Applying the Concept of Europeanization to the Study of Foreign Policy: Dimensions and Mechanisms

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Abstract

Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in applying the Europeanization concept to the study of foreign policy. Discussing how foreign policy Europeanization relates to Europeanization research in other areas of EU governance as well as to traditional approaches from the International Relations discipline, we examine the added value of studying foreign policy through the lens of Europeanization. As there is by now a considerable diversity of explanations for EU-induced changes of the national foreign policies of EU Member States, we propose important conceptual refinements, providing a clear distinction between the dimensions of Europeanization, their respective outcomes and particularly the mechanisms that drive Europeanization in these different dimensions. Overall, this working paper illustrates that Europeanization research addresses important shortcomings of International Relations approaches dominant in the field of European foreign policy analysis. By focusing on the interplay of “top-down” and “bottom-up” dynamics between the EU and national levels, which have been previously considered as isolated phenomena, the Europeanization concept contributes to a better understanding of the complex nature of European foreign policy-making.

Keywords: Europeanization, Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Security and Defence Policy, CFSP, ESDP, International Relations, expert committees, socialization, national interest, political science

General note:

Opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Institute.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Europeanization research has been described as one of the growth industries in European studies. Initially developed to examine the consequences of integration in the communitarized first pillar of the European Union (EU) on Member States, recent years have witnessed a growing interest in applying the concept of Europeanization to the study of foreign policy (Major 2005; Miskimmon 2007; Vaquer i Fanés 2001; Wong 2005, 2007). However, as many Europeanization scholars have tended to customize theoretical frameworks, rather than employ and refine established frameworks, there is by now a considerable diversity of explanations for EU-induced changes of the national foreign policies of EU Member States. Moreover, previous conceptualizations of the Europeanization of foreign policy do not offer a clear distinction between the dimensions of Europeanization, their respective outcomes and the mechanisms that drive Europeanization, nor do they provide a clear understanding of how the Europeanization of foreign policy actually works.

In this working paper we review the growing Europeanization literature in the foreign policy realm and put forward important refinements for the conceptualization of the Europeanization of foreign policy. At the outset we discuss how Europeanization research in the area of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) relates to first pillar Europeanization studies, as well as to ‘traditional’, state-centric theoretical approaches to foreign policy analysis. In doing so, this working paper also aims to clarify the added value of studying foreign policy through the lens of Europeanization. We illustrate that research on the Europeanization of foreign policy incorporates mechanisms from different theoretical approaches from the field of International Relations (IR) in a single analytical framework, which allows to better capture the complex interactions between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ dynamics in European foreign policy-making.

Subsequently, we turn to the two key dimensions of the Europeanization of foreign policy: the uploading of national foreign policy preferences to the EU level (also called bottom-up Europeanization) and the downloading of policy models and ideas from the CFSP to the national level (also referred to as top-down Europeanization). Europeanization in these two key dimensions may lead to two different basic outcomes: the projection of national policy preferences and ideas onto the EU level, and the adaptation of national foreign policy to EU stimuli and pressures.

As a next step, we present policy learning and socialization as the key mechanisms that drive the Europeanization of foreign policy. The emergence of common EU foreign policy norms and processes of elite socialization in CFSP institutions has significantly altered the environment in which EU foreign policy is made, and affects Europeanization in both its bottom-up and its top-down dimensions. Concerning the bottom-up dimension of
Europeanization, we argue that the consensus-oriented decision-making culture in the CFSP encourages uploading strategies such as the strategic utilization of norm-based arguments or normative suasion. By moving from a bargaining to an arguing style of decision-making, the Member States have enhanced their ability to reach agreement.

At the same time, policy learning and socialization in CFSP institutions has led to the adaptation of national foreign policy or even long-term changes in national preferences (top-down Europeanization). EU adaptation can thus take place even in the absence of formal enforcement mechanisms and despite conflicting initial policy preferences of Member States. A further differentiation can be made here, depending on the ‘quality’ of socialization: socialization may be strategic when the actors adhere to EU norms and rules for reasons of reputation-building and long-term gains, or the actors may internalize CFSP norms and rules so that their national identities and preferences are also affected – which would suggest a more profound impact of socialization.

In conclusion, we summarize the main findings of the working paper, identify promising avenues for further investigation and highlight the added value of a refined Europeanization concept, as well as important pitfalls and risks associated with research on the Europeanization of foreign policy.
2. REVIEWING EUROPEANIZATION

Concepts of Europeanization were first applied to the realm of the EU’s first pillar, where the progress of European integration has been most profound. As the body of Europeanization literature has expanded substantially over the last two decades, the study of Europeanization has matured at the empirical, conceptual and theoretical levels, and has moved beyond what Johan P. Olsen (2002: 921) called an “attention-directing device”.

2.1. Defining Europeanization

There has been an extensive debate on how Europeanization should be defined and conceptualized and how it should be delimited from other concepts, such as European integration or policy convergence. In early works, Europeanization was generally understood as the “emergence and development at the European level of distinctive structures of governance” (Green Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001), which result from the process of European integration. Europeanization thus described a ‘bottom-up’ process that starts at the level of Member States and results in changes at the European level.

Since the late 1990s, however, scholars have become increasingly interested in the effects of European integration and institution-building on Member States and the ways in which EU states are adapting to Europe (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008). These studies understood Europeanization as a ‘top-down’ process, whereby stimuli and commitments that emerge from the EU level produce changes of various aspects at the national level.

Central to the understanding of top-down Europeanization is the ‘goodness-of-fit’ argument, which posits that the degree of compatibility of EU and Member State arrangements is a central factor determining changes in domestic polity, policies and politics (Green Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001). The ‘goodness of fit’ argument, which has become increasingly disputed in recent contributions to the Europeanization literature (Dunia 2007; Mastenbroek 2005), seeks to account for the adaptation of Member States’ policies in response to EU pressure and in compliance with EU requirements. Most scholars assumed that a ‘misfit’ between the EU and Member State levels leads to adaptation pressures that trigger domestic change.

Research on Europeanization also examines ways to conceptually link the bottom-up and top-down dimensions of Europeanization, which are interconnected in the real world (Radaelli 2000). In this view, Member States adapt to Europe and simultaneously seek to actively shape developments at the EU level. According to Bulmer and Burch (2000: 4):
“European integration is not just ‘out there’ as some kind of independent variable; it is itself to a significant degree the product of member governments’ wishes. Given that the European Union has its own organisational logic, it is necessary for national political actors […] to accommodate some of that logic if the opportunities afforded by the EU are to be exploited.”

Drawing on evidence from the field of EU environmental policy-making, Tanja Börzel (2002) has shown that Member States may respond to top-down pressures of Europeanization by making proactive attempts to export their own policy preferences to the EU level. Through this so-called ‘uploading’ of national preferences to the EU level – in contrast to ‘downloading’, which refers to the reception of EU policies at the national level – EU Member States seek to shape EU policies by which they are subsequently affected.

Although Europeanization research advanced at the conceptual and explanatory-theoretical level, there continues to be a lively debate on how best to account for domestic responses to the integration process (Bulmer 2007). Europeanization is not a theory, but rather a conceptual framework that draws on a range of theoretical and explanatory schemes that emphasize different mechanisms that produce change at the domestic and EU levels.

In addition, research on Europeanization faces important methodological challenges, most notably the problem of equifinality – that is, scholars must differentiate between domestic changes resulting from Europeanization and changes caused by other phenomena in both the international and domestic spheres of EU Member States. There might be other developments against which the impact of the CFSP has to be checked, such as changes in the structure of the international system (e.g. the end of the Cold War), international political events of great significance or changes in governments. To deal with these challenges, different research strategies such as process tracing, comparative case study designs, triangulation and counterfactual reasoning have been suggested (Major 2005; Mendez, Wishlade, and Yuill 2008).

Finally, it seems important to caution against the risk of overstating the EU’s impact on national foreign policy. The Europeanization of foreign policy might be reversible, and there might not be a complete convergence of foreign policies; there may also be processes of ‘de-Europeanization’ or ‘renationalization’. For example, EU Member States may fall back on their own resources and individual strategies during political crises or in the context of changes in governments if domestic actors who oppose EU-inspired changes are empowered.
2.2. No ‘One Size Fits All’-Europeanization Concept

In contrast to policy fields in the EU’s first pillar, foreign policy has not been extensively studied through the lens of Europeanization for a long time (e.g. Green Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001). This can be attributed, among other things, to the distinctive character of the CFSP as compared to the policy fields in the EU’s first pillar.

White (1999: 37) has pointed out that European foreign policy comprises three different levels of activity: first, the supranational external relations of the European Community (EC) as the EU’s first pillar; second, the CFSP as the foreign policy of the EU on an intergovernmental basis, which constitutes the second pillar in the architecture of the EU; third, the national foreign policies of Member States. Though bearing in mind that these three levels are increasingly interwoven, the focus of this working paper is on the question of how far the national foreign policies of EU Member States have been adapted or transformed because of the CFSP, which is seen as the political and diplomatic core of European foreign policy (Wagner 2002: 17).

European Political Cooperation (EPC) – the forerunner of the CFSP – was originally created as an informal, non-binding forum for discussion outside the EC system, and supranational institutions played hardly any role in this sphere. The strongly intergovernmental character and comparatively weak institutionalization of EPC, and later of the CFSP, led scholars to suspect a “limited impact [of EPC/CFSP] on domestic policy choices” (Hix and Goetz 2000: 6). Consequently, Europeanization was expected to be less likely to occur and its effects to be much weaker and more difficult to trace than in policy fields in the EU’s first pillar, where substantial competences had been transferred to the supranational EU level.

However, more recent works have shown that the distinction between ‘first pillar’ and ‘second pillar’ Europeanization can easily be misleading, as the dynamics of Europeanization also seem to differ in policy areas found in the EU’s first pillar. Simon Bulmer and Claudio Radaelli (2004) distinguish between four main patterns of governance in the EU – i.e. governance by negotiation, governance by hierarchy in terms of positive and negative integration, and facilitated coordination – arguing that different factors explain Europeanization outcomes for each of these patterns.²

Conceptualizations of the Europeanization of foreign policy thus have to account for the fact that the Europeanization dynamics in this policy field differ from dynamics in other policy areas. Very importantly, the ‘goodness of fit’ explanation of Europeanization is not as suitable

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² Foreign policy – just as police coordination and the various policy fields governed by the Open Method of Coordination – falls under the pattern of facilitated coordination. Here, policy processes are not subject to European law, the powers of supranational actors (i.e. the Commission and the European Court of Justice) are weak and decisions are taken by unanimity.
for the field of foreign policy as it is for policy fields marked by hierarchical governance. In foreign policy, there is usually no “clear, vertical chain-of-command, in which EU policy descends from Brussels into the Member States” (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004: 9). Member States cannot be coerced by ‘convergence criteria’ or anything of the like into following a common line. Rather, Member States themselves – usually by consensus – shape the decisions they are affected by afterwards (esp. see Kohler-Koch 2000) and there are no ‘robust’ compliance mechanisms through which Member States’ governments could be pressured to conform to EU foreign policy objectives and positions. It therefore can be assumed that the level of adaptational pressure in foreign policy will not match the level of pressure in other policy fields, where policy templates are made on the EU level and supranational actors like the European Commission play an important role. This is not to say, however, that the Europeanization dynamics in the foreign policy field are insignificant; Rather, it is assumed that Europeanization follows no single ‘logic’ across the various EU policy areas and that, in the realm of foreign policy, it takes place on a more voluntary and non-hierarchical basis (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004: 7).

Although the EU promotes general principles of political order such as democracy and human rights also outside of Europe (Schimmelfennig 2007) the domestic effects of European integration beyond the group of actual and prospective EU Member States will not be dealt with in this working paper. In the absence of the membership incentive and conditionality, the mechanisms of such Europeanization beyond Europe can be expected to be significantly different from those of Europeanization with regard to the group of actual and prospective EU members. Moreover, the focus of this working paper will be on the Europeanization of policy – that is, on changes of the substance, priorities and objectives of national foreign policy in response to Europe, rather than on the Europeanization of politics and polity. However, an absolutely sharp separation is not always possible or useful as these theoretical political dimensions are often interconnected in practice. Thus, institutional changes as well as changes to the policy-making process in the field of foreign policy will be discussed, where appropriate and relevant.

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3 Töller makes a point that, in examining the Europeanization of national policies, one should not only focus on the effects of particular European policies and their implementation on the national level, but rather “work with a broader notion of European ‘impulses’ that may impact on national policy making” (Töller 2004: 3).
3. Europeanization vs. ‘Traditional’ Foreign Policy Analysis – The Added Value of the Europeanization Approach

Traditionally, the field of (European) foreign policy analysis has been dominated by realist (Mearsheimer 1994/95; Waltz 2000) and liberal intergovernmentalist approaches (Hoffmann 2000) from the discipline of International Relations. These approaches understand states as the central actors in international affairs that seek to maximize their self-regarding utility and which define their foreign policy preferences independent of institutions. From a realist perspective, states act together – for example within the EU and the CFSP – in order to enhance their chances of survival in an anarchical environment; international institutions are not expected to affect the fundamental goals that states pursue. While liberal intergovernmentalism also takes into account the role of domestic politics in the formation of interests (esp. see Moravcsik 1993; 1998), this approach still assumes that “[t]he EU will only adopt a true CFSP when a consensus exists among the EU states that CFSP is in their interests” (Ginsberg 2001: 34). In this view, EU foreign policy negotiations represent a bargaining process that results in a policy at the level of the lowest common denominator of Member States’ interests.

This focus on ‘one-shot’ bargaining situations, however, led to a neglect of the long-term historical perspective that provides a different picture. In fact, since the establishment of European foreign policy cooperation in the early 1970s, Member States have made continuous efforts to strengthen the institutional structures of the EPC/CFSP. A particularly important finding was that, despite the prevailing principle of unanimity for decision-making in this field, the CFSP did not always represent the lowest common denominator of the positions of Member States, but often converged around a point of view that represented an intermediate position between the positions of individual Member States (e.g. Nuttall 1992: 12). Several observers further noted a shared basic commitment and belief in joint policy-making as “EU states have increasingly learned to define many, though certainly not all, of their policy positions in terms of collectively determined values and goals” (Smith, M.E. 2004b: 99).

Against this background, the intergovernmental approaches that traditionally dominated the field of foreign policy analysis no longer seemed sufficient for capturing the uniqueness and complexity of the realm of European foreign policy. Very importantly, these approaches failed to account for the influence of the EU on the foreign policies of Member States. It became clear that European foreign policy presented a new challenge to traditional foreign policy analysis (esp. see White 1999). Important aspects of European foreign policy cooperation, particularly its ‘top-down’ influence on national foreign policy, could rather be explained by

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4 In this view, institutions are primarily seen as a bargaining arena for nationally defined state interests, and decisions are assumed to be based on lowest common denominator deals.
new institutionalist approaches (Smith, M.E. 2004a). The sociological variant of new institutionalism in particular – which has enjoyed a growing popularity following the so-called “constructivist turn” (Checkel 1998) in IR theory in the early 1990s – was increasingly applied to the study of European foreign policy (Tonra 1999; 2001; Smith, M.E. 2004b). In contrast to the intergovernmentalist perspective, sociological institutionalism understands institutions as constitutive forces that shape and change the interests and identities of its members.5

However, scholars of European foreign policy became increasingly discontent with the fact that both the intergovernmental and the (sociological) institutionalist perspective could capture only part of the reality of European foreign policy. While the former can explain the essentially intergovernmental structure of EPC/CFSP, the latter can grasp the evolution of the written and particularly the unwritten norms and rules within EPC/CFSP. But neither of these approaches alone was able to account for the complex interplay between top-down and bottom-up dynamics in European foreign policy-making. The concept of Europeanization has been able to contribute to filling the gap in this regard, as it facilitates the integration of arguments rooted in different theoretical perspectives in an explanatory framework – which seems essential for grasping the reality of European foreign policy.

Such an ‘integrative’ approach is not without problems, however, as International Relations scholars have tended to focus on meta-theoretical debates surrounding the philosophy of social sciences and the ontological disputes between rationalism and social constructivism. And Europeanization scholars themselves have not been immune to becoming entangled in such meta-theoretical debates (see Tonra 1999). It would go clearly beyond the scope of this working paper to deal in more depth with the issue of the meta-theoretical consistency of different theoretical perspectives. It thus must suffice here to point out that several scholars of EU studies have chosen a ‘pragmatic’ approach, developing analytical frameworks that incorporate both the rationalist and the social constructivist perspective to better capture the complex reality of European policy-making (e.g. Checkel 1999; Jupille/Caporaso/Checkel 2003).

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5 The rationalist and constructivist paradigms are based on different ontological assumptions. Whereas rationalism assumes an individualist ontology, social constructivism assumes a holist ontology, in which parts exist only in relation to wholes, and stresses the social constructedness of reality.
4. EUROPEANIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY – DIMENSIONS, MECHANISMS AND OUTCOMES

There is a growing consensus among scholars working in the realm of European foreign policy that Europeanization is best understood as an interactive process of change linking the national and EU levels (Juncos and Pomorska 2006; Major 2005; Wong 2006, 2007). The distinction between the bottom-up and top-down dimensions of Europeanization, which is well established in Europeanization research, has been picked up in the literature on European foreign policy, and two distinct dimensions of Europeanization in particular have been identified: (a) the uploading of national foreign policy preferences to the European level and (b) the downloading of EU foreign policy to the national level (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005, Wong 2005, 2006, Major and Pomorska 2005).  

However, further clarification is required with regard to how the different processes of foreign policy Europeanization work and what mechanisms drive Europeanization (Miskimmon 2007). Previous conceptualizations of the Europeanization of foreign policy do not provide a clear distinction between the dimensions of Europeanization (uploading/bottom-up and downloading/top-down), the mechanisms that drive Europeanization, and the respective outcomes (which can be grouped into policy projection and policy adaptation) (see Table 1). Addressing this research deficit, this section provides a refined conceptualization of the Europeanization of foreign policy.

Table 1: Dimensions, Mechanisms and Outcomes of the Europeanization of Foreign Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>Outcomes/Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uploading/Bottom-Up</td>
<td>Socialization</td>
<td>Policy Projection - projection of national policy preferences, policy models and ideas onto the EU level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member States seek to influence EU foreign policy and the foreign policies of other Member States</td>
<td></td>
<td>Policy Adaptation - increasing salience of the European political agenda, adherence to common EU objectives, norms and values, common policy outputs taking priority over national ‘domaines réservés’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downloading/Top-Down</td>
<td>Socialization/Learning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member States are subject to influences and stimuli from the EU and other Member States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Given the specific nature of the CFSP, some authors have also referred to ‘crossloading’ as a further dimension of foreign policy Europeanization, emphasizing that changes may not only be due to the EU but may also occur within it (e.g. Major and Pomorska 2005; Wong 2007). However, as in this paper the horizontal interactions and exchanges of ideas, norms and ‘ways of doing things’ between Member States within the framework of the CFSP are also captured by the notion of Europeanization as ‘uploading’, this paper content itself with distinguishing two basic dimensions of the Europeanization of foreign policy.
4.1. The Uploading Dimension of Europeanization

The uploading dimension of Europeanization relates to the construction of European foreign policy. The outcome of Europeanization here is the projection of national foreign policy preferences (ideas and policy templates) onto the EU level. From the perspective of rationalist institutionalism, European foreign policy cooperation can be understood as an important instrument that allows Member States to pursue their national interests more effectively. Through the pooling of joint resources, European foreign policy cooperation results in a ‘politics of scale effect’ (Ginsberg 1989), which increases the influence and leverage of EU governments in world affairs. This provides an incentive for Member States to ‘Europeanize’ their foreign policy priorities and policy styles by projecting them onto the EU level. Diplomats of smaller Member States like Denmark or Ireland have stated that they value the greater influence, higher profile and stronger voice that EU membership offers them (Tonra 2000b). The projection of national preferences is also particularly attractive when Member States pursue goals that they cannot attain through unilateral action. It has, for instance, been argued that France understands European integration and foreign policy cooperation as the solution to its decline in power and status in the post-Cold War era, and as a means to preserve the nation’s ‘Frenchness’ in an increasingly globalized world (Blunden 2000; Lefebvre 2004).

European foreign policy furthermore allows Member States to pursue national objectives at lower costs and with fewer risks. Member States can use the “shield effect” (Tonra 2000b) offered by European foreign policy cooperation to reduce the costs of pursuing a controversial policy such as political or economic sanctions towards a third country. Very importantly, Member States can externalize national foreign policy problems to the EU level. Greece, for example, has successfully transferred important foreign policy problems to the EU level, such as the resolution of its Aegean dispute with Turkey (Economides 2005). At the end of the 1990s, Greece lifted its objections to Turkish EU membership and successfully encouraged its EU partners to lay down far-reaching conditions for Turkey’s accession, which included a specific reference to attempting to resolve the Aegean dispute within a clear timeframe. A similar observation of France has been made in the realm of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), where French foreign policy-makers sought to commit their European partners to EU interventions in sub-Saharan Africa, such as in Congo and Chad (Menon 2009).

National projection can also be used as a strategy to manage adaptation pressures stemming from CFSP participation. In a study on the Europeanization of German foreign policy, Alister

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7 This has raised concerns in other EU Member States, however, that France seeks to hide its own policies behind the EU, attempting to transfer the burden of stabilizing the French sphere of interest in Africa onto the EU level (Menon 2009).
Miskimmon (2007) argued that German foreign policy-makers were influencing the development of the CFSP to mirror their own national preferences in order to keep adaptation pressures within clear bounds. This indicates that top-down and bottom-up dynamics in European foreign policy-making are linked in practice and highlights the need for an analytical framework that can capture these complex interactions.

The shaping of EU foreign policy in accordance with national foreign policy preferences ideally results in other Member States' adoption of the projected policies. However, several Member States will often inject their foreign policy preferences into EU-level negotiations. In such a situation, intergovernmental IR approaches assume that the unanimity principle in CFSP decision-making would favour a policy outcome that represents the lowest common denominator of Member States' preferences. If there is leeway in the negotiations, in a setting that is governed by instrumental rationality and where power is defined in material terms, the largest states – i.e. France, Germany and the UK – usually have the most influence over the outcome.

It has been argued, however, that the institutionalization of European foreign policy cooperation and the emergence of common norms and values have transformed the environment of European foreign policy-making in important ways (see Smith, M.E. 2004a). Common procedural norms such as the practice of sharing information and the automatic ‘reflex of coordination’ (Glarbo 1999; Smith, M.E. 1998: 315; Wessels and Weiler 1988) were first developed on an informal basis and were specified over the years. They were confirmed in the Single European Act (SEA), which came into force in 1987 and provided a treaty base for European foreign policy cooperation for the first time, and also in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1993, though no provisions for their enforcement were stated. Besides the procedural norms that characterize the CFSP decision-making process, important substantive norms, policy positions and objectives that make up the EU’s foreign policy acquis have developed, which set precedents that guide further decision-making. European foreign policy norms, such as the promotion of peace, liberty and democracy, as well as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, that constitute the EU’s collective foreign policy identity (Manners 2002; Smith, K.E. 2003) are often incorporated into concepts such as ‘normative’ or ‘civilian power’ Europe.

These changes in the European foreign policy environment, in turn, have affected the strategies that Member States employ to ‘upload’ their national preferences onto the EU level, which differ in important ways from inter-state bargaining. Socialization – a process whereby actors of a given community are inducted into its norms and rules – plays an important role in this regard, while a further differentiation can be made depending on the nature or ‘quality’ of socialization (see table 2 and section 5 below).
Member States may use norm-based arguments (Checkel 2005; Schimmelfennig 2001), ‘framing’ their preferences on the basis of common EU norms, values and policy precedent to enhance the legitimacy of their claims. This approach to dealing with diverging foreign policy preferences has been termed ‘arguing’ and is based on the assumption of ‘strategically socialized’ actors (see section 5). Here, Member States strategically appeal to common norms and values and make use of ostracisms or peer pressure to advance their interests and sanction defectors of cooperation. As pointed out by Frank Schimmelfennig and Daniel C. Thomas (Schimmelfennig and Thomas 2009), a Member State’s ability to successfully employ norm-based arguments depends on a number of conditions, including the determinacy of an EU norm and its relevance to a particular policy, as well as the forum for negotiations. For example, Anna Juncos and Karolina Pomorska (2006) suggested that Member State representatives in Council working groups make (strategic) use of the opportunities provided by an institutional environment characterized by common norms and rules (playing the ‘Brussels game’).

Member State representatives may also try to influence not only each other’s behaviour but also thinking through deliberation and ‘normative suasion’ (Schimmelfennig and Thomas 2009; Tonra 1999; 2001; Smith, M.E. 2004b). This would mean that national ideas and interests are not static but may change and come closer to each other in the framework of these processes, as actors internalize new understandings of appropriateness. From such a social constructivist perspective, actors may start to perceive each other increasingly as partners or colleagues who have to solve joint problems, rather than negotiating opponents in a bargaining game (Smith, M.E. 2004b: 102).8

Table 2: The Europeanization of Foreign Policy – Socialization and Negotiation Styles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality of socialization</th>
<th>Negotiation style</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialization</td>
<td>Bargaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arguing/ strategic role-playing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Normative suasion</td>
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8 Checkel (2005) makes a similar point in regards to the normative persuasion that operates in international institutions.
Both of these latter styles of preference uploading may also explain why smaller Member States with less bargaining power might succeed in influencing European foreign policy outcomes. If Member States convincingly present their position in terms of common European norms and values, and especially if they are perceived as honest brokers that have the aim of upgrading the common interest, they can be successful in promoting particular norms and policy models and ideas at the EU level. For example, Jakobsen (2009) has illustrated that the small Nordic EU members, particularly Sweden and Finland, have generally wielded strong influence in the establishment of the civilian dimension of the ESDP. Finland’s Northern Dimension Initiative (e.g. Arter 1996; Arter 2000), as well as Sweden’s efforts to promote conflict prevention as an integral part of EU policy (e.g. Björkdahl 2008), are also noteworthy in this regard.

Overall, it has been noted that by shifting from a bargaining style of interest mediation to an arguing/joint problem-solving style of cooperation, EU states have improved their prospects for foreign policy cooperation (Smith, M.E. 2004b; Juncos and Pomorska 2006). Thus far, however, different ways of preference-uploading have primarily been described empirically. It would thus be an interesting avenue for future studies to engage in more theory-guided research in order to look at how Member States further their interests in European foreign policy-making, and to examine under which ‘conditions’ Member States employ a particular uploading strategy.

It would be conceivable, for instance, that negotiations about less contended foreign policy issues that are not deeply entrenched at the domestic level are more likely to encourage an arguing or problem-solving mode of interest mediation. Highly contested foreign policy issues that are of substantial significance to individual Member States, by contrast, can be expected to privilege a bargaining style of negotiations.

It is moreover important to point out that ‘preference-uploading’ might begin at an earlier stage in the EU foreign policy cycle. While this working paper has focused on uploading strategies available to Member States to influence EU-level decision-making in the ‘negotiation-phase’, other routes of influence might exist. Very importantly, EU Member States might seek to shape the EU’s foreign policy agenda and form coalitions with like-minded states to influence the issues that will be subject to EU-level negotiations and deliberations.
4.2. The Downloading Dimension of Europeanization

The downloading dimension of Europeanization refers to a top-down process where the state adapts to EU standards, norms and institutions. The outcome of downloading is foreign policy adaptation. For the purposes of this paper, we define foreign policy adaptation as the adjustment of national foreign policies – in terms of substance, objectives and policy-making style – to common EU positions and ‘ways of doing things’. Important indicators of foreign policy adaptation are, among other things, a Member State’s adherence to common objectives, the relaxation of national positions in order to accommodate the progress of EU policy and institutions and an increasing degree of salience of the EU agenda (Wong 2006). As Member States together initiate and shape the policies to which they later adapt, the uploading and downloading dimensions of Europeanization are linked in practice (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004; Gross 2007: 504).

The literature on Europeanization mentions several cases where EU Member States have adapted to EU positions, standards and norms that deviated substantially from their initial national stances. Nevertheless, the general picture that emerges from the growing body of literature on the Europeanization of national foreign policies is that the trajectories of foreign policy adaptation differ in individual Member States. Very importantly, domestic factors such as the size of a Member State and the extent of a Member State’s foreign relations network, as well as historically conditioned variables like national identity (e.g. an ‘Atlanticist’ versus a ‘Europeanist’ orientation) and strategic culture (e.g. views concerning the use of force), seem to influence national Europeanization experiences.

Larger Member States are frequently portrayed as ‘shapers’ rather than ‘takers’ of European foreign policy. In the case of Germany, for instance, it has been argued that foreign policy adaptation in response to the EU has been limited (Miskimmon 2007). Similar findings have been made for France and the UK, for which the CFSP has often provided an opportunity to reinforce their national interests (see above) rather than constraining their national foreign policies. This is not to say, however, that larger Member States are immune to the ‘EU impact’, or that foreign policy adaptation in response to the EU may not have significant benefits for larger Member States. As argued by Reuben Wong (2006) in a detailed study of French foreign policy toward East Asia, the impact of EU institutions and the CFSP on French foreign policy behaviour has been more significant than is commonly imagined. Still, there is a general agreement that the EU impact on smaller Member States, which do not have an extensive network of foreign policy relations and possess only limited international influence, is more profound. As pointed out in the case of Ireland, small Member States are quicker to adapt their preferences to the ambitions of larger Member States as they know that their unilateral influence in international affairs is limited (Tonra 2000b).
Moreover, integration-related factors such as the duration of EU membership seem to play an important role in foreign policy adaptation. Unlike old Member States, new members were unable to influence and shape the EU foreign policy *acquis* from the outset of European foreign policy cooperation. Foreign policy adaptation thus followed a top-down direction as new members adjusted their national foreign policies to pre-established European foreign policy positions. Greece and Spain, for instance, which joined the then EC in 1981 and 1986 respectively, downgraded the importance of central traditional policy positions to bring them in line with the EU’s *acquis politique* EU membership had a significant impact on Spain’s position toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, as demonstrated by its recognition of Israel in 1986, as well as on its stance on the Western Saharan conflict (Kennedy 2000). And Greece, which at first showed great reluctance to adapt to Europe, displayed in the second half of the 1990s an increasing willingness to comply with EU procedural norms and ways of doing things in order to replace the label of the ‘awkward partner’ with that of a ‘good pro-European’ state (Economides 2005; Ioakimidis 2000).

Recent works on new Member States like Poland, which was part of the Eastern enlargement and joined the EU in 2004, also detected evidence of foreign policy Europeanization (Pomorska 2007; Zaborowski 2004a, 2004b; Kaminska 2007), although it must be mentioned that Poland has, on important occasions, also forcefully insisted on its national interests in its dealings with the EU. Adaptation of Polish foreign policy to EU standards has been evident both before and after EU accession, showing that the Europeanization of national foreign policy may extend beyond the EU’s frontiers. However, while Poland’s foreign policy adaptation was motivated by conditionality and the desire to join the EU during the accession stage, foreign policy adaptation follows different mechanisms once a country has joined the EU.\(^9\)

Wong (2007: 325) points out that it is probably still the most contested question for research on Europeanization of foreign policy whether convergence can be expected to be the dominant tendency over the long term: However, there has been an observable general trend throughout the Member States that ‘Europe matters more’ with regard to their foreign policies.

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\(^9\) As the focus of this working paper is on the Europeanization of EU Member States, this section will not deal with the conditionality-mechanism, which is employed by the EU in its policy vis-à-vis non-member countries (including candidate countries) (for this see the work of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). The model underpinning EU conditionality “follows a logic of consequences and is driven by external rewards and sanctions that the EU adds to the cost-benefit calculations of the rule-adopting state” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 9; emphasis in the original).
5. **MECHANISMS OF EUROPEANIZATION**

In this section, we distinguish learning and the socialization of foreign policy elites in European foreign policy institutions as key mechanisms of Europeanization. As pointed out above, processes of elite socialization and the emergence of common EU foreign policy-norms have affected both the strategies available to Member States to upload their national preferences to the EU-level and the way Member States adapt their policies and preferences to the EU. Learning, by contrast, results in changes of beliefs, cognitions and attitudes of political elites that, in turn, can lead to changes in foreign policy and national adaptation.

5.1. **Learning**

Learning has been identified as a key mechanism that drives Europeanization and leads to foreign policy adaptation (Wong 2005; Smith, M.E. 2004a,b). This view stresses the exchange of ideas and policy transfer between Member States, for which the EU may serve as an arena, and takes into account that learning is often driven by the recognition of interdependence and of the need for common responses to common problems.

In policy areas like employment and social protection, the EU has established the ‘Open Method of Coordination’ to provide a platform for collective learning and to promote convergence among Member States’ foreign policies.\(^\text{10}\) In the foreign policy realm, where no learning platform like the Open Method of Coordination has been put into practice, policy makers are more likely to learn from critical experiences, such as crises and policy failures, which put into question the policy that has been followed hitherto rather than from common benchmarks and best practices (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004).

This is not to say, however, that in the framework of EU foreign policy cooperation Member States do not also learn from each other. As it has been shown in France’s trade and investment relations with China, France’s foreign policy was Europeanized in terms of learning and emulative transfer from the ‘German model’ (Wong 2006). Still, it is commonly understood that the most substantial shift in national foreign policy positions and preferences were driven by critical external events. Very importantly, it has been observed that Member States’ experience with helplessness in collectively dealing with international conflicts and crises led to enhanced efforts to strengthen the EU’s capacity for joint action, and to speak with one voice in international affairs. The EU’s inability to effectively respond to the violent break-up of former Yugoslavia, for example, has been identified as a key factor that has driven<br><br>\(^\text{10}\) The Open Method of Coordination rests on soft law mechanisms that are agreed upon by the Member States, such as guidelines, benchmarking and best practice in order to help Member States converge towards common policy objectives.
the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). And European disunity during the Iraq crisis of 2003 has been an influential factor that promoted the development of the European Security Strategy (Mahncke 2004).

Two forms of learning can essentially be distinguished: ‘thin’ (single loop) and ‘thick’ (double loop) learning (Radaelli 2003: 52). Whereas it is assumed that ‘thin learning’ occurs when actors readjust their strategies in order to achieve their unwavering goals, ‘thick learning’ involves that the values of actors are modified and their preferences and goals thus reshaped. Moreover, a model of policy learning can be devised that is based on two key stages (Levy 1994: 291): in the first stage, the observation and interpretation of experience leads to change in the beliefs of foreign policy-makers, and in the second stage, these changed beliefs affect subsequent behaviour. However, the phenomenon of learning from joint European foreign policy experiences has rarely been studied in an in-depth, theoretically informed manner. An interesting new research avenue for the study of EU foreign policy would thus be to examine in depth and with regard to concrete key foreign policy issues to what extent sustained foreign policy deliberations among CFSP participants have led to the emergence of shared understandings of key foreign policy issues, and whether such changes effected subsequent common foreign policy decisions.

5.2. The Socialization of CFSP participants

To derive a more fine-grained explanation of Europeanization, scholars moved down the ladder of abstraction from the state level (macro-level) to the level of Member State representatives in EU-level institutions (micro-level). Most of this research has focused on the socialization of national representatives in CFSP committees and working groups. Still, it is important to notice that socialization effects are not limited to the lower-level bodies of decision-making. As Daniel C. Thomas (2009) has argued, key procedural CFSP norms, i.e. the normative commitment to joint action and the commitment to maintaining consistency and coherence in EU foreign policy-making, characterize EU-foreign policy negotiations in all forums of decision-making, including the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) (composed of the foreign ministers).

Yet, given the high frequency of interaction between Member State representatives in CFSP committees and working groups, socialization effects are expected to be particularly profound in these institutions. In the realm of the CFSP, research on socialization has largely focused on the Political and Security Committee (PSC) (Duke 2005; Duke 2007; Juncos and Reynolds 2007), its forerunner the Political Committee (de Schoutheete 1980; Jørgensen 1997; Nuttall

11This can be explained, in part, by the fact that the study of social learning raises important conceptual and methodological problems, as learning is difficult to define, isolate, operationalize and thus measure empirically (see Levy 1994).
1992; Nuttall 2000) and COREPER (Heinisch and Mesner 2005), as well as the Council working groups (Beyers 2005; Juncos and Pomorska 2006). Works on the Political Committee generally identified the ‘club-like atmosphere’ and Member States’ willingness to coordinate their foreign policy actions, share information and comply with common procedural norms in the absence of ‘robust’ compliance mechanisms as evidence for elite socialization. For example, the fact that EU Member States that do not respect the acquis politique or take foreign policy actions single-handedly are usually criticised as defectors (Smith, M.E. 2004b: 123) illustrates that compliance in European foreign policy may be ensured through ‘softer’ mechanisms, such as peer pressure.

Drawing on insights from social constructivist research, a number of empirical studies on the CFSP (Juncos and Pomorska 2006; Tonra 2000a; Tonra 2001) and the ESDP (Cornish and Edwards 2001; Martinsen 2003; Meyer 2005) have argued that EU-level foreign policy institutions have the ability to socialize their agents.\footnote{Early works of neofunctional theorists like Ernst Haas have already assumed that the EU plays an important socializing role, which was understood to result in a loyalty transfer from the national to the supranational level. Socialization effects – such as the development of an ‘esprit de corps’ – have also been described in early studies of EU level foreign policy (de Schoutheete 1980; Jørgensen 1997; Nuttall 1992).} Research on CFSP committees and working groups has shown that Member State representatives – which are formally ‘agents’ of their states who receive instructions and must report back to their home ministry – have considerable leeway in influencing foreign policy decisions. As a matter of fact, according to estimates only 10-15 percent of the foreign policy issues – although usually issues that are of special salience to one or more Member State(s) – are on the agenda of the GAERC (Hayes-Renshaw 2002). The majority of the issues have been not only prepared but also agreed upon at the level of CFSP committees and working groups before they reach the Council. Europeanization might thus occur through the influence of Member State representatives placed in Brussels on national preference/interest formation.

Socialization is a process of inducting individuals into the norms and rules of a given community (Hooghe 2005), which eventually implies a switch from a logic of consequentiality (egoistic, interest-maximizing behaviour) to a logic of appropriateness (rule-following behaviour). A particularly important question when trying to understand the impact of socialization on European foreign policy outcomes concerns the nature of socialization in CFSP institutions. Drawing on Jeffrey Checkel’s (2005) distinction between two essential types of norm internalization, it has been examined whether actors simply take the normative context of the CFSP into account when they pursue their national objectives (type 1 internalization/strategic socialization), or if CFSP institutions transform the properties of actors, i.e. their national identities and foreign policy interests (type 2 internalization) – which would suggest a more profound Europeanization.
### Table 3: Socialization and Europeanization Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Socialization</th>
<th>Instruments/Interest Mediation</th>
<th>Outcomes/Logic of Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type 1 Internalization (strategic socialization)</td>
<td>Arguing/Normative Framing</td>
<td>Adaptation (strategic action/logic of consequentiality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 2 Internalization</td>
<td>Normative Suasion</td>
<td>Preference/Identity Change (appropriate action/logic of appropriateness)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a study on Council working groups, Anna Juncos and Karolina Pomorska (2006) argued that EU level diplomats comply with a group’s procedural norms and rules because they calculate that doing so helps them reach their national goals more effectively (Juncos and Pomorska 2006). Here, the main mechanism behind socialization is ‘strategic action’ (Checkel 2005), and no internalization of European norms has (yet) occurred.

In situations of repeated negotiations, as in the case of the CFSP, reputation-building enhances a Member State’s ability to influence CFSP decision-making (see above). In this view, it can be expected that foreign policy adaptation follows a strategic calculus. CFSP actors may adapt to EU policies and positions because they are willing to trade the losses of one round of negotiations against the higher benefits of a subsequent round, gained by accomplishing a cooperative reputation. Non-cooperation, in turn, entails the risk of being isolated and marginalized in the CFSP decision-making process.

Scholars like Michael E. Smith (2004a) and Ben Tonra (2001) have taken the impact of participation in EU foreign policy-making on national foreign policies a step further. Drawing on insights from sociological institutionalism, they argue that European foreign policy cooperation has led to the emergence of a common ‘role identity’ among CFSP participants.

In this view, Member States support EU positions and policies when they are convinced that doing so is appropriate in terms of promoting common European objectives, norms and values. Here, socialization goes beyond conscious role-playing and requires norm internalization and a change in the values and interests of actors (type II internalization). As a result, European foreign policy actors increasingly identify themselves with common European objectives and try to find solutions in the interest of a common European good (Beyers 2005). This is not to say, however, that identity change requires a shift in loyalty away
from nation states to the EU. Rather, it implies a redefinition of national identity that incorporates the EU (Mercer 1995).  

Against this background, an especially promising avenue for further investigation will be to specify the conditions under which policy makers may have internalized common norms and ideas in order to shed further light on the links between CFSP institutions, socialization outcomes and changes in national foreign policies. It would be conceivable, for instance, that internalization is more likely to occur if the meetings of the respective committee or working group are relatively insulated (Lewis 2005). In addition, the length and intensity of a national representative’s exposure to an EU committee/working group may also play a role (Beyers 2005).  

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13 State representatives develop a supranational role in addition to their national role (Beyers 2005).
6. CONCLUSIONS

In this working paper, we have provided an overview of the state-of-the-art research on foreign policy Europeanization and offered a further refinement of the Europeanization concept. While previous conceptualizations of the Europeanization of foreign policy have differentiated between different schools of Europeanization research (Wong 2005; Gross 2007), this working paper has emphasized the need to further explore and specify the way in which these different ‘branches’ of research are linked, rather than treating them as separate phenomena. Distinguishing between dimensions (uploading and downloading), outcomes (national projection and foreign policy adaptation) and especially mechanisms of Europeanization (socialization and learning), we have attempted to better capture the complex dynamics of the Europeanization of foreign policy, which differ in important ways from areas of hierarchical governance located in the EU’s first pillar. Very importantly, Europeanization processes in the foreign policy area are more voluntary and less hierarchical in nature.

In our view, the central added value of studying European foreign policy through the lens of Europeanization lies in the fact that Europeanization concepts shift the attention to the interactions between the national and EU level in European foreign policy. While theoretical International Relations approaches that previously dominated the field of European foreign policy analysis examined top-down and bottom-up processes in European foreign policy-making in an isolated, disjointed fashion, and thus could capture only part of the reality of European foreign policy, the Europeanization concept offers interesting insights into how these dynamics may influence each other.

On the one hand, we argued that mechanisms of Europeanization, such as learning and socialization, can explain why European foreign policy-cooperation worked in the absence of formal enforcement mechanisms and against national interests and initially diverging policy preferences of Member States. Very importantly, adaptations of their foreign policies can result from evolving social rules for convergent foreign policy behaviour, as well as from emulative policy transfer and the learning from foreign policy experiences. At the same time, Member States might be willing to adapt their individual foreign policies to EU objectives and adhere to procedural norms when it is in their (long-term) interest (strategic socialization), or when they become convinced that doing so is appropriate to pursue common European objectives (norm internalization).

On the other hand, we argued that the fact that European foreign policy negotiations take place in an increasingly institutionalized space has impacted the ways (and strategies) in which Member States seek to upload their foreign policy-preferences to the European level. Assuming the existence of strategically socialized actors, Member State representatives will be
encouraged to switch from a ‘bargaining’ to an ‘arguing’ mode of negotiation, and will try to influence each other’s behaviour by framing their policy preferences as consistent with common EU policy norms. As a result, Member States with divergent preferences might be compelled to adapt their positions when they feel that the social rewards for co-operative behaviour exceed the costs of concession. At the same time, we highlighted that socialization processes can have an even more profound impact on EU Member States and result in changes of national preferences and identities. In this view, agreement and preference convergence in EU-level negotiations can be attained through ‘normative suasion’, and the interactions of Member States may be marked by a collective orientation of ‘problem-solving’, so that common definitions of problems and philosophies for their solution may emerge.

While this working paper has set out significant refinements of previous conceptualizations of foreign policy Europeanization, we also highlighted the need for further research to enhance our knowledge of the Europeanization of foreign policy. As far as the downloading dimension of foreign policy Europeanization is concerned, the phenomenon of learning from joint European foreign policy experiences has certainly remained under-researched. A promising avenue for further investigation would thus be to examine how processes of learning in CFSP institutions encourage joint understandings and beliefs among EU-policy makers on key issues such as crisis management. Regarding the uploading dimension of Europeanization, further research is required to derive a better understanding as to how Member States further their interests in European foreign policy-making, and in which situations they employ a particular uploading strategy. As pointed out above, recent works (Schimmelfennig and Thomas 2009) have made a first attempt in the direction of specifying conditions that are conducive for a certain negotiation style/strategy. So far, however, research has produced only tentative results, and the scope conditions for uploading strategies need to be tested more systematically.
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