Union as it exists now” (EU) (McLaren, 2006: 21). In the first case, we deal with the perception of an on-going process that implies some power delegation to a supranational entity and has consequences for individuals. This dynamic approach includes retrospective and prospective evaluations. They are not limited to current policy effects but can be seen from an historical perspective. Since the process is not finished yet, EI encompasses the changes made to become a member state and the consequences of this membership. Such a question is open ended, and the notion of project brings on hopes, common definition and prospective judgment on the future path of integration. In the second case, the expression “the EU as it exists now” refers to an institutionalized object, the supranational polity, which has specific institutions and an identifiable action on individuals (i.e. the competences that are delegated to the EU, the policies derived from these competencies and the effects of such policies). The EU stands for a system that can be judged according to its institutions, to its actions and that embodies the current stage of European integration (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: 301).

1.1. Hypotheses

According to this conceptualization of support, we first hypothesize, that attitudes towards the EU empirically reflect the theoretical distinction between diffuse and specific support. We expect that all the indicators concerning the legitimacy of the system, the image of the EU, political affection and trust in EU institutions will be perceived differently from the evaluation of EU policies (specific support). To validate this distinction at the European level, it should be verified in all the member states. We can formulate this first hypothesis as follows:

Individual attitudes towards the European Union empirically reflect the theoretical distinction between diffuse and specific support. (H1)

Second, we hypothesize that European citizens distinguish between the EU institutions and European collectivity. This feeling of belonging to a broader community – defined as European identity – gained a central role in explaining individual attitudes towards the EU (see for example Hooghe and Marks, 2004; McLaren, 2006) and more generally in the debate about European integration and democracy (among others see Deutsch, 1957; Risse, 2005). For this reason, investigating whether identity is distinct from attitudes towards the European political system is a necessary step for the study of European public opinion. We assume that individual attitudes are as structured as those conceptualized in literature; we postulate that European identity differs from diffuse support for Europe. Our second hypothesis is:

European identity belongs to a different dimension than diffuse support for Europe. (H2)

Finally, we focus on the degree of complexity of diffuse support and the difference between the static and dynamic idea of Europe. The gap between the EU and its citizens is maintained by scarce information about the EU, second-order elections and a complicated bureaucracy (Hix, 2005; Thomassen, 2009). However, several studies argue that European citizens distinguish between the process of integration (the EU as it was, and the EU as it should be) and the present institutional system (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002; Brinegar et al., 2004; McLaren, 2006). The last part of the analysis tests this assumption by looking at the indicators used in previous research on concerns about European integration. Our third hypothesis is:

The dynamic and static conceptions of Europe belong to different dimensions of diffuse support. (H3)

After a brief description of the methodological strategy, the sources, and the variables used, we test three hypotheses: (a) is support for Europe uni- or multi-dimensional? (b) Does identity belong to diffuse support for Europe? (c) Do individuals differentiate between static and dynamic conceptions of Europe?

2. Design of the study

2.1. Research strategy and method

The present analysis aims at confronting the theoretical complexity of individual attitudes towards Europe with the empirical reality of these attitudes. We therefore want to see if support for Europe can be broken down into different dimensions; more specifically, between diffuse and specific support. For that reason, the first step is an exploratory analysis of the variables most widely used in the literature and some other variables that, although scarcely used, could shed some light on different dimensions of support. More details on variables are provided in the next sub-section. The result of this first step is that we were able to construct two indexes of specific and diffuse support. We use this last one in the two remaining steps of our empirical analysis. Following our hypotheses, we first investigate the difference between identity and diffuse support, and then between the static and the dynamic dimensions within diffuse support. These three analyses target potential latent traits in individual attitudes

towards Europe. Many research objects in political science are assumed to be unobservable directly, but only through constructed measures. Those objects are called latent traits. An operation of data reduction is needed to assess whether different measures of attitudes towards Europe capture different latent traits (Jackman and Treier, 2002). The two main methods to do so are factor analysis and Mokken scaling. We chose this latter method to derive the latent traits since most of the variables here are ordinal or dichotomous. In those cases, indeed, relying on factor analysis could lead to artificial multidimensionality. Mokken scaling is a non-parametric probabilistic version of Guttman scaling that accounts for the difference of items in popularity and allows unidimensional measurement of the latent trait (van Schuur, 2003; van der Eijk, 2007). This has the advantage of determining each trait separately without any requirement of independence, that is, each dimension does not have to be orthogonal to the others.

A major concern in such comparative research is the equivalence of measurement across nations. Each analysis is run with the whole sample (twenty-six EU member-states), and then replicated using national sub-samples, to assess if the multidimensionality of individual attitudes varies across Europe.

Missing observations (refusal and “don’t know” values) have been imputed using multiple imputation (five datasets were created). This method has two advantages: to provide unbiased estimators and to maximize information, as we do not lose individuals who had missing values for some variables (King, 2001, Raghunathan, 2004). We have however to acknowledge two limits to the present analysis on this issue. First, Mokken scaling, in the software used here, could not be performed on a multiply imputed dataset. The results presented were obtained with the original dataset, and each analysis was then replicated with each of the five imputed datasets, to check the results robustness. These additional results did not differ from the first set. They are, therefore, not presented here but are available on request. Second, due to its small sample size and the high level of collinearity among variables, one country could not be successfully imputed (Malta) and was excluded from the analysis.

2.2. Data and variables

Testing attitudes towards Europe for multidimensionality requires an extensive set of measures on European issues, in order to differentiate between different types of support for Europe and between several European projects. The Eurobarometer 71.3 from June-July 2009 is the most recent dataset on attitudes towards Europe that includes the main indicators of support and extended trend of more than 70 questions on specific EU-related issues. It enables an in-depth and up-to-date analysis of the various types of support for Europe, with a diversity of question designs and issues.

As stated in the previous section, we distinguish between, first, diffuse support for Europe that encompasses support for European integration and for the European political system, and second, specific support that focuses on the current state of integration, the European Union, as a polity and a policy maker. As summarized in table 1 below, we operationalized support for Europe as widely as possible without making any assumption on which variables capture

what dimension, in order not to introduce artificial structuring in our data. The traditional measures for support that we included are: general opinion on national membership to the EU, the measure of membership's benefit for the country, trust in the European Union and in the European Commission, preferences for competence delegation in various policy areas⁶, evaluation of the EU's performance in the same domains, evaluation of the EU and a measure of European identity. We included as well an evaluation of the EU's present direction and the opinion on two specific aspects of integration: single currency and further enlargement. A statistical summary of all variables used here and their exact wording are provided in the appendix (table A1).

Table 1: Operationalization of support for Europe

Opinion on membership
Trust in the EU
Trust in the European Commission
Opinion on single currency
Opinion on future enlargement
Feeling European
Preferences on decision-making level
(social rights, economic growth, defence against terrorism, environment, agriculture, democracy and peace)
General evaluation of membership
Image of the EU
Evaluation of the EU's present direction
Evaluation of the EU's performance
(social rights, economic growth, defence against terrorism, environment, agriculture, democracy and peace)

2.3. Results

Is support for Europe uni- or multi-dimensional?

All twenty-one measures of support for Europe that we previously described were included in a Mokken analysis. We use as threshold for scale construction the value 0.5. To put it differently, for an item to be added to the scale, its H coefficient had to be above 0.5. This threshold allows us to construct robust scales where items show a strong coherence (van der

⁶ Both trends of questions on competence delegation and on the EU's performance include 13 policy areas. Among them we chose six policies to be included in the analysis. The multiple imputation process only allowed for a limited amount of variables to be imputed (30 variables in Stata 11). It was thus not possible to include all policy areas. We chose these six ones based on two criteria: to avoid redundancy between areas (as it might be the case between unemployment and economic growth, and between fighting organized crime and terrorism) and to avoid policy domains with a high rate of "don't know" that was likely to indicate non salient domains in public opinion (it is the case for research cooperation, food safety, energy and gender equality).

Eijk, 2007). Given the great proximity in language, topic and spatial proximity in the questionnaire, this high threshold was chosen in order to ensure that any scale would not be an effect of wording, but would capture an actual latent trait. Table 2 below displays the results for all countries together.

Table 2: Diffuse and specific support – pooled sample

Item	Mean	Loevinger H coeff	z-stat.
Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.66	165.69
Benefit of membership ^(a)	67	0.62	147.09
Image of the EU ^(b)	45	0.64	154.73
Membership	55	0.60	153.40
Opinion on a European monetary union	69	0.51	112.94
The EU's going in the right direction	41	0.57	128.43
Trust the European Commission	60	0.57	141.30
Trust in the EU	57	0.60	150.51
Scale 2 – Specific support		0.55	255.80
The EU's performance in economic growth	5	0.57	153.32
The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	5	0.54	142.99
The EU's performance in promoting democracy and	6	0.58	153.13
The EU's performance in protecting the environment	5	0.56	150.28
The EU's performance in social rights	5	0.57	152.27
The EU's performance in supporting agriculture	5	0.51	135.67

All Z statistics significant at the 0.05 level (N=14,831)

^(a) All variables except the EU's performance ones are binary or ordinal. The "mean" column thus displays the percentage of the value the most supportive of Europe

^(b) Mean column displays the percentage of values "fairly positive" and "very positive" image


Source: Eurobarometer 71.3 (Spring 2009)

The results of the Mokken analysis clearly suggest two different scales, showing that individuals do differentiate between two dimensions of support. On the first dimension we find the opinion on EU's membership, on the EU itself, the evaluation of the benefit from membership, trust in the EU and in the European Commission, together with opinion on the EU's present direction and on the Monetary Union. The second dimension includes only the evaluation of the EU's performance in the six chosen policy domains. It is thus clear that individuals do make a difference between *diffuse* and *specific* support (respectively the first and second scales). At the same time, this difference appears less fine-grained than the one hypothesized in literature. In particular, the measures of specific institutions' performance and image capture the same latent trait as the variables targeting the European system, trust and opinion on the EU's orientation. Specific support is exclusively captured by the variables on evaluation of the EU's action in various policy domains. Out of twenty-one variables, eight had an H coefficient lower than 0.5 and were therefore not used to construct the two scales. These are the six measures of preferences for delegation, the measure of European identity, and the opinion on further enlargement.

We also considered this approach for each country separately because most public debates on Europe are national and differences in the duration of membership make it plausible for the coherence of attitudes towards Europe to vary by country. Moreover, data are collected on a

national basis and questions are asked in a different language for each national sample. Finally, the two scales in table 1 summarize the degree of structure in the whole EU, and the congruence of each scale could greatly vary from one country to another. To be sure to capture any differences due to national context, we repeated the Mokken analysis for each member state separately. For clarity's sake, the detailed results are displayed in the appendix (Table A2). Figures 1 and 2 below summarize those results.

Figure 1: The degree of structure in diffuse support in member states



Across the countries, the degree of difference between diffuse and specific support varies and this variation has substantial implications. At one extremity of the continuum, Greece, the United Kingdom, and the Czech Republic, there is no difference between diffuse and specific support: the evaluation of the EU's action and opinion on the European project belong to the same dimension.⁷ Individual attitudes in these countries load on a single scale, labelled *uni-dimensional* support in table A2, and this category is solid in figure 1. At the other extremity, we see much more structure in individual perceptions of Europe. First, in a few cases, diffuse support is split in two sub-dimensions. This category is represented by dark narrow hatching in figure 1. In Ireland, individuals differentiate between support for the European project as it is and the political system on the one hand, and the future of this project (both variables on this dimension capture individual preferences for the monetary union and a potential enlargement). In Italy and Romania, individuals differentiate support for integration and the

⁷ The case of the Czech Republic is slightly different from Greece and the United Kingdom because, aside from the uni-dimensional scale that groups together support for membership, for the European system and most variables related to policy evaluation, there is a second scale on which only two variables load. These two variables are the evaluation of the EU's action in fighting terrorism and protecting the environment. This scale is labeled "global safety" (more details are provided later on. Support for Europe is uni-dimensional in this country, except in the specific case of global safety.

political system on the one hand, and the EU as a community on the other hand. Second, some national samples exhibit one dimension of diffuse support, but specific support is split into policy domains. This is the case for Belgium, Denmark, France, Estonia, and Latvia. Between these two extremes, uni-dimensionality and multi-dimensionality the majority of individuals, independently of national context, exhibit the same two dimensions that we found in the pooled analysis: diffuse versus specific support.

Figure 2: The congruence of diffuse support in member states






Figure 2 shows the degree of coherence of diffuse support among member states. It provides us with a summary of the first scale for each national sub-sample. The darker the filling colour, the higher the H coefficient of the diffuse support scale, which means the greater the coherence of items in this scale. The robustness of the scale varies from 0.53 in Romania to 0.68 in Hungary. In terms of content, despite national differences, five variables are included in all diffuse support scales (including when support has only one dimension): opinion on membership, benefit from membership, image of the EU, trust in the EU and trust in the European Commission. This latent trait combines support for the European project (the membership and benefit question) together with support for the European institutions (more specifically trust in the Commission) and for the regime (trust in the EU and image of the EU). Out of these five variables, we create an index of diffuse support to be used later.⁸

⁸ This index is in fact a factor, created out a confirmatory factor analysis that included all five variables. This factor has an eigenvalue of 3.3 and all factor loadings are above 0.77. This diffuse support index ranges from -2 to 1.2, and has a mean of 0. The higher the score of an individual is, the higher is his/her diffuse support for Europe.

Looking at specific support, we found two scales: the evaluation of the EU on social rights and economic growth on the first scale, and fighting against terrorism, support for democracy and protecting the environment on the second. We labelled the first dimension of specific support *socio-economic* and the second one *global safety* as it encompasses areas of international security as well as environmental issues. Figure 3 and 4 below summarize these results by country. The first map displays the degree of structure of this specific support, and shows three different situations. a) Specific support is uni-dimensional: all six performance variables belong to a single scale, regardless of policy areas (this category is represented by pale green filling in Figure 3). b) Some of these variables load on one scale, focusing on a policy domain (this category is represented by green hatching on the map). c) Variables load on two different scales, distinguishing between socio-economic issues and global safety (this category is represented by narrow dark hatching in figure 3). Figure 4 shows these differences in specific support by allocating a particular colour for each of these two dimensions: red for social and economic areas (the Netherlands and Luxemburg); orange when, in addition to the social and economic scale there is a second specific support scale focused on global safety (targeting security, democracy and environment protection); yellow when there is the global safety scale and another one that brings together all other areas; and hatched when there is only one scale, when individuals do not differentiate their support according to policy domains (these countries correspond to the pale green areas in figure 3). As we said before, the majority of individuals differentiate diffuse and specific support, hence confirming our first hypothesis, but do not differentiate specific support according to policy domains. In a few cases, Belgium, Denmark, France, Estonia, and Latvia, we find a stronger structuring of attitudes, with specific support split into two areas of competence: the social and economic one, and the global safety one.

Another interesting fact emerges from the first analysis and was confirmed in the analysis by country: European identity is very rarely, if at all, linked to diffuse support. It is the case only for Cyprus, Austria, France, Italy and Romania. In the first three cases, the measure of European identity simply belongs to the diffuse support dimension. In the case of Italy and Romania, it is possible to identify a separate dimension, labelled *European community*, which encompasses both the feeling of belonging and how to define this community (with references to enlargement in the Italian case, and to membership in the Romanian one). Having said that, with the exception of these few cases, the empirical results tell us that identity is more a factor than a sign of diffuse support. In order to further assess this point, we now turn to the second step of analysis: investigating the difference between diffuse support for Europe and European identity.

Figure 3: The degree of structure in specific support in member states**Figure 4: Different dimensions of specific support in member states**

Does identity belong to diffuse support for Europe?

In order to assess with further certainty whether European identity belongs to the dimension of diffuse support, we conduct a Mokken analysis with the measure of European identity and the diffuse support index that was created after the first analysis. Table 3 below displays the results of the pooled analysis, results for national sub-samples are displayed in table A3 in the appendix.

Table 3: The complexity of diffuse support: Political allegiance versus European identity – pooled sample

Item	Mean	Loevinger H coeff	z-stat.
Scale 1		0.45	53.17
Diffuse Support Index	0.00	0.45	53.17
Feeling European	2.08	0.45	53.17

All Z statistics significant at the 0.05 level (N=18,367)

Source: Eurobarometer 71.3 (Spring 2009)


When we consider the whole sample, identity and diffuse support can be said to belong to the same dimension but in a very loose way. Indeed, the scale has an H coefficient of 0.45, and scales are usually considered to be strong above 0.5. Moreover, if we compare this to the homogeneity of the diffuse support index, we find a different degree of congruence: in table 1, the coefficients of the five variables used in the diffuse support index are all above 0.6⁹. We could thus conclude that European identity and diffuse support are related, that they partly belong to the same dimension, but that in some cases they both capture different traits. Figure 5 below summarizes the results of the analysis per country and sheds some light on what these cases are. This map displays the H coefficient of the scale obtained for each national sub-sample: the darker the filling, the higher the homogeneity of the scale, i.e. the more identity belongs to the diffuse support dimension.¹⁰ When the country is hatched, no scale could be constructed, meaning that identity and diffuse support are two different dimensions. This is the case for individuals in Ireland, Spain, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Czech Republic. If we adopt the threshold used for the first analysis (H=0.5), we can include in this group individuals from Greece, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland, bringing the number to twelve member-states. Hypothesis 2, stating that identity did not belong to the same dimension as diffuse support for Europe, is thus confirmed in half of national samples only. In these cases, explaining diffuse support with European feeling is likely to produce fruitful results, whereas, in the rest of countries, the relationship might be spurious.

⁹ Except for trust in the European commission that has an H coefficient of 0.57.

¹⁰ One could argue that identity could be in fact part of the more general dimension of support for European rather than the diffuse one. As a robustness check, we conducted an additional test by including two indexes of specific support for Europe.

Following the same strategy than for the diffuse support index, we run a confirmatory factor analysis with the variables capturing the socio-economic dimension and the global safety dimension. In the first case, factor has an eigenvalue of 1.12 and both variables (the EU's performance in social rights and in economic growth) have loading score above 0.75. In the second case, factor has an eigenvalue of 1.6 and the three variables (the EU's performance in fighting terrorism, in protecting the environment and building peace and democracy) have loading score above 0.7.

The Mokken analysis on the whole sample showed that identity scored on the same scale than diffuse support, whereas the two specific support index scored on a second scale. We can thus conclude that identity is closer to the diffuse support dimension (results available on request).

Figure 5: Political allegiance and European identity in member states

Now that we assessed the difference between identity and support, we can focus on the last potential distinction in diffuse support: the difference between static and dynamic dimensions of Europe. Like in the case of identity, the exploratory analysis already pointed that individuals might indeed differentiate between these two conceptions of Europe, but the third part of our analysis brings more light on this issue.

Do individuals differentiate between static and dynamic conceptions of Europe?

The first Mokken analysis included twenty-one measures of support for Europe, including six variables measuring the preferences for competence delegation in various policy areas. They were included neither on the diffuse nor on the specific dimension, suggesting that the preferences on the EU's competences belonged to a different dimension than the evaluation of the EU's action or current state. Following the strategy used for identity, we thus conducted a Mokken analysis including the index of diffuse support and the six measures of preferences for delegation. The static dimension is operationalized with the index of support that includes the measure of attitudes towards Europe as it is now. For the dynamic dimension, ideally we would include an assessment of how European integration was, has evolved, and how it should be. However, data availability enables us to consider only prospective assessment: what competences should be handled at the European level. A threshold of 0.4 for the H coefficient was used, like in the case of the analysis on identity. Table 4 displays the results of the pooled analysis. It shows a scale of seven variables with an H coefficient of 0.53, where diffuse support index has the lowest coefficient ($H=0.44$). Consequently, we can conclude that all variables are clearly related, but that the scale would be much more homogeneous with only the delegation variables.


Table 4: The complexity of diffuse support: static versus dynamic support – pooled sample

Item	Mean	Loevinger H coeff	z-stat.
Scale 1 – Static and Dynamic		0.53	213.31
Diffuse support index	0.01	0.44	82.51
Decision-making level: supporting agriculture ^(a)	67.62	0.50	113.58
Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	84.44	0.56	123.15
Decision-making level: social rights	66.97	0.52	121.61
Decision-making level: economic growth	73.66	0.54	132.59
Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	85.89	0.56	116.70
Decision-making level: protecting the environment	77.78	0.52	121.46

All Z statistics significant at the 0.05 level (N=17,482)

^(a) Decision-making level variables are ordinal, the “mean” column thus displays the percentage of the value the most supportive of Europe

The analysis of national sub-sample reveals the same heterogeneity among member states. Figure 6 summarizes the information of interest and the full results are displayed in table A4 in the appendix. We see that in nine cases, the preferences for delegation belong to a different dimension than diffuse support: Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. If we consider a more strict threshold ($H=0.5$), this is also the case for individuals in Latvia, the Netherlands and Sweden, bringing the number of cases where this differentiation occurs to twelve. That is, individual diffuse support can be differentiate into static and dynamic conceptions of Europe in half of the member states, while in the other half, individuals do not differentiate between the EU as it is and the EU as it should be. If we take the whole sample, hypothesis 3 is thus not confirmed, as static definition of support scores on the same dimension as preferences for delegation (dynamic definition), and when we look at the national sub-samples, the hypothesis is confirmed in roughly 50% of member states.

Figure 6: Static and dynamic definition of Europe in member states

Assessing findings

Before proceeding with general conclusions about this special issue and its contribution to the studies of European public opinion, we assess the findings reached by our analysis and their implications for future research.

As Kopecky and Mudde deplored it, studies on Euro-skepticism too often fail to “do enough justice to the subtle, yet important, distinction between the ideas of European integration, on the one hand, and the European Union as the current embodiment of these ideas, on the other hand” (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: 300). Beyond the issue of putting the right label on these different objects, what is at stake is the validity of concepts and measures. While confronted with this profusion of labels and definition, one cannot help but wonder: does such conceptual complexity find an echo in individual attitudes, especially given the geographical scope of European public opinions and the relative newness of European integration? Is support for Europe uni- or multi-dimensional?

The present analysis attempts to provide some answers to this core question. We investigated the degree of structure that could be found in individual attitudes towards Europe, focusing on three issues: do diffuse and specific supports belong to the same dimension? Is identity part of diffuse support? Can diffuse support be disentangled into a static and a dynamic conception of the EU. The general conclusion of our analysis is that individual attitudes towards Europe are structured and multi-dimensional but that the distinctions made by individuals in their perceptions of Europe are less fine-grained than is theorized in the literature.

First of all, we hypothesized that individual attitudes towards the European Union empirically reflect the theoretical distinction between diffuse and specific support (H1). The results showed in the previous section provide enough evidence to accept this hypothesis. On the one hand, all variables capturing opinions on the EU system, whether they focus on the EU as system, on European institutions, or on membership, belong to a same dimension. On the other hand, all variables evaluating the EU’s performance in policy domains belong to another dimension. Diffuse support is based on political allegiance to a regime, when one recognizes its legitimacy and identifies with. In the European case, diffuse support targets both the European system and the European project, that is, European integration (Easton, 1965; Kopecky and Mudde, 2002; Krouwel and Abts, 2007). This is exactly the elements captured by the first dimension in our analysis. On the contrary, specific support is based on the evaluation of the EU’s performance and policies and targets institutions and policies. In our analysis, specific support appears to be captured by direct measures of the EU’s policy performance.

Within this general pattern, we found some particularities both in terms of variables and countries. The measure of utilitarian choices (benefit from EU membership) and the general evaluation of the EU (image), unexpectedly load on the diffuse dimension, as well as the evaluations of institutions and the general trust in the regime. Individuals do distinguish between the EU as system and integration as a process on the one hand, and the EU as policy-maker on the other one, but this distinction is less sophisticated in reality than is conceptualized. In all national contexts except for three (Greece, United Kingdom, and Czech

Republic), individuals differentiate diffuse from specific support, although the degree of congruence of both dimensions greatly vary. In a few cases, a high degree of structure is expressed: people distinguish between two specific domains: the social and economic dimension, focusing on domestic issues mainly, and the global safety one that targets international relations, security and the environment.

This has two direct methodological consequences. First, the specific dimension is better captured by the evaluation of the EU's action, formulated in a very precise way. Second, there is a common empirical definition of diffuse support that can be used to safely compare individual attitudes across countries. It encompasses the opinion on regime, institutions, and integration, and is can be operationalized with five variables that are available in almost all Eurobarometer surveys: opinion on membership, benefit from membership, the EU's image, trust in the EU, and trust in the European Commission.

In our second hypothesis, according to the Eastonian framework, we stated that diffuse support and identity described different dimensions of individual perceptions (H2). Looking at the results by country we can only partially accept this hypothesis. Identity clearly belongs to a different dimension in only seven countries (Ireland, Spain, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Czech Republic). From a geographical perspective it is interesting to note that the Southern countries and some of the Eastern members do distinguish between diffuse support and identity. Assessing the reason for national differences in this distinction is unfortunately beyond the scope of this article, but should be considered in future research. In most of the countries, however, identity loads on the same dimension of diffuse support as political allegiance. This finding gives us at least two important answers both in theoretical and empirical terms. First of all, contrary to Easton (1965), the sense of belonging to the community (collectivity) is not always a different dimension of diffuse support, but it is one indicator of diffuse support. In most cases, European identity is part of the attitudes towards the European system, and a separation between the regime and the collectivity can be detected only in a minority of the member states. The internal division of diffuse support between attitudes towards the political regime and identity does not apply to attitudes towards Europe in half of the member states. Second, since European identity is part of diffuse support in at least half of member states, to use it to predict support for Europe in the whole EU presents a serious risk of spurious results and artificially inflated explained variance.

Finally, we tested the existence of a different dimension of support for the integration process (dynamic support) (H3). Like for identity, the hypothesis cannot be accepted for the whole EU, but the analysis showed a great variety of results among member states. Dynamic and static perceptions belong to two different dimensions in twelve cases (Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, the Netherlands, and Sweden). It is particularly interesting to note that the Eastern member states differentiate between a dynamic and static diffuse support for the EU. This could be evidence against the common sense idea that the sophistication of attitudes towards Europe depends on the length of membership. Once again, it is not possible in the present article to infer any macro or micro-level explanations for these national differences. We will leave this for a future investigation. At the same time, even if dynamic and static diffuse supports belong in

most of the cases to the same dimension, for a consistent part of EU countries it is not possible to assume that the two groups of attitudes are the same. This conclusion represents an important finding for both the past and future research on support for integration. It calls for caution in generalizing results obtained only with variables that focus on one type of diffuse support. These inferences might not be generalizable to general diffuse support for individuals in all countries.

Conclusion

Since Easton's theory of political support (1965), a vast amount of researches has focused on explaining support for Europe. The last two decades saw in particular a strong emphasis on Euro-skepticism. Public opinion studies contributed a great deal to our knowledge on aversion toward Europe and its institutions. Despite these intensive efforts, the debate about attitudes towards the EU is far from closure. On the contrary, it is at a turning point. Some authors introduced the notion of multidimensional attitudes, opening a new theoretical and empirical path towards a more complex and in-depth approach to European citizens' opinions and feelings towards Europe. The first contribution of this special issue to this debate is to increase our knowledge of European attitudes by investigating the gap between the conceptual and empirical definition of multidimensionality. The second contribution is to provide a few recommendations to improve the empirical study of these multidimensional attitudes. According to these objectives, we demonstrated that two kinds of support clearly emerge when we observe the evaluation of the performance (specific support) and the opinion on the European system (diffuse support). This difference, in line with the previous contributions, appears robust at the European scale as well as in each member state taken separately, providing us with an empirical tool to comparatively measure support in all member states.

Bruno Cautrès focused on a particular scenario where these attitudes have implications on voting behaviour. According to his findings, French attitudes towards European integration are multi-dimensional. Three dimensions are particularly salient: the general fears towards integration, fears regarding social protection and fears for national culture. European integration generates many concerns that strongly affect the traditional electoral lines. The first dimension blurs the left-right placement, while the second and the third ones match with the left-right self-placement of respondents. From an electoral behaviour perspective, the measurement of attitudes towards Europe cannot be simply uni-dimensional despite the common practice in most of the literature. For this reason, the author points out the absolute necessity to update the measure of support for Europe in survey data.

Recognizing the multidimensionality of attitudes towards the EU, Christine Arnold, Eliyahu V. Sapir and Galina Zapryanova addressed one of the most debated dimensions in public opinion studies: trust. Their findings show new evidences about the relationship between trust towards national and EU institutions. Particularly, at the individual level citizens show coherent feelings of trust towards both national and European institutions. At the same time, when the analysis takes into account country-level characteristics, the level of corruption assumes a crucial role in explaining trust for EU institutions: the higher is corruption in

national contexts the higher is trust towards EU institutions. These findings demonstrate that citizens sometimes perceive the EU's institutions as an alternative to corrupt domestic political bodies and, for this reason, corruption should be incorporated in analytical models of support for EU. The two authors stress the need to complement individual and countries characteristics in the researches of the field, adopting a multilevel perspective.

Independently from the specific results reached on each of these topics, the three articles of this special issue highlight the need for a different vision of Europe and European collectivity. One can only agree that several elements disturb the action and the state of the European Union: over-represented domestic focus in public debate, a lack of information, political parties' strategies and a large disinterest of national media. Despite all this, European citizens' perceptions represent a kaleidoscopic set of attitudes. This multidimensionality proves that the EU institutional design is not only an evolving process, but a reality on which grievances and demands are addressed more or less directly. In the mind of Europeans, the EU is a political actor whose institutions are responsible for the policies they conduct and for addressing the problems standing at the top of the political agenda. Those attitudes have demonstrated more than one time to have the capacity to be represented in the factual behaviour of opposition and direct refusal of policy strategy, as past referendum and European elections showed. The existence of this multidimensionality in attitudes towards the EU, more than reaching a conclusive point, opens further avenues for research. *To what extent the explanatory factors discussed until now in the literature differently affect diverse kinds of attitudes towards the EU? What are the bases of diffuse support? Are they related to national support? How do different types of support affect citizens' behaviours?* These questions are just the top of the iceberg that surfaces when we admit the multidimensionality of Europeans' attitudes.

At the same time, the analyses presented here show that national specificities have to be taken into account when investigating further these dimensions. Going beyond the uniform concept of Euro-skepticism, this special issue draws a map of the many dimensions of support for Europe, at the European scale. While diffuse and specific supports are distinct regardless of national context, it is not the case for other dimensions or more fine-grained distinction, such as: trust in the regime and institutional trust, identity, static and dynamic support, fears regarding integration and the politicization of Europe. These preliminary findings necessitate further analysis in order to explain some geographical patterns that emerged. More strongly, the analysis of trust shows a clear difference between new and old member states. National scenarios matter and can make a lot of difference in such a variegated set of member states. This represents a great richness in terms of subjects to investigate and variance to explain that will inspire further investigations on these issues.

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Appendix

Table 5: Summary statistics and wording of variables

Variable	Type	Original Name	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Opinion on membership	Ordinal	QA6A	25374	0.40	0.73	-1	1
Trust in the EU	Binary	QA9_5	23485	0.57	0.49	0	1
Opinion on single currency	Binary	QA15_1	24591	0.69	0.46	0	1
Opinion on future enlargement	Binary	QA15_2	23317	0.52	0.50	0	1
Feeling European	Ordinal	QE4_1	26007	2.02	0.88	0	3
General evaluation of membership	Binary	QA7A	23395	0.67	0.47	0	1
Image of the EU	Continuous	QA10	25738	0.32	0.89	-2	2
Evaluation of the EU's present direction	Ordinal	QA8A_2	23450	0.05	0.87	-1	1
Trust in the European Commission	Binary	QA14_2	21242	0.60	0.49	0	1
Delegation preferences in social rights	Continuous	QA17_2	24059	4.80	2.11	1	10
Delegation preferences in economic growth	Continuous	QA17_3	24365	4.63	2.08	1	10
Delegation preferences in fighting terrorism	Continuous	QA17_5	24200	5.35	2.28	1	10
Delegation preferences in protecting the environment	Continuous	QA17_7	24679	5.37	2.14	1	10
Delegation preferences in supporting agriculture	Continuous	QA17_10	24182	4.94	2.33	1	10
Delegation preferences in promoting democracy and peace	Continuous	QA17_11	24383	5.82	2.20	1	10
The EU's performance in social rights	Ordinal	QA16_2	25089	0.39	0.90	-1	1
The EU's performance in economic growth	Ordinal	QA16_3	25026	0.51	0.84	-1	1
The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	Ordinal	QA16_5	25337	0.76	0.63	-1	1
The EU's performance in protecting the environment	Ordinal	QA16_7	25366	0.60	0.77	-1	1
The EU's performance in supporting agriculture	Ordinal	QA16_10	24968	0.40	0.89	-1	1
The EU's performance in promoting democracy and peace	Ordinal	QA16_11	25154	0.74	0.63	-1	1

Table 6: Summary statistics and wording of variables (continued)

Variable	Wording
Opinion on membership	Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is...?
Trust in the EU	For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. The European Union
Opinion on single currency	What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. A European Monetary Union with one single currency, the euro
Opinion on future enlargement	Further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years
Feeling European	Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are: European
General evaluation of membership	Taking everything into account, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?
Image of the EU	In general, does the European Parliament conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?
Evaluation of the EU's present direction	At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, in: the European Union?
Trust in the European Commission	And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? The European Commission
Delegation preferences in social rights	For each of the following areas, please tell me if you believe that more decision-making should take place at a European level or on the contrary that less decision-making should take place at a European level? Social rights
Delegation preferences in economic growth	Economic growth
Delegation preferences in fighting terrorism	Fighting terrorism
Delegation preferences in protecting the environment	Protecting the environment
Delegation preferences in supporting agriculture	Supporting agriculture
Delegation preferences in promoting democracy and peace	Promoting democracy and peace
The EU's performance in social rights	Using a scale from 1 to 10, how would you judge the performance of the European Union in each of the following areas? : social rights
The EU's performance in economic growth	Economic growth
The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	Fighting terrorism
The EU's performance in protecting the environment	Protecting the environment
The EU's performance in supporting agriculture	Supporting agriculture
The EU's performance in promoting democracy and peace	Promoting democracy and peace

Table 7: Diffuse and specific support – per country (continued)

	Item	Mean	Loevinger H coeff	z-stat.
Belgium	Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.56	45.20
N=780	Benefit from membership *	71.92	0.52	24.34
	Image of the EU **	51.34	0.59	28.05
	Membership	66.05	0.56	27.60
	The EU's going in the right direction	39.37	0.62	26.44
	Trust the European Commission	66.34	0.51	25.24
	Trust the EU	60.21	0.57	28.31
	Scale 2 – Specific support (social & economic)		0.60	16.49
	The EU's performance in economic growth	4.85	0.60	16.49
	The EU's performance in social rights	4.94	0.60	16.49
	Scale 3 – Specific support (global safety)		0.53	14.44
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	5.33	0.53	14.44
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy and	5.72	0.53	14.44
Denmark	Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.64	47.19
N=675	Benefit from membership *	81.84	0.74	26.18
	Image of the EU **	40.8	0.71	29.90
	Membership	65.81	0.68	30.51
	Opinion on a European monetary union	55.07	0.53	22.33
	Trust the European Commission	65.69	0.61	27.88
	Trust the EU	61.49	0.64	29.12
	Scale 2 – Specific support (social & economic)		0.58	14.57
	The EU's performance in economic growth	5.39	0.58	14.57
	The EU's performance in social rights	4.72	0.58	14.57
	Scale 3 – Specific support (global safety)		0.53	13.49
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	5.72	0.53	13.49
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy and	5.94	0.53	13.49
Germany	Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.59	62.42
N=876	Benefit from membership *	61.45	0.58	33.95
	Image of the EU **	44.29	0.62	37.65
	Membership	61.44	0.64	35.38
	Opinion on a European monetary union	69.78	0.55	28.42
	The EU's going in the right direction	38.83	0.60	33.28
	Trust the European Commission	53	0.55	33.43
	Trust the EU	49.71	0.61	35.78
	Scale 2 – Specific support (no differentiation)		0.54	38.17
	The EU's performance in economic growth	4.08	0.52	25.94
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	2.33	0.53	26.34
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy and	5.61	0.54	26.93
	The EU's performance in social rights	4.57	0.58	28.83
Greece	Scale 1 – Unidimensional support		0.58	106.55
N=940	Benefit from membership *	65.43	0.61	46.27
	Image of the EU **	45.25	0.54	47.43
	Membership	44.69	0.52	44.33
	Opinion on a European monetary union	61.08	0.52	39.61
	The EU's going in the right direction	28.63	0.41	33.28
	The EU's performance in economic growth	4.24	0.61	51.03
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	4.12	0.54	44.99
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy and	5.47	0.61	51.33
	The EU's performance in protecting the environment	4.77	0.61	51.03
	The EU's performance in social rights	4.94	0.64	54.29
	The EU's performance in supporting agriculture	4.74	0.56	47.60
	Trust the European Commission	51.31	0.55	43.10
	Trust the EU	54.86	0.57	44.90

All Z statistics significant at the 0.05 level (N=14.831)

* All variables that are not on EU's evaluation are binary or ordinal. The "mean" column thus displays the percentage of the value most supportive of Europe** mean column displays the percentage of values "fairly positive" and "very positive" image

	Item	Mean	Loevinger H coeff	z-stat.
Spain	Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.61	34.92
N=516	Benefit from membership *	77.99	0.66	20.91
	Image of the EU **	53.56	0.63	24.38
	Membership	72.69	0.69	21.77
	The EU's going in the right direction	35.51	0.54	15.41
	Trust the European Commission	55.49	0.58	20.95
	Trust the EU	56.65	0.61	21.94
	Scale 2 – Specific support (no differentiation)		0.56	47.68
	The EU's performance in economic growth	4.61	0.57	28.13
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	5.46	0.54	26.51
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy and peace	5.59	0.59	28.93
	The EU's performance in protecting the environment	5.11	0.54	26.41
	The EU's performance in social rights	5.02	0.58	28.47
	The EU's performance in supporting agriculture	4.72	0.54	26.84
Finland	Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.63	47.17
N=742	Benefit from membership *	61.83	0.65	31.09
	Image of the EU **	31.48	0.60	24.42
	Membership	51.55	0.60	30.02
	Opinion on a European monetary union	82.3	0.74	25.00
	Trust the European Commission	61.76	0.59	27.24
	Trust the EU	54.99	0.64	30.00
	Scale 2 – Specific support (no differentiation)		0.55	45.96
	The EU's performance in economic growth	5.26	0.58	30.25
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	5.68	0.55	29.07
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy and peace	6.05	0.55	28.86
	The EU's performance in protecting the environment	5.72	0.52	27.52
	The EU's performance in social rights	5.03	0.56	29.65
France	Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.56	51.73
N=566	Benefit from membership *	59.93	0.56	26.98
	Feeling European	33.14	0.51	24.38
	Image of the EU **	42.2	0.61	30.73
	Membership	49.95	0.61	31.19
	Opinion on a European monetary union	75.17	0.59	22.93
	The EU's going in the right direction	28.6	0.52	22.50
	Trust the European Commission	52.4	0.51	25.53
	Trust the EU	47.01	0.60	29.36
	Scale 2 – Specific support (social & economic)		0.61	13.94
	The EU's performance in economic growth	4.56	0.61	13.94
	The EU's performance in social rights	4.18	0.61	13.94
	Scale 3 – Specific support (global safety)		0.55	22.33
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	5.5	0.55	18.03
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy and peace	5.56	0.56	18.49
	The EU's performance in protecting the environment	5.24	0.55	18.19
Ireland	Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.59	30.56
N=439	Benefit from membership *	87.5	0.67	17.39
	Image of the EU **	61.32	0.58	21.41
	Membership	72.53	0.63	18.75
	The EU's going in the right direction	33.37	0.55	15.12
	Trust the European Commission	67.02	0.56	18.23
	Trust the EU	58.35	0.61	19.36
	Scale 2 – Specific support (no differentiation)		0.59	38.18
	The EU's performance in economic growth	4.84	0.57	23.17
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	5.29	0.58	23.70
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy and peace	5.96	0.61	25.01
	The EU's performance in protecting the environment	6.06	0.58	23.51
	The EU's performance in social rights	5.49	0.62	25.40
	Scale 3 – Future European project		0.58	3.97
	Opinion on a European monetary union	90.17	0.58	3.97
	Opinion on further enlargement	50.42	0.58	3.97

	Item	Mean	Loevinger H coeff	z-stat.
Italy	Scale 1 – Specific support (no differentiation)		0.73	69.79
N=566	The EU's performance in economic growth	4.57	0.72	38.72
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	5.04	0.72	39.02
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy and peace	5.36	0.76	40.58
	The EU's performance in protecting the environment	5.09	0.75	40.48
	The EU's performance in social rights	4.92	0.72	38.96
	The EU's performance in supporting agriculture	5.14	0.73	39.06
	Trust the EU	56.28	0.51	24.13
	Scale 2 – Diffuse support		0.63	45.45
	Benefit from membership *	59.11	0.67	29.73
	Image of the EU **	57.24	0.58	25.35
	Membership	50.81	0.69	29.42
	Opinion on a European monetary union	66.81	0.62	27.58
	The EU's going in the right direction	32.52	0.67	25.00
	Trust the European Commission	61.58	0.57	26.04
	Scale 3 – European community		0.51	8.10
	Feeling European	17.63	0.51	8.10
	Opinion on further enlargement	49.29	0.51	8.10
Luxemburg	Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.56	23.69
N=282	Benefit from membership *	79.33	0.55	13.17
	Image of the EU **	56.4	0.53	15.49
	Membership	80.38	0.55	12.11
	The EU's going in the right direction	36.08	0.63	13.12
	Trust the European Commission	68.28	0.54	14.37
	Trust the EU	62.31	0.61	16.35
	Scale 2 – Specific support (social & economic)		0.71	11.60
	The EU's performance in economic growth	5.52	0.71	11.60
	The EU's performance in social rights	5.22	0.71	11.60
Netherlands	Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.63	47.08
N=574	Benefit from membership *	78.37	0.63	25.48
	Image of the EU **	43.85	0.65	28.36
	Membership	73.17	0.64	27.74
	Opinion on a European monetary union	82.99	0.56	20.74
	The EU's going in the right direction	40.9	0.62	23.95
	Trust the European Commission	69.89	0.58	24.73
	Trust the EU	61.66	0.70	29.39
	Scale 2 – Specific support (social & economic)		0.53	12.31
	The EU's performance in economic growth	5.32	0.53	12.31
	The EU's performance in social rights	5.52	0.53	12.31
Austria	Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.63	68.65
N=700	Benefit from membership *	51.47	0.67	37.98
	Feeling European	33.7	0.52	27.14
	Image of the EU **	34.99	0.65	38.29
	Membership	41.12	0.67	38.67
	Opinion on a European monetary union	75.42	0.64	27.91
	The EU's going in the right direction	31.93	0.69	37.68
	Trust the European Commission	48.66	0.66	37.31
	Trust the EU	47.13	0.65	37.48
	Scale 2 – Specific support (no differentiation)		0.57	46.61
	The EU's performance in economic growth	4.56	0.60	31.00
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	4.98	0.55	28.25
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy and peace	5.58	0.57	29.36
	The EU's performance in social rights	4.76	0.58	29.89
	The EU's performance in supporting agriculture	5.02	0.56	29.09

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	Item	Mean	Loevinger H coeff	z-stat.
Portugal	Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.62	45.03
N=425	Benefit from membership *	74.1	0.72	26.74
	Image of the EU **	52.46	0.63	25.29
	Membership	55.9	0.61	25.13
	Opinion on a European monetary union	63.27	0.60	24.83
	The EU's going in the right direction	47.22	0.64	23.94
	Trust the European Commission	69.64	0.60	24.51
	Trust the EU	64.98	0.56	24.13
	Scale2 – Specific support (no differentiation)		0.59	45.66
	The EU's performance in economic growth	4.15	0.60	26.96
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	5.05	0.55	24.93
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy and peace	5.14	0.62	27.74
	The EU's performance in protecting the environment	5.07	0.62	27.92
	The EU's performance in social rights	4.35	0.61	27.12
	The EU's performance in supporting agriculture	4.12	0.52	23.53
Sweden	Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.63	39.83
N=564	Benefit from membership *	54.35	0.58	24.40
	Image of the EU **	40.4	0.70	28.14
	Membership	55.9	0.68	28.08
	Trust the European Commission	65.94	0.60	22.43
	Trust the EU	49.44	0.60	23.52
	Scale 2 – Specific support (no differentiation)		0.54	30.22
	The EU's performance in economic growth	4.69	0.56	22.34
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	5.34	0.53	21.07
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy and peace	5.8	0.52	20.82
	The EU's performance in social rights	4.45	0.54	21.43
UK	Scale 1 – Unidimensional support		0.67	90.40
N=599	Benefit from membership *	41.55	0.55	32.87
	Image of the EU **	24.05	0.51	35.33
	Membership	31.39	0.53	34.64
	The EU's going in the right direction	25.36	0.50	28.09
	The EU's performance in economic growth	4.16	0.72	46.20
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	4.78	0.67	43.35
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy and peace	4.87	0.70	45.22
	The EU's performance in protecting the environment	4.88	0.71	45.74
	The EU's performance in social rights	4.53	0.66	42.80
	The EU's performance in supporting agriculture	5.55	0.69	44.55
	Trust the European Commission	30.6	0.58	33.45
	Trust the EU	26.88	0.53	30.52
Cyprus	Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.57	34.56
N=279	Benefit from membership *	58.12	0.60	20.39
	Feeling European	17.06	0.51	15.73
	Image of the EU **	51.63	0.64	21.97
	Membership	46.88	0.65	20.50
	Opinion on a European monetary union	67.75	0.54	17.25
	Trust the European Commission	63.98	0.50	16.79
	Trust the EU	62.32	0.58	19.96
	Scale 2 – Specific support (no differentiation)		0.59	23.50
	The EU's performance in economic growth	5.37	0.60	16.81
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	5.08	0.59	16.46
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy and peace	6.64	0.57	15.74
	The EU's performance in social rights	5.85	0.62	17.50

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	Item	Mean	Loevinger H coeff	z-stat.
Czech	Scale 1 – Unidimensional support		0.53	63.88
N=740	Benefit from membership *	64.71	0.55	32.64
	Image of the EU **	36.61	0.48	31.95
	Membership	39.38	0.49	31.76
	The EU's going in the right direction	43.5	0.48	29.86
	The EU's performance in economic growth	4.52	0.59	36.92
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy and peace	6.46	0.52	31.87
	The EU's performance in social rights	5.04	0.55	34.73
	The EU's performance in supporting agriculture	4.51	0.50	31.34
	Trust the European Commission	51.91	0.51	30.86
	Trust the EU	53.7	0.52	31.82
	Scale 2 – Specific support (global safety)		0.55	14.62
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	6	0.55	14.62
	The EU's performance in protecting the environment	5.94	0.55	14.62
Estonia	Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.61	32.15
N=550	Benefit from membership *	83.17	0.64	20.19
	Image of the EU **	45.56	0.68	20.42
	Membership	60.37	0.61	21.50
	Trust the European Commission	74.78	0.52	19.00
	Trust the EU	74.75	0.60	22.00
	Scale 2 – Specific support (social & economic)		0.71	16.31
	The EU's performance in economic growth	4.62	0.71	16.31
	The EU's performance in social rights	4.82	0.71	16.31
	Scale 3 – Specific support (global safety)		0.53	21.09
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	5.96	0.54	17.59
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy and peace	5.99	0.54	17.58
	The EU's performance in protecting the environment	5.86	0.50	16.47
Hungary	Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.69	63.19
N=568	Benefit from membership *	41.38	0.69	32.84
	Image of the EU **	33.64	0.72	36.72
	Membership	33.54	0.70	35.62
	Opinion on a European monetary union	69.74	0.66	27.23
	Opinion on further enlargement	69.78	0.64	27.90
	The EU's going in the right direction	30.04	0.59	28.46
	Trust the European Commission	60.38	0.74	35.01
	Trust the EU	56.53	0.73	35.33
	Scale 2 – Specific support (no differentiation)		0.63	56.43
	The EU's performance in economic growth	3.76	0.64	33.21
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	4.95	0.63	32.66
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy and peace	5.4	0.62	31.90
	The EU's performance in protecting the environment	4.78	0.66	34.12
	The EU's performance in social rights	4.01	0.66	34.54
	The EU's performance in supporting agriculture	3.85	0.57	29.32
Latvia	Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.63	34.74
N=484	Benefit from membership *	40.02	0.62	22.89
	Image of the EU **	24.2	0.66	23.15
	Membership	25.92	0.63	22.25
	Trust the European Commission	46.4	0.58	20.38
	Trust the EU	50.58	0.65	22.22
	Scale 2 – Specific support (social & economic)		0.59	21.81
	The EU's performance in economic growth	3.64	0.65	19.79
	The EU's performance in social rights	3.99	0.59	17.80
	The EU's performance in supporting agriculture	3.63	0.53	16.00
	Scale 3 – Specific support (global safety)		0.57	21.48
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	5.27	0.56	17.24
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy and peace	5.63	0.57	17.28
	The EU's performance in protecting the environment	5.29	0.59	18.13

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	Item	Mean	Loevinger H coeff	z-stat.
Lithuania	Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.61	28.82
N=381	Benefit from membership *	82.09	0.69	20.73
	Image of the EU **	46.62	0.66	19.17
	Membership	59.01	0.62	19.81
	Trust the European Commission	70.84	0.50	15.85
	Trust the EU	72.18	0.57	17.30
	Scale 2 – Specific support (no differentiation)		0.61	44.48
	The EU's performance in economic growth	4.93	0.62	26.43
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	5.77	0.62	26.39
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy	6.67	0.60	25.38
	The EU's performance in protecting the	5.66	0.62	26.23
	The EU's performance in social rights	4.88	0.64	26.81
	The EU's performance in supporting agriculture	6.63	0.55	23.06
Poland	Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.63	30.68
N=410	Benefit from membership *	83.43	0.69	19.13
	Image of the EU **	51.43	0.68	21.71
	Membership	60.13	0.58	18.86
	Trust the European Commission	65.97	0.63	19.85
	Trust the EU	60.99	0.58	18.95
	Scale 2 – Specific support (no differentiation)		0.60	46.46
	The EU's performance in economic growth	4.89	0.61	26.88
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	5.63	0.61	27.11
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy	6.01	0.62	27.62
	The EU's performance in protecting the	5.84	0.60	26.66
	The EU's performance in social rights	4.68	0.59	25.99
	The EU's performance in supporting agriculture	5.69	0.60	26.71
Slovakia	Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.65	48.87
N=692	Benefit from membership *	87.23	0.77	27.63
	Image of the EU **	51.24	0.71	31.48
	Membership	63.98	0.61	29.41
	Opinion on a European monetary union	92.41	0.79	22.63
	The EU's going in the right direction	41.82	0.58	22.86
	Trust the European Commission	69.56	0.58	26.13
	Trust the EU	69.69	0.62	29.01
	Scale 2 – Specific support (no differentiation)		0.57	46.32
	The EU's performance in economic growth	4.79	0.57	29.32
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	5.43	0.57	29.23
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy	6.15	0.54	27.54
	The EU's performance in protecting the	5.45	0.58	29.84
	The EU's performance in social rights	5.09	0.60	30.70
Slovenia	Scale 1 – Diffuse support		0.55	49.20
N=703	Benefit from membership *	68.42	0.60	26.82
	Image of the EU **	49.15	0.54	28.44
	Membership	48.35	0.55	29.48
	Opinion on a European monetary union	89.53	0.69	18.40
	The EU's going in the right direction	43.08	0.57	27.99
	Trust the European Commission	52.85	0.51	25.92
	Trust the EU	53.07	0.54	28.16
	Scale 2 – Specific support (no differentiation)		0.54	54.17
	The EU's performance in economic growth	4.43	0.54	31.01
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	5.09	0.52	30.08
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy	5.57	0.58	33.24
	The EU's performance in protecting the	5.24	0.55	31.62
	The EU's performance in social rights	4.21	0.54	31.19
	The EU's performance in supporting agriculture	5.37	0.53	30.83

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** mean column displays the percentage of values "fairly positive" and "very positive" image

	Item	Mean	Loevinger H coeff	z-stat.
Bulgaria	Scale 1 – Specific support (no differentiation)		0.67	49.09
N=373	The EU's performance in economic growth	4.9	0.70	29.42
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	5.77	0.67	28.20
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy and peace	6.59	0.70	29.18
	The EU's performance in protecting the environment	5.68	0.66	27.75
	The EU's performance in social rights	5.19	0.70	29.44
	The EU's performance in supporting agriculture	5.2	0.63	26.54
	Scale 2– Diffuse support		0.67	40.32
	Benefit from membership *	62.89	0.65	23.30
	Image of the EU **	60.97	0.70	24.98
	Membership	53.53	0.73	26.62
	The EU's going in the right direction	69.57	0.61	22.29
	Trust the European Commission	72.93	0.63	22.12
	Trust the EU	72.5	0.68	24.04
Romania	Scale 1 – Specific support (no differentiation)		0.68	52.00
N=407	The EU's performance in economic growth	5.06	0.71	31.38
	The EU's performance in fighting terrorism	5.83	0.66	29.05
	The EU's performance in promoting democracy and peace	6.45	0.63	27.74
	The EU's performance in protecting the environment	5.79	0.72	32.00
	The EU's performance in social rights	5.33	0.69	30.36
	The EU's performance in supporting agriculture	5.29	0.67	29.73
	Scale2 – Diffuse support		0.53	28.32
	Image of the EU **	63.73	0.56	19.24
	Membership	70.05	0.51	18.54
	The EU's going in the right direction	55.57	0.54	16.97
	Trust the European Commission	73.96	0.53	18.47
	Trust the EU	72.23	0.52	18.27
	Scale 3 – European Community		0.58	8.47
	Benefit from membership *	70.05	0.58	8.47
	Feeling European	42.26	0.58	8.47

All Z statistics significant at the 0.05 level (N=14.831)

* All variables that are not on EU's evaluation are binary or ordinal. The "mean" column thus displays the

** mean column displays the percentage of values "fairly positive" and "very positive" image

Table 8: Diffuse support and European identity in member states

	Item	Mean	Loevinger H coeff	z-stat.
Belgium	Scale 1		0.52	8.70
N=844	Diffuse support index	0.12	0.52	8.70
	Feeling European	2.25	0.52	8.70
Denmark	Scale 1		0.69	7.89
N=795	Diffuse support index	0.15	0.69	7.89
	Feeling European	2.39	0.69	7.89
Germany	Scale 1		0.61	14.39
N=1064	Diffuse support index	-0.10	0.61	14.39
	Feeling European	2.25	0.61	14.39
Greece	Scale 1		0.41	14.85
N=967	Diffuse support index	-0.15	0.41	14.85
	Feeling European	1.53	0.41	14.85
Finland	Scale 1		0.80	8.11
N=826	Diffuse support index	-0.15	0.80	8.11
	Feeling European	2.17	0.80	8.11
France	Scale 1		0.71	14.04
N=702	Diffuse support index	-0.17	0.71	14.04
	Feeling European	2.03	0.71	14.04
Luxemburg	Scale 1		0.68	7.14
N=353	Diffuse support index	0.28	0.68	7.14
	Feeling European	2.44	0.68	7.14
Netherlands	Scale 1		0.52	7.43
N=768	Diffuse support index	0.21	0.52	7.43
	Feeling European	2.10	0.52	7.43
Austria	Scale 1		0.56	13.65
N=805	Diffuse support index	-0.35	0.56	13.65
	Feeling European	2.12	0.56	13.65
Portugal	Scale 1		0.51	9.91
N=618	Diffuse support index	0.25	0.51	9.91
	Feeling European	2.20	0.51	9.91
Sweden	Scale 1		0.71	8.09
N=726	Diffuse support index	-0.12	0.71	8.09
	Feeling European	2.43	0.71	8.09
United Kingdom	Scale 1		0.63	13.01
N=805	Diffuse support index	-0.84	0.63	13.01
	Feeling European	1.39	0.63	13.01
Cyprus	Scale 1		0.57	9.23
N=364	Diffuse support index	0.05	0.57	9.23
	Feeling European	1.84	0.57	9.23
Estonia	Scale 1		0.47	9.48
N=724	Diffuse support index	0.34	0.47	9.48
	Feeling European	2.20	0.47	9.48
Hungary	Scale 1		0.44	8.83
N=691	Diffuse support index	-0.32	0.44	8.83
	Feeling European	2.32	0.44	8.83
Latvia	Scale 1		0.74	8.53
N=664	Diffuse support index	-0.49	0.74	8.53
	Feeling European	1.74	0.74	8.53
Lithuania	Scale 1		0.44	8.25
N=565	Diffuse support index	0.31	0.44	8.25
	Feeling European	1.98	0.44	8.25
Poland	Scale 1		0.49	8.37
N=586	Diffuse support index	0.28	0.49	8.37
	Feeling European	2.17	0.49	8.37
Slovakia	Scale 1		0.67	9.34
N=794	Diffuse support index	0.34	0.67	9.34
	Feeling European	2.34	0.67	9.34

All Z statistics significant at the 0.05 level.

No scale found for Spain, Ireland, Italy, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania.

Table 9: Static versus Dynamic dimensions of diffuse support per member states

	Item	Mean	Loevinger H coeff	z-stat.
Belgium	Scale 1 – Dynamic		0,45	39,59
N=822	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	77,66	0,46	22,21
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	87,72	0,45	23,70
	Decision-making level: social rights	79,40	0,46	22,58
	Decision-making level: economic growth	85,95	0,44	23,29
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	89,47	0,46	23,49
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	86,92	0,44	23,06
Denmark	Scale 1 – Static and Dynamic		0,54	29,10
N=759	Diffuse support index	0,16	0,55	16,21
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	90,32	0,61	19,70
	Decision-making level: social rights	46,23	0,55	14,03
	Decision-making level: economic growth	68,19	0,56	20,19
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	90,93	0,54	17,53
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	79,83	0,48	16,09
Germany	Scale 1 – Static and Dynamic		0,53	47,64
N=1026	Diffuse support index	-0,09	0,45	21,86
	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	66,62	0,44	23,79
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	90,57	0,61	27,92
	Decision-making level: social rights	66,85	0,51	27,30
	Decision-making level: economic growth	72,39	0,52	27,87
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	90,35	0,59	26,26
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	86,31	0,58	27,70
Greece	Scale 1 – Static and Dynamic		0,61	66,10
N=964	Diffuse support index	-0,15	0,65	28,14
	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	65,17	0,61	34,71
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	78,58	0,64	37,83
	Decision-making level: social rights	70,14	0,63	40,46
	Decision-making level: economic growth	69,27	0,62	38,91
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	77,00	0,56	33,62
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	74,80	0,58	35,75
Spain	Scale 1 – Dynamic		0,70	61,60
N=631	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	80,43	0,67	34,07
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	87,86	0,74	36,01
	Decision-making level: social rights	79,32	0,69	36,14
	Decision-making level: economic growth	80,95	0,70	36,49
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	83,25	0,65	34,63
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	86,18	0,76	36,78
Finland	Scale 1 – Static and Dynamic		0,66	27,37
N=802	Diffuse support index	-0,15	0,69	10,59
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	83,22	0,63	18,99
	Decision-making level: social rights	54,56	0,67	17,93
	Decision-making level: economic growth	68,66	0,71	23,10
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	87,23	0,62	17,00
	Scale 2 – Dynamic		0,49	8,11
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	76,04	0,49	8,11
	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	52,69	0,49	8,11

All Z statistics significant at the 0.05 level (N=17,482)

Decision-making level variables are ordinal, the “mean” column thus displays the percentage of the value the most supportive of Europe

	Item	Mean	Loevinger H coeff	z-stat.
France	Scale 1 – Static and Dynamic		0,52	35,97
N=664	Diffuse support index	-0,18	0,44	15,00
	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	69,94	0,47	18,28
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	88,84	0,54	20,78
	Decision-making level: social rights	68,72	0,49	20,19
	Decision-making level: economic growth	78,24	0,55	23,01
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	89,65	0,54	18,48
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	87,93	0,59	22,89
Ireland	Scale 1 – Dynamic		0,55	35,23
N=547	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	62,17	0,54	20,39
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	74,89	0,66	23,21
	Decision-making level: social rights	61,23	0,51	19,12
	Decision-making level: economic growth	67,61	0,54	21,16
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	74,00	0,59	20,12
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	61,75	0,49	19,00
Italy	Scale 1 – Static and Dynamic		0,62	57,49
N=639	Diffuse support index	0,02	0,54	24,32
	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	66,70	0,63	30,53
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	79,86	0,65	33,05
	Decision-making level: social rights	73,38	0,63	32,75
	Decision-making level: economic growth	74,09	0,59	31,40
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	79,40	0,62	32,15
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	77,40	0,64	32,96
Luxemburg	Scale 1 – Dynamic		0,49	5,27
N=337	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	91,00	0,49	5,27
	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	78,83	0,49	5,27
Netherlands	Scale 1 – Dynamic		0,45	9,49
N=692	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	45,81	0,47	7,90
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	79,12	0,43	8,34
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	91,33	0,45	7,10
	Scale 2 – Static and Dynamic		0,47	7,39
	Diffuse support index	0,21	0,47	7,39
	Decision-making level: economic growth	71,51	0,47	7,39
Austria	Scale 1 – Static and Dynamic		0,44	42,83
N=768	Diffuse support index	-0,33	0,66	21,57
	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	51,11	0,41	21,01
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	76,23	0,45	23,58
	Decision-making level: social rights	50,25	0,41	22,09
	Decision-making level: economic growth	64,13	0,47	25,58
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	79,72	0,52	24,69
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	61,70	0,41	23,03
Portugal	Scale 1 – Static and Dynamic		0,65	48,62
N=561	Diffuse support index	0,31	0,71	14,61
	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	82,97	0,57	24,14
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	89,99	0,70	29,73
	Decision-making level: social rights	86,99	0,63	28,96
	Decision-making level: economic growth	85,96	0,69	31,45
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	87,05	0,67	29,92
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	85,28	0,62	28,55

All Z statistics significant at the 0.05 level

Decision-making level variables are ordinal, the “mean” column thus displays the percentage of the value the most supportive of Europe

	Item	Mean	Loevinger H coeff	z-stat.
Sweden	Scale 1 – Static and Dynamic		0,48	20,73
N=674	Diffuse support index	-0,12	0,44	14,72
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	89,61	0,48	12,33
	Decision-making level: social rights	46,58	0,46	12,12
	Decision-making level: economic growth	63,66	0,53	15,97
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	90,91	0,42	10,39
	Scale 2 – Dynamic		0,43	4,67
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	84,92	0,43	4,67
	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	49,65	0,43	4,67
United Kingdom	Scale 1 – Static and Dynamic		0,78	73,32
N=769	Diffuse support index	-0,84	0,91	32,36
	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	48,66	0,78	41,37
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	67,95	0,80	40,68
	Decision-making level: social rights	42,94	0,78	39,50
	Decision-making level: economic growth	46,81	0,76	40,92
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	68,38	0,79	39,01
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	62,02	0,77	41,23
Cyprus	Scale 1 – Static and Dynamic		0,63	28,51
N=357	Diffuse support index	0,05	0,48	8,86
	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	91,85	0,57	16,45
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	96,16	0,80	20,69
	Decision-making level: social rights	90,71	0,58	16,79
	Decision-making level: economic growth	92,49	0,59	17,05
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	93,72	0,63	18,06
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	95,76	0,72	18,71
Czech Republic	Scale 1 – Static and Dynamic		0,54	43,25
N=808	Diffuse support index	-0,16	0,73	20,03
	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	68,53	0,47	22,07
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	87,27	0,55	21,09
	Decision-making level: social rights	68,03	0,52	25,03
	Decision-making level: economic growth	75,88	0,54	27,79
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	90,88	0,65	23,47
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	78,20	0,52	24,78
Estonia	Scale 1 – Dynamic		0,57	36,85
N=690	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	57,53	0,54	22,25
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	86,24	0,61	17,34
	Decision-making level: social rights	52,43	0,58	23,36
	Decision-making level: economic growth	57,32	0,58	24,80
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	87,88	0,58	15,93
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	63,56	0,57	22,57
Hungary	Scale 1 – Dynamic		0,46	36,29
N=662	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	79,92	0,48	22,69
	Decision-making level: social rights	83,04	0,47	23,84
	Decision-making level: economic growth	87,31	0,53	25,98
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	84,92	0,43	21,23
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	85,28	0,40	21,02

All Z statistics significant at the 0.05 level

Decision-making level variables are ordinal, the “mean” column thus displays the percentage of the value the most supportive of Europe

	Item	Mean	Loevinger H coeff	z-stat.
Latvia	Scale 1 – Static and Dynamic		0,48	22,48
N=624	Diffuse support index	-0,47	0,31	6,78
	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	63,28	0,49	17,03
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	85,64	0,50	13,08
	Decision-making level: social rights	67,52	0,46	16,83
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	66,36	0,49	17,48
	Scale 2 – Dynamic		0,58	8,30
	Decision-making level: economic growth	72,06	0,58	8,30
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	88,60	0,58	8,30
Lithuania	Scale 1 – Dynamic		0,55	33,09
N=515	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	84,30	0,43	15,69
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	90,33	0,55	16,29
	Decision-making level: social rights	64,74	0,57	19,83
	Decision-making level: economic growth	76,63	0,58	22,09
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	85,83	0,57	20,25
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	69,63	0,57	20,66
Poland	Scale 1 – Static and Dynamic		0,57	11,08
N=541	Diffuse support index	0,28	0,57	7,21
	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	79,37	0,54	9,43
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	87,47	0,60	10,91
	Scale 2 – Dynamic		0,49	21,34
	Decision-making level: social rights	71,00	0,54	15,71
	Decision-making level: economic growth	79,66	0,53	17,48
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	89,14	0,42	10,73
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	78,73	0,47	15,81
Slovakia	Scale 1 – Static and Dynamic		0,50	15,59
N=783	Diffuse support index	0,35	0,46	6,56
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	82,47	0,50	14,34
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	89,27	0,59	13,90
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	71,66	0,44	10,73
	Scale 2 – Dynamic		0,43	10,14
	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	71,98	0,43	10,14
	Decision-making level: economic growth	78,68	0,43	10,14
Slovenia	Scale 1 – Dynamic		0,64	51,05
N=793	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	74,14	0,59	28,53
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	81,71	0,69	31,55
	Decision-making level: social rights	70,12	0,64	28,97
	Decision-making level: economic growth	72,51	0,62	29,92
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	83,47	0,63	27,34
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	78,13	0,67	31,63
Bulgaria	Scale 1 – Dynamic		0,51	22,45
N=513	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	81,22	0,47	15,93
	Decision-making level: social rights	78,67	0,55	16,89
	Decision-making level: economic growth	80,48	0,53	17,76
	Decision-making level: fighting terrorism	92,55	0,50	12,48
Romania	Scale 1 – Dynamic		0,49	32,74
N=541	Decision-making level: supporting agriculture	84,29	0,48	21,12
	Decision-making level: promoting democracy and peace	86,67	0,42	16,12
	Decision-making level: social rights	82,12	0,54	21,74
	Decision-making level: economic growth	84,61	0,51	22,21
	Decision-making level: protecting the environment	83,65	0,51	21,76