Building Peace Through Proxy-Mediation:

The European Union’s Mediation Support in the
Libya Conflict

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Abstract

This paper develops the concept of EU proxy-mediation for the study EU mediation support. EU proxy-mediation is an indirect approach to conflict mediation where the EU works through intermediaries (proxy mediators) that are institutionally distinct from the EU foreign policy system in pursuit of its mediation objectives. Conceptually, the paper identifies drivers of EU proxy-mediation, strategies of proxy-mediation, and ways to manage EU-proxy relations. Empirically, the paper demonstrates the relevance of EU proxy-mediation activities for the case of EU mediation support in Libya. While the EU has not assumed a prominent profile as a direct mediator in Libya, it has actively engaged in proxy-mediation activities, providing mediation support to a variety of actors at the regional, national and local levels. Importantly, the EU facilitated coordination among key third-party mediators; provided financial support and training to a range of proxy mediators; and lend its own leverage to support peace initiatives of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). The EU’s proxy-mediation activities in Libya show that the EU can play a meaningful mediation role through empowering others, even in situations where it does not establish itself as a direct mediator.
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1. **Introduction**

Research on the EU’s role as a conflict mediator has predominantly focused on high profile cases of direct EU involvement in peace negotiations (Bergmann and Niemann 2015). Yet, in today’s conflict settings there are often a series of actors who provide mediation services (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 2001; Böhmelt 2011), making it challenging or even importune for the EU to strive for a role as lead mediator. Accordingly, direct EU involvement in peace negotiations – such as its role as lead mediator in the “Belgrade-Pristina dialogue” between Serbia and Kosovo – remain relatively limited. Rather, situations of multi-party mediation often require that the EU pursues its mediation objectives through cooperation with other third party mediators, including international and regional organizations, transnational NGOs and private foundations, as well as local actors. To derive at a more comprehensive understanding of the EU’s mediation role, it is thus important to pay greater attention to the EU’s mediation support for others. As noted by an observer:

(...) mediation is not just about high-profile and high-level mediation of formal peace talks, often conducted by prominent politicians. It is also about engaging in informal political dialogue and supporting other international or local actors who are better placed – or more acceptable to the conflict parties – to facilitate or mediate talks in a specific context (Gourlay 2011).

Despite the growing importance of the EU’s support for other mediators, we still know relatively little about this aspect of the EU’s mediation role. Addressing this gap in existing research this paper develops the concept of “proxy-mediation” to study EU mediation support activities. We understand proxy-mediation as an indirect approach to conflict mediation where the EU works through intermediaries (proxy mediators), who are institutionally distinct from the EU foreign policy system, in pursuit of its mediation objectives. Building on the literature on indirect governance (Abbott et al. 2015; Cooley and Spruyt 2009; Lake and Fariss 2014) and works on conflict resolution, we argue that EU proxy-mediation pursues two main objectives: first, it aims at empowering proxy mediators in peacebuilding processes and,
second, it aims at stirring proxy mediators in line with EU mediation objectives. Our conceptual framework developed in this paper deals with drivers of EU proxy-mediation, EU strategies of empowering proxies, and managing EU-proxy relations.

Empirically we will illustrate the relevance of different EU proxy-mediation strategies for the case of EU mediation in Libya. Addressing the complex, multi-level crisis in Libya has been described by the EU’s High Representative Federica Mogherini as one of the EU’s top priorities for promoting stability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region (EEAS 2017a). Simultaneously, the Libyan case constitutes a multi-party negotiation setting where the EU needs to define its role in relation to a number of other third-parties active in mediation. While the United Nations (UN) has established itself as the principle mediator through its Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), we show that EU proxy-mediation activities have played a significant role in facilitating the UN-led peace efforts. Furthermore, the EU has also offered its support to the mediation activities of a variety of transnational and local actors that mediate at the local level. Importantly, the EU facilitated coordination among key third-party mediators; provided financial support and training to a range of proxy mediators and lent its own leverage to support peace initiatives. The EU’s proxy-mediation activities in Libya show that the EU can play a meaningful mediation role in mediation processes through empowering others, highlighting the need for further works on this under-researched aspect of the EU’s mediation activities.

The paper proceeds as follows. We first give a brief overview of existing research on the EU’s role in conflict mediation and highlight important ways in which the concept of proxy-mediation can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the EU’s mediation role. Consequently, we develop the concept of EU proxy-mediation in terms of drivers, strategies, and EU-proxy relations. The subsequent empirical section examines EU proxy-mediation in the Libya crisis. In the conclusion, we present a brief summary of our main findings and highlight promising avenues for future research.
2. The EU and Conflict Resolution: Reviewing the State of the Art

Work on EU mediation can build on a well-established body of literature on the EU’s broader role in peacebuilding. A prominent strand of research on EU peacebuilding has looked at how the Union’s own experience, identity, normative constitution and institutional practice as an “integration project” relates to its role in conflict resolution. Employing the concept of “normative power Europe” (Manners 2002), several scholars have examined the diffusion of key EU peacebuilding norms, principles and policy positions in the domain of conflict resolution (Björkdahl 2005; Diez and Pace 2011; Persson 2017). Others have focused on the power vested in European economic integration, examining the influence resulting from integration and association of third countries with the EU’s large economic market for promoting peace (Diez et al. 2006; Tocci 2007). More recently, Visoka and Doyle (2016) have shifted attention to the concept of “neo-functional peace”, which considers the EU’s self-perception and neo-functional interpretation of its own history as central for its approach to resolving disputes. In particular, the concept of “neo-functional peace” shifts attention to the way the EU is “deconstructing highly political issues into technical meanings in order to achieve mutually acceptable agreements” (Visoka and Doyle 2016: 862).

Simultaneously, a number of insightful studies have explored the EU’s “comprehensive approach” to conflict resolution that combines a broad range of civilian and military tools, dealing also with the relevant EU institutions and co-ordination efforts that underpin this approach (see e.g. Whitman and Wolff 2012 for an overview). Scholarship on intra-EU policy coordination has shed light on the role of a host of EU actors involved in conflict resolution - including the member states and the Council, the High Representative, the European External Action Service (EEAS), EU Delegations – as well as the relations between these actors (Plank and Niemann 2017). Others, in turn, have zoomed in on specific aspects of the EU’s conflict resolution activities, such as on the EU’s role in civilian and military crisis management (Gross and Juncos 2012; Gourlay 2004; Hynek 2011). Additionally, a number of studies have focused on the EU’s conflict resolution policy vis-à-vis specific geographic regions and states, including the Arab-Israeli conflict (Müller 2012, Musu 2010, Bouris 2014), the Cyprus conflict
(Diez and Tocci 2009; Yakinthou 2009), or the Western Balkans (Juncos 2005, Papadimitriou et al. 2007). Some of these works have also explicitly focused on the EU’s role as a mediator (e.g. Grono 2010; Forsberg and Seppo 2010), provided interesting, case-specific insights on the EU’s mediation role. More recently, scholars have engaged with the local dimension of EU peacebuilding, exploring how local actors and societies in conflict settings perceive and interact with EU peacebuilding efforts (Ejdus and Juncos 2017; Müller and Zahda 2017).

Simultaneously, research has started to engage more systematically with the EU’s specific role as a mediator in conflicts. Bergmann and Niemann (2015) have offered a conceptual framework for analysing the effectiveness of the EU as a conflict mediator, considering factors such as the EU’s leverage and mediation strategy, the coherence of its mediation efforts, as well as factors pertaining to the conflict context. Though recent scholarship has made a welcome, and much overdue, contribution to our theoretical and empirical understanding of the EU’s role as a conflict mediator, its analytical focus has predominantly been limited to cases of direct EU mediation. The concept of proxy-mediation, in turn, shifts attention to the fact that EU conflict mediation often takes place in a complex environment that involves multiple third parties, which provides for indirect and often less visible EU mediation strategies (see Gourlay 2011). In so doing, the concept of proxy-mediation provides a complementary perspective to studies on direct EU mediation, contributing to a richer, and more comprehensive understanding of the EU’s mediation role.

To be sure, the emphasis the concept of proxy-mediation places on the EU’s crowded policy environment – and its interaction with other players - is not entirely new. Notably, it relates to previous research that has explored the EU’s “inter-institutional interaction” with other international and regional organizations present in a particular policy area. A key argument advanced by this line of work is that overlap between the EU and another international and regional organization - in terms of mandate, functions and membership - creates a situation where the presence of other institutions in a given field may impact on the development and/or performance of the EU and vice versa (Oberthür and Stokke 2011). The EU’s interplay with other organizations may create tensions, or even competition and suboptimal policy
outcomes, as it has been illustrated with regard to certain shortcomings in EU crisis management interventions as a result of NATO’s presence in this domain (Hoffmann 2009: 45). At the same time, institutional overlap can also have positive effects in terms of operational division of labour and effective policy coordination (see e.g. Brosig and Motsamai 2014). The interest in the interaction and cooperation between the EU and other organizations is shared by the concept of proxy-mediation. At the same time, proxy-mediation extends beyond situations of EU overlap with other international or regional organizations, as the EU may rely on a number of different types actors as proxies (see below).

3. The Concept of Proxy-Mediation: Drivers, Strategies, and EU-Proxy Relations

As an indirect form of mediation, EU proxy-mediation differs from mediation approaches where the EU directly engages with the parties to a conflict, either by acting as the principal mediator, or by functioning as a co-mediator through collective formats such as “groups of friends”. Simultaneously, it also differs from situations where the EU relies on the services of actors that are part of its institutional system, e.g. by delegating authority to a special EU representative or by making use of EU delegations. Rather, proxy-mediation is concerned with situations where the EU mediates through “others”, i.e. actors that are located outside its immediate institutional control.

Theoretically, the concept of EU proxy-mediation can build on related conceptual arguments from the literature on indirect governance in international politics, whilst also integrating important insights from works on peacebuilding. Among other things, indirect governance in international politics has been studied in terms of “international trusteeship” (Bain 2003; Lake and Fariss 2014); “contracting by states” (Cooley and Spruyt 2009); “public private partnerships” (Reinicke 1998; O’Brian et al. 2000; Börzel and Risse 2005) and, “IO governance through intermediaries” (Abbott et al. 2015). As a form of indirect governance, EU proxy-mediation pursues two main ambitions. First, it aims at empowering intermediaries (proxy
mediators) so that they can effectively address a conflict situation; and, second, it aims at stirring an intermediary in line with the EU’s mediation objectives. The study of EU proxy-mediation thus involves both the analysis of EU mediation support for other actors, including the effectiveness of this support, as well as the analysis of the EU’s relation with proxy mediators.

3.1 Drivers of EU Proxy-mediation: Why to Engage through Intermediaries?

EU proxy-mediation responds to a number of demands placed by contemporary conflict environments that function as drivers of proxy-mediation. Perceived gains in terms of problem solving and legitimacy are a common motive for the decision to opt for indirect governance (see e.g. Cooley and Spruyt 2009: 4; Börzel and Risse 2005), which also applies to proxy-mediation. Importantly, proxy-mediation allows the EU to draw on outside resources provided by proxy-mediators, such as direct access to and leverage over disputants, regional or local knowledge about a conflict situation, or legitimacy as a conflict mediator. Today’s conflicts are often intra-state in nature, take place in areas of limited statehood, where governmental authority is weak and fragmented, and involve a strong local dimension. Here, local mediators – who possess local authority, have access to local networks, and hold local knowledge - may perform key functions in conflict mediation (Mason 2009). For instance, in situations where the EU lacks legitimacy, access, or local knowledge, working through proxy mediators that enjoy trust and credibility within local society can enhance mediation effectiveness. Local mediators may create new entry-points for negotiations, facilitate consensus among key stakeholders, deepen dialogue, and shift the discourse towards peace.

The EU may also opt for proxy-mediation strategies in situations where direct mediation appears too costly, ineffective or simply unfeasible. For instance, direct mediation can expose the EU to criticism of interfering with domestic affairs of host countries, which the EU can deflect by relying on proxies instead. Simultaneously, contemporary conflicts frequently involve “problematic” disputants and stakeholders, such as non-state armed groups or designated terrorist entities. Directly engaging with such actors can pose serious dilemmas for
the EU, such as the risk of legitimizing human rights violators (EEAS 2012). In some instances, the EU may also face legal constraints for engaging directly with disputants. For instance, the EU’s counter terrorism legislation does not permit collaboration with listed terrorist entities, such as the Palestinian Hamas, the military wing of the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Columbian FARC, or the Communist Party of the Philippines. Here, even low intensive direct mediation strategies like facilitation through dialogue and the channelling of information could cause significant problems for the EU with host governments or part of the international Community. Conversely, engaging via proxy mediators may allow the EU to promote its mediation objectives through an inclusive approach that involves all relevant stakeholders, whilst mitigating the risks posed by a direct engagement.

Moreover, the EU may rely on proxy-mediation to escape institutional constrains related to its complex, multi-layered policy-making system (see Abbott et al. 2015: 27). EU coherence - understood as the ‘coordination and substantive agreement between individual member states’ policies towards a conflict, and the mediation activities carried out by EU institutions’ - has been identified as a key condition for effective EU mediation (Bergmann and Niemann 2015). In situations where the EU lacks internal coherence effective mediation becomes very difficult, if not impossible to achieve. Here, proxy-mediation can preserve the EU’s capacity to act even in situations where it finds it difficult to agree on a joint direct involvement. Simultaneously, proxy-mediation can be a strategy to avoid the bureaucratic complexities and administrative constraints of day to day EU foreign policy-making. The reliance on flexible “proxy mediators” with a lean decision-making structure and a capacity to swiftly respond to fast moving conflict developments can be a real asset (see e.g. Müller 2014).

At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that EU proxy-mediation also comes with certain costs and trade-offs. EU mediation is not only linked to specific peacebuilding objectives, but also to efforts to promote the EU’s public profile as an international actor (see e.g. Jett 2013). Evidently, proxy-mediation does not give the EU the kind of public visibility
that is often associated with a direct role in the mediation process. Proxy-mediation is thus not a particular effective strategy to promote the EU’s public profile as an international peacemaker, though it still can earn it the trust and respect of policy insiders. Proxy-mediation, moreover, can easily result in a certain disconnect of the EU from the kind of privileged information and intimate knowledge often enjoyed by mediators that are directly involved in the negotiation process. What is more, proxy-mediation may involve intermediaries that lack committed to the EU’s own mediation objectives and its peacebuilding principles and values, such as the basic principles of international human rights and humanitarian law, transnational justice, or the representation of women in peace processes.

The extent to which the EU is able to ensure that a proxy mediator acts in accordance with its own principles and preferences will depend on both, characteristics of the proxy mediator as well as the arrangement governing the EU’s relationship with the proxy (see below). On the one hand, the EU may be interested to establish a tight control over a proxy mediator, allowing it to inject its own preferences into the mediation process. On the other hand, it is important to be aware that it may not always be desirable for the EU to exercise tight influence and control over proxy mediators, which may conflict with other EU peacebuilding objectives. As the literature on international trusteeship reminds us (e.g. Lake and Fariss 2014: 570), intermediaries that are “loyal” to a trustee may lose legitimacy in the eyes of the people, especially in situations of divergent policy preferences between a trustee and the population. Similarly, proxy mediators that closely pursue an EU sponsored agenda in conflict mediation may lose legitimacy in the eyes of local stakeholders with divergent preferences. Accordingly, empowering local actors as proxy mediators whilst respecting their autonomy can be a more productive strategy than tight control. Notably, strategies that preserve the authority of proxy mediators can make mediation processes more sensitive to local contexts, agencies and communities that can contribute to “bottom-up” peacebuilding dynamics, as demanded by the so-called “local turn” in the peacebuilding literature (Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015; Mac
Ginty and Richmond, 2013). Such an approach is also is more in line with peacebuilding principles embraced by the EU like “local ownership”, which acknowledges the distinct agendas and priorities of local actors. This shows that the key objectives of EU proxy-mediation of “empowering” and “stirring” must not be mutually reinforcing, but may also involve certain tensions and contradictions.

3.2 Strategies of EU Proxy-Mediation: Promoting Peace through Proxies

Mediation can be understood as “a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties’ own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider (whether an individual, an organization, a group, or a state) to change their perceptions or behaviour, and do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law (Bercovitch 1997: 130).” Direct third-party mediation may involve different strategies, with a classic concept distinguishing between “facilitation”, “formulation”, and “manipulation” (Touval and Zartman 1985; see also Beardsley et al. 2006). Through “facilitation” a mediator primarily serves as a channel of communication and information among the parties to a conflict; whilst through “formulation” a mediator formally structures the negotiation process, also offering solutions to promote agreement and compromise. “Manipulation”, in turn, entails the formulation of substantive proposals, whilst incentivizing these solutions by means of coercive measures and/or the provision of benefits. Through such direct mediation strategies a third-party mediator directly engages with the parties to a conflict.

Conversely, “proxy-mediation” constitutes an indirect form of engagement where the EU relies on intermediary actors (“proxy mediators”) to pursue its mediation objectives vis-à-vis the parties to a conflict. Like direct mediation, proxy-mediation may take different forms.

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2 Proponents of the local turn are concerned that peacebuilding by international actors like the EU often relies on top-down policies - based on Northern rationales, and Universalist values like human rights, democratization and marketization - whilst granting only limited room for the inclusion of local perspectives and agency (see Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013).
Specifically, we distinguish between the following strategies: “coordinating”; “enabling”; and “lending leverage”. “Coordination” is a central task to achieve coherence and mediator focus in multi-party negotiation settings, where the EU seeks to coordinate the mediation initiatives and activities of key mediators. In fact, a central challenge of multi-party mediation settings is posed by multiple actors that are working without a common script, a situation that can also be exploited by the parties to a conflict through strategies like “forum shopping” (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001). Coordination may also help to at integrating peace efforts located at different levels (i.e. international, regional, national, and local) into a coherent peacebuilding framework. The EU can rely on its extensive external relations networks and diplomatic skills to facilitate communication, span boundaries, and provide venues to facilitate mediation efforts of others. It can also facilitate a certain hierarchy of mediators, by lending legitimacy and diplomatic support to a particular mediation initiative.

“Enabling”, in turn, is a proxy-mediation strategy through which the EU seeks to strengthen the mediation capacity of others, providing financial support, resources, as well as training and knowhow to a proxy mediator. International organizations, trans-governmental civil society actors and private mediation specialists often require additional financial resources to develop and implement specific mediation initiatives and programmes. Similar, local mediators may possess relevant knowledge about the local context, but lack political mediation skills or the necessary technical infrastructure for effective mediation (UNDP 2014). Here, the EU can rely on its financial instruments and its considerable mediation expertise and technical resources to enable the mediation activities of proxy mediators.

“Lending leverage”, in turn, constitutes a proxy-mediation strategy where the EU uses its leverage over the parties to a conflict in an effort to support the mediation activities of others. Using positive and negative inducements can be essential for moving negotiations forward,

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3 The literature distinguishes between “inside mediators” and “outside mediators” (UNDP 2014). Inside mediators are “credible figures, groups or institutions internal to a conflict, who are able to use their influence to play a role – often largely behind the scenes or in undefined capacities – which directly or indirectly influences the trajectory of conflict in a constructive manner” (UNDP 2014: 8).
but doing so often requires a coordinated effort (Beardsley 2013). Lending EU leverage is closely related to the direct mediation strategy of “manipulation”, only that the EU does not function as the lead mediator that puts forward policy proposals and backs them up through its resources. Rather, the EU lends its support to the initiative of a proxy mediator, offering incentives to induce the parties to a dispute to change their behaviour and attitudes in line with the proposals of other mediators, who may lack sufficient resource on their own. For instance, the UN - which has assumed a prominent profile in conflict resolution around the globe – often depends on the support of its member states to incentivize its mediation efforts.

3.3 The EU-Proxy Relationship: between Delegation and Orchestration

Although the EU, as other international mediators, generally seeks to present itself as a “neutral” mediator, it is also a political actor that has developed its own normative peacebuilding framework and pursues strategic interests in world affairs (Björkdahl 2005; Diez and Pace 2011; Visoka and Doyle 2016). This also suggests an interest on the part of the EU to stir a proxy mediator in line with its own mediation objectives. The relationship between the EU and a proxy mediator is itself subject to negotiation and may take different forms, ranging from loose, informal coordination to contractual relationships. Works on indirect governance in international politics can provide us with helpful conceptual tools to study the EU-proxy mediator relationship. Recent scholarship on governance by international organizations (IOs) provides us with the distinction between the ideal type governance modes of “principal-agent delegation” and “orchestration” (see Abbott et al. 2015).

Principle-agent delegation is a mode of indirect governance where the EU functions as a “principal” that has formal legal control over an “agent” (here a proxy mediator), invests it with authority vis-à-vis target actors, supervises its activities, and can ultimately rescind its authority (Abbott et al. 2015: 9). Orchestration, by contrast, is a mode of indirect governance where the EU functions as an “orchestrator” that needs to illicit the voluntary support of an “intermediary” (here a proxy mediator) over which it has no hard control. These two indirect
forms of IO governance, which in practice often blend into each other, are best understood as extreme points of a continuous scale that marks different degrees of “hardness” of EU control over an intermediary (Abbott et al. 2015: 10). For instance, a proxy mediator over which EU member states have established a relatively hard degree of control is the European Institute of Peace (EIP), which has been established in 2014 and has eight EU member states as well as Switzerland among its founding members (Bergmann 2017). As a “non-profit public-interest foundation” under Belgian law, the EIP is formally separate from the institutional structure of the EU and enjoys considerable operational independence. At the same time, the EIP has been established with the clear purpose of augmenting the Union’s “global peace agenda through mediation and informal dialogue” (EPI 2016). The EIP also depends almost entirely on the funding of its member states, who also supervise its performance. This provides the EU with sufficiently more control over the EIP than it has, for instance, over other international organizations such as UN agencies to which it provides mediation support.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the possibilities for the conceptual analysis of the EU-proxy mediator relationship are not limited to the concepts of orchestration and delegation, which generally shift the focus to the EU’s relation with a specific proxy mediator. Conversely, complex relationships between the EU and multiple “proxy mediators” – as well as related efforts of EU coordination between multiple negotiators – may be productively studied through analytical concepts such as “network governance” (Slaughter 2002) or “network diplomacy” (Heine 2016; Ahtisaari, M. and Rintakoski 2016). This would allow to systematically explore the EU’s role in global mediation networks, whose importance has become increasingly recognized by practitioners and researchers (Piiparinen and Brummer 2012: 12; Neumann 2011).
4. EU Proxy-Mediation in Practice: Building the EU’s Capacity for Supporting Others

Though the academic debate has thus far only paid little attention to the study of EU mediation support, the EU understands proxy-mediation as a central part of its mediation role. In its 2009 “Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacity” the EU emphasized the need for “supporting mediation processes led by other actors” and for “providing financial support to formal, informal and grassroots mediation processes” (Council of the European Union 2009: 6). The EU’s growing emphasis on proxy-mediation is also reflected in efforts to build its institutional capacity for mediation support (Haastrup 2015). Notably, the Mediation Support Team of the European External Action Service (EEAS) has gradually build up networks with international partners such as the UN, regional organization like the OSCE, the African Union, or ASEAN, and relevant NGOs for cooperation in the field of mediation (ECDPM 2012).\footnote{While the EEAS’s Mediation Team provides a hub for expertise and knowledge a series of EU actors may become involved in mediation activities, including the High Representative, EU missions, special representatives as well as heads of EU delegations and missions and their staff. Moreover, the European Parliament has its own Mediation Support Service that may assist mediation initiatives of its members. Finally, EU member states may also engage in mediation initiatives (see Haastrup 2015).} The EU has forged particular close institutional ties with the UN, including through the UN-EU Steering Committee on Crisis Management and the Brussels based UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security (Grossmann and Véríter 2016). To provide mediation support to EU institutions, the Mediation Support Team, furthermore, maintains a roster of more than 70 specialised external experts that can be deployed on short notice.

Simultaneously, the EU has put in place funding instruments through which it can lend its support to the mediation activities of a range of other actors. The EU’s “Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace” (IcSP) serves as a central financial framework for EU mediation support. Through its programs under the IcSP framework, the EU provides financial and technical support to a broad host of actors and their mediation activities, including the UN Mediation Support Unit, transnational NGOs and foundations active in peace mediation, as well as local mediation initiatives (EPLO 2013). For the period 2014-2020,
EU support under the IcSP framework for security initiatives and peace-building activities have thus far covered 250 projects in 70 countries with a total budget of 2.3 billion Euro (European Commission 2017a). These numbers indicate that mediation support has developed into a central element of the EU’s toolkit for peacebuilding, with the EU actively providing mediation support in a number of conflict theatres around the world.

In the remainder of this section we focus on EU proxy-mediation in the conflict in Libya. The complex, multi-level crisis in Libya constitutes a key challenge for the EU’s stability interests in the region (Mühlberger and Müller 2016), whilst posing many of the characteristics that call for proxy-mediation strategies. After a brief overview of the conflict situation in Libya, we will briefly illustrate the way the EU has empowered the mediation efforts of other actors through “coordinating”; “enabling”; and “lending leverage”. Accordingly, the focus of our empirical case study is on the empowering aspect of proxy-mediation, rather than on the EU’s efforts to stir proxy mediators.

4.1 The Conflict Situation in Libya: Multi-Party Mediation in a Complex Conflict Environment

Addressing the multi-level conflict in Libya has been a major challenge for international mediation efforts. The inability of Libya’s National Transition Council (NTC) to achieve a successful transition after the fall of the Qadhafi regime has led to the eruption of a second civil war (2014-16). The main rival camps in the conflict have been the democratically elected and internationally recognized government of the House of Representatives, also known as the Tobruk government, and a rival government in Tripoli endorsed by the General National Congress, composed of key parties that had lost Libya’s 2014 elections. Both governments were backed by their own military blocs, commonly referred to as the Dignity bloc (House of Representatives) and Dawn bloc (General National Congress). Yet, from the outset Libya’s civil war has been more complicated than a confrontation of two rival blocs, each with its own government and parliament (Washington Post 2015). Rather, Libya has been facing a multitude of small-scale conflicts across the countries, which involve local militias and a
variety of jihadi groups with a high degree of autonomy from the main political and military coalitions at the national level. At the same time, regional countries like Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Sudan and Turkey provide backing to their preferred Libyan clients in the conflict, whilst international actors like Russia also maintain an active interest.

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has established itself as the lead mediator at the peace process at the national level (Collombier 2016), though a number of actors provide mediation services and intervene politically. Following the eruption of Libya’s second civil war, UNSMIL mediation efforts aimed at the formation of a national unity government to address the institutional crisis at the national level, as well as a ceasefire and confidence building measures involving the major rival factions. In December 2015, negotiations produced the Libyan Political Agreement, in which the rival political camps in Tripoli, Tobruk and elsewhere in the country agreed on the formation of a Government of National Accord. The agreement was unanimously endorsed by the UN Security Council, which recognized the Government of National Accord as Libya’s sole legitimate executive authority (UNSC 2015). However, since early 2016 the conflict between the Libyan House of Representatives and the General National Congress has again intensified, with the former withdrawing its support of the Government of National Accord in summer 2016.

At the same time, the fragmented conflict situation in Libya has been marked by rapidly shifting alliances and entails a strong local dimension, where in many areas elders, tribal leaders and notables hold legitimacy and influence on the ground (McGregor 2015). The high degree of political and territorial fragmentation in Libya and the importance of regional tribal cleavages has given rise to the view that the inclusion of local actors is also central for the success of peacebuilding at the national level, not least to secure the implementation and sustainability of agreements between rival factions (Collombier 2016: 31). At the same time, military confrontation involving armed groups that respond to leaders from local communities and cities by themselves constitute a major factor of insecurity and have caused severe hardship and humanitarian crises. This has spurred local mediation efforts on the part of the UN, as well as of other international and transnational actors involved in peacebuilding,
to also address conflict dynamics in communities and towns. Local actors from civil society have also taken matters in their own hands, entering into dialogue and negotiations to resolve conflicts and crisis that impacted on the daily lives in their local communities.

The complexity of mediation efforts in Libya is further compounded by a multitude of external actors that intervene in the mediation process. While the UN has assumed a prominent role as a lead mediator at the national level, the conflict is also addressed through other actors acting on their own as well as in support of the UN. The Libya Quartet - composed of the African Union (AU), the EU, the League of Arab States (LAS), and the UN - coordinates the positions of its members on the peace process in Libya. The EU first participated in the Quartet in March 2017, with the other members previously meeting as Troika. The Quartet supports the lead mediation role of the UN, which is represented by its Special Representative for Libya who also heads the UNSMIL mission. At the same time, individual participants of the Quartet also are actively involved in their own mediation activities. The AU has established a “High Level Committee on Libya” that meets regularly and the AU’s Special Representative for Libya actively engages with key Libyan and international stakeholders. At the same time, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Egypt, Niger, Chad, and Sudan have established the Mechanism of Libya’s neighbours, through which they routinely consult at the level of foreign ministers (The Arab Weekly 2017). As neighbours they are not only directly affected by the crisis in Libya, but they also have close ties with key actors in Libya.

4.2 The EU’s Mediation Role in Libya: Coordination, Enabling and Lending Leverage

While the EU has not assumed a prominent profile as a direct mediator in Libya, it has actively engaged in proxy-mediation activities, providing mediation support to a variety of actors at the regional, national and local levels. An important element of the EU’s support has been the “coordination” of the UN led peace efforts in Libya at the national level. In its declarations on Libya, the EU routinely expresses its support for UNSMIL’s mediation
activities, recognizing the UN’s leading role in mediating in the political process at the national level. Given the diplomatic weight of the EU, its support for UNSMIL as the principle international framework for facilitating the process for a political settlement in Libya is important for maintaining a mediator focus in this multiple actor negotiation setting.

Since the establishment of the Libyan Political Agreement, the EU has been working closely with UNSMIL to facilitate the implementation of the agreement, supporting mediation efforts to bring the relevant parties into the agreement (EEAS 2017b). At the same time, the EU has also worked towards a unified international and regional approach vis-à-vis the peace process in Libya, including EU coordination efforts with the League of Arab States, the African Union, and the UN through the framework of the Libya Quartet. The EU first participated in the Libya Quartet in March 2017, with the other members previously meeting as Troika. The invitation by the other members for the EU to join the Quartet testifies of their recognition of the EU’s role in the international peacebuilding diplomacy. In May 2017, the EU hosted the second meeting of the Quartet in Brussels, providing a venue for international coordination. The Quartet’s meeting in Brussels, as its previous meeting in Cairo in March 2017, concluded with a joint communiqué in which the members of the Quartet presented their coordinated position on several substantive issues. In its Brussels Communiqué, the Quartet expressed, inter alia, its continued support for the Libyan Political Agreement, the rejection of foreign military intervention, the support of the Government of National Accord, as well as its support for UN leadership in facilitating amendments to the Libyan Political Agreement (Libya Quartet 2017).

Besides assuming an active coordination role, the EU has also “lent its leverage” to back up UN mediation initiatives. Notably, the EU has been giving targeted financial and technical support to those actors in Libya that have gained international recognition by the UN and support the UN-led political process. The EU’s bilateral support to Libya currently amounts to 120 million Euro, which goes to six sectors: civil society, governance, health, youth and
education, migration and protection, and support of the political process, security and mediation (EEAS 2017b). Together with individual EU members states the EU is also the main contributor to the so-called Stabilisation Facility for Libya (SFL), which involves 12 international donors that have pledged about 28 million Euro (USAID 2017). Besides promoting development objectives, the Stabilization Facility for Libya also aims at strengthening the political authority of the Libyan Government of National Accord. Among other things, it promotes tangible “quick wins” through projects at the local level that restore basic public services and infrastructure. In addition to positive measures in support of actors that support the UN-led political process, the EU has also supported the implementation of a number of restrictive measures that have been issued by the UN Security Council (UNSC 2016) against leading Libyan political opponents against the political agreement.

Simultaneously, the EU has also sought to enable the UNSMIL as the lead mediator through technical and financial support. Among other things, the EU has offered technical support to UNSMIL through the security related planning and intelligence capacity of its Liaison and Planning Cell (EULPC) (EEAS 2017b). Simultaneously, the EU also has provided technical and financial support to the mediation activities of the UN’s Development Programme (UNDP) as well as to a series of transnational actors, who engage in peace initiatives at the local level. Addressing the local conflict dimension, the EU has been operating 12 peacebuilding projects in Libya with a volume of over 29 million Euro since 2014 through its “Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace” (IcSP) (European Commission 2017b). Five of these projects have a specific focus on mediation support. Besides UNDP, these projects are implemented by the transnational actors “Promediation”, the “Peaceful Change Initiative”, and the “Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue” (European Commission 2017c). These actors often maintain a permanent presence inside Libya and have strong local networks and expertise, which allows them to provide mediation services in this demanding and volatile context. This has been important for the EU, whose delegation to Libya was temporarily relocated to Tunis following the outbreak of violence in 2014.
Table 1: EU Support for Mediation Projects through the IcSP (European Commission 2017c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title and Duration</th>
<th>Implementing Partner and EU Funding</th>
<th>Type of Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supporting the Libyan Mediation Process (Jan. 2015-May 2018)</td>
<td>Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) (2 Million Euros)</td>
<td>HD works with Libyan mediators and tribal and religious leaders to resolve regional conflicts. It also aims at linking local mediation with the political process at the national level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for a more inclusive peace process in Libya (Jan. 2017-July 2018)</td>
<td>Promediation (797,112 Euro)</td>
<td>Mediation in conflicts affecting the local communities of the Amazigh, Tuareg and Tebu. Foster cooperation between local leaders, reduce tensions and risks of conflict at the local level. Better inclusion of local actors in peace and stability process in Libya, support for outreach activities of local parties towards international communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilization Facility for Libya – towards recovery and peace (Jan. 2017-July 2018)</td>
<td>UNDP (5 Million Euro)</td>
<td>Quick recovery of vital sectors such as municipal functions, health and education to ensure survival of whole communities in Benghazi, Kikla and Obari, assessments of people’s needs in Sirte and Sebha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Leadership in Conflict Management During the Political Transition in Libya (Jan. 2015-May 2017)</td>
<td>Peaceful Change Initiative (1.12 Million Euro)</td>
<td>Strengthening the capacity of local leaders to manage conflict, reduce tensions within and between communities, as well as contributing to laying the foundations for a political settlement at the national level. Covers several municipal areas, including Al Bayda, Aubari, Bani Walid, Benghazi, Marzouk, Nalut, Tiji, Sabratha, Al-Sahel and Suq-al-Juma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate Assistance to the Libyan Political Dialogue and Government of National Accord (April 2015-Oct. 2016)</td>
<td>UNDP (3,88 million Euro)</td>
<td>Provide a safe and neutral platform for political dialogue, strengthen the capacities of the Government of National Accord (GNA) to respond to immediate public priorities, ensure greater capacity of GNA to communicate successes and maintain public support.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Though on the whole the conflict situation in Libya has remained volatile, some of the EU’s proxy-mediation activities at the local level have facilitated some notable progress. The role of the EU in the context of the mediation activities of “Promediation” is a good case in point. Promediation is a Paris based non-governmental organization that has been involved in local mediation activities in Libya since late 2014. It first mediated in Libya on request of the parties to a local conflict in the town of Awbari, situated in Libya’s southwestern region of Fezzan. The conflict involves the Tuaregs and Tebus, two communities who play an important role for the stability of Southern Libya. Following a first meeting between Tebu and Touareg representatives in Tunis, the EU sponsored European Institute of Peace hosted a second meeting with both parties in Brussels end of July 2015. At the meeting mediated by Promediation, it was agreed to continue negotiations in Libya and work together for peace (European Institute of Peace 2017). In December 2015 the disputants finally agreed on a cease-fire, facilitating the removal of checkpoints and an exchange of prisoners. Subsequently, the European Institute of Peace also assisted efforts by Promediation to create a better awareness on the part of international peacebuilders about the capacities of local actors in supporting Libya’s stabilization process. To facilitate greater inclusion of local actors, the European Institute of Peace jointly hosted a conference with Promediation in Brussels in November 2016 to initiate a dialogue between local Libyan actors and the international community. This shows that EU proxy-mediation not only aimed at supporting mediation efforts at various levels (international, national, local), but also sought to better link and integrate these efforts into a coherent, multi-level strategy.

5. Conclusion

Supporting the mediation activities of other actors constitutes an important, yet under researched aspect of the EU’s mediation role. Developing the concept of EU proxy-mediation, this paper shed light on the way the EU enlists the support of others in pursuit of its mediation objectives in Libya. Importantly, proxy-mediation has been a strategy to cope with
a multi-party mediation environment in Libya, where the UN has established itself as the lead mediator whilst other international mediators such as the League of Arab States, the African Union, and Libya’s neighbours also undertake mediation initiatives. At the same time, the complex, multi-level conflict in Libya is marked by considerable political and territorial fragmentation and requires mediation initiatives to address conflicts at various levels, including numerous local disputes. The local conflict dimension has posed particular challenges to the EU, including problems of access as well as a lack of local knowledge and legitimacy. In dealing with these multiple challenges the EU has relied on valuable resources of a range of intermediaries, including transnational actors with a presence in Libya.

Our empirical analysis has shown that the EU has employed different proxy-mediation strategies to provide support to third-party mediators in Libya, encompassing the coordination of mediation activities, the enabling of third-party mediators through financial and technical support, as well as lending leverage to incentivize mediation initiatives of others. Through these different proxy-mediation strategies the EU has addressed both, the national dimension of the Libyan conflict as well as local conflict dynamics. While the conflict situation at the national level has remained volatile even after the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement, EU sponsored mediation initiatives at the local level – such as the mediation efforts of the NGO Promediation between the Tebu and Touareg tribes – have produced some notable progress. This shows that the EU’s mediation support for others can be an effective way to facilitate progress towards peace, even in situations where the EU itself does not engage in substantive direct mediation efforts. To derive at a more comprehensive understanding of the EU’s mediation role, it thus seems important to engage in further efforts towards conceptualizing the EU’s role and effectiveness in providing mediation support to others and studying it empirically.

A more comprehensive understanding of the EU’s mediation role - that transcends the literature’s dominant focus on direct EU mediation – can also be considered to be of considerable interest from a policy perspective. In addition to producing policy relevant
insights that can help the EU to optimize its mediation support, a systematic analysis of EU mediation support can also help the EU to better manage expectations related to its role as an international mediator. As noted above, direct EU mediation is generally considered well suited to promote the EU’s public profile as an active international mediator, which can generate demands for an active EU role. Yet, as argued in this paper not every conflict context is equally conductive for direct EU mediation efforts and, for itself, the search for prestige is generally considered ill-guidance for opting for a direct mediation role (see Jett 2013: 110). Accordingly, directing attention to proxy-mediation is important to facilitate a more informed policy debate about the prospects of EU mediation and the available policy tools and strategies.

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