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The role of identity in support for supranational integration in EU Foreign and Security Policies

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Abstract: This paper examines the effect of popular identification with Europe and the European Union on the level of governments’ willingness to consent to supranational reforms of foreign and security policies. Applying ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on a series of statistical analyses based on data provided by Eurobarometer and state positions prior to the three major EU treaties (the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and the 2004 Constitutional Treaty), this paper concludes that higher levels of European identification by citizens greatly increase domestic support for joint decision-making in foreign and defence policies which in turn pushes governments to adopt more integrationist positions during negotiations.

Keywords: European identity; CFSP; supranationalism; public opinion; political science.

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Introduction

Intergovernmentalism is still the defining characteristic of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policies (CFSP) today. Member states are in charge as the primary actors of shaping the scope and speed of foreign policy integration. In that, there is a striking difference with the affairs of the former EC pillar, where the Commission enjoys a great degree of autonomy and power in constructing EU policy, the EP is relatively influential in decision-making, and the use of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers has increased substantially over the years of integration.

Yet despite the degree of differences, a gradual move towards more supranationalism in the functioning of common foreign and security affairs was evident in each of the major treaty revisions. Divergent state positions during the exhaustive debates and negotiation

processes for the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 and the Constitutional Treaty in 2004 revealed that some members no longer hold the same level of sympathy and preference for the preservation of intergovernmentalism in these sensitive areas. Parallel to changes in state preferences, the public also seems to embrace a much more approving stance towards further integration as evidenced by consistent support for foreign and security policies in surveys (Peters 2011).

This paper aims to examine the slow yet steady shift toward further supranationalism in foreign policy and defence which according to the realist discourse constitute the very core of state sovereignty and are thus expected to remain under the firm grips of nation-states. To explain the growing enthusiasm for the pooling of sovereignty over the course of negotiations on these two policy areas during the last two decades, this paper visits constructivist approaches and tests whether actors' identities play a role in shaping their interests. In this theoretical configuration, "actors" denote not only negotiating partners, i.e., nation-states, but equally so the public, whose collective identity molds state identities through democratic mechanisms.

Thus, the research question to be investigated in the following pages is whether states whose constituencies have higher levels of self-identification with Europe are more likely to willingly give up some of their sovereign rights and veto power to a more encompassing entity and support supranational integration on foreign and defence policies. In this pursuit, this paper aims to contribute to the literature in two ways: first, by exploring how public opinion on European integration is formed specifically on foreign and security policies; and second, by testing the extent to which domestic public opinion is a variable in the formation of state positions in EU negotiations. Unlike the previous studies that aimed to explain the sources of support for common foreign and security policies (Carrubba and Singh 2004, Schoen 2008, Foucault, Irondelle and Mérand 2009, Koenig-Archibugi 2004), this study aims to capture the dynamic nature of the relationship between self-identification and support for integration by presenting a longitudinal analysis covering three major treaty negotiations and three Eurobarometers over the course of ten years, while simultaneously providing a more robust analysis of government responsiveness during the key junctures of the European integration process.

The next section will offer a theoretical discussion of competing explanations on public attitude formation towards European integration and the relevance of public opinion on government positions. The second section will present the hypotheses to be tested and outline the research design and operationalization. The third section will discuss the findings based on a series of statistical analyses and the last section will conclude the paper.

1. Public opinion and supranational integration

From the very beginning, the EC was an elite-driven project with very little, if any, public input in decision-making processes (Gaubatz 1995). The idea of a ‘permissive consensus’, termed by Lindberg and Scheingold, that pointed to a generally favourable prevailing attitude among the public towards European integration, was widely accepted among scholars working on this historically unique integration scheme (1970). According to the ‘permissive consensus’ hypothesis, the public did not have a coherent and structured attitude on integration and was volatile and susceptible to manipulation (Inglehart 1970, Stavridis 1992). Furthermore, issues on integration had low saliency in party competition and were largely unrelated to other, more ideological conflicts of political competition (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 7)

The Danish referenda on the Maastricht Treaty was the first shock that showed that public opinion can indeed influence the direction, content and speed of integration. With the visibility of common policies that directly affected citizens’ lives and welfares, such as a common currency or immigration, issues on Europe became salient and party competitions were shaped accordingly. Euroskepticism grew gradually during the decade and populist right-wing parties became the beneficiaries of growing public discontent. The period of permissive consensus, which was once taken for granted by policy-makers, was replaced with a period of ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009).

In this transition from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus, convergence in opinion between the elites and the public became a requirement to push the integration process forward as any divergence between the two ran the risk of serious legitimacy problems and had the potential to halt integration altogether (Peters 2011, 5-6). The close vote in the Irish referenda against the Nice Treaty, the rejections of the Constitutional Treaty in the French and Dutch referenda and finally, the rejection of Lisbon in another referendum in Ireland were major incidents in which public opinion had a dramatic impact on the integration process. Each negative reaction in referenda since Maastricht resulted in the expansion of the subsidiarity principle in the institutional setting of the Union. Active public participation was promoted by the political elites in an attempt to overcome the democratic deficit and increase the legitimacy of the Union (see Eriksen and Fossum 2000).

Though an ‘electoral connection’ between the elites and the public has proven to be vital for the future prospects of integration, following the traditional route of the Lipmann-Almond consensus, it is possible that citizens’ positions, as passive recipients of discourses from the top, could be molded by the elites. As summarized by Hooghe and Marks (2009, 10), if individuals have no time or prior knowledge of the issue, they may rely on cues provided by the actors possessing knowledge and political power. It is possible therefore, in situations where the public is disinterested or ill-informed, to

observe an overlap between the attitudes of the elite and the public, but this is conditioned by the elites who drive the public on matters related to European integration (Zaller 1992, Popkin 1991).

The alternative route is from the bottom to the up. The bottom-up dynamic starts with the assumption that in the post-Maastricht context of political competition, the direction of the cueing effect changed from the elites to the public such that the elites must pay close attention to the public when negotiating European integration. Political parties of European polities, with the intention of receiving more votes, regularly monitor public opinion and shape their positions accordingly (Carrubba 2001). In established democracies, gaps between public opinion and government policies run the risk of policy-makers being punished in elections. Thus, rather than ignoring them, rational, vote-seeking policy-makers seek to address public preferences and engage in public debate to succeed in political competition. Once elected, the party in office conducts policies that are in line with its electoral preferences. The elected government assigns national representatives to a body of EU institutions, including the EU Council of Ministers, which approves of EU laws. Furthermore, the heads of governments participate in the European Council and decide the agenda for the future of the integration process (Gabel 2000, 57). Public opinion can also act as a supervisory force for national parliaments in dealings with pieces of EU legislations (Katz and Wessels 1999).

A number of studies proposed that in post-Maastricht Europe, integration has indeed affected domestic political competition and vote-seeking elites have taken positions accordingly, providing evidence for the bottom-up route over the top-down (e.g. Evans 1999, Tillman 2004, Evans and Butt 2007, Gabel 2000, de Vries 2007, Raunio 1999). Based on expert surveys, Steenbergen and Scott (2004) claimed the role of European integration in domestic party programs greatly increased between 1984 and 1996. It would not be wrong to assume that this has only grown since 1996. In another study employing content analysis of the media in several member states, Kriesi found that the number of statements on European issues in national election campaigns rose from 2.5 percent in the 1970s to 7 percent in the 1990s (2007). Similarly, Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver demonstrated that in 2003, European integration was still only the third-most salient issue in party competition after tax rates and privatization (2006). In a similar vein, Tapio Raunio showed that during the 1990s, Finnish political parties strategically adjusted their policies on European integration to increase their share of votes (Raunio 1999).

The conclusion reached by these studies is that European integration is a significant factor in the election behaviour of European citizens. Concerns over integration have created a new electoral cleavage in national elections which opens up new possibilities for political competition. Domestic elites in turn have an incentive to differentiate themselves from the others and reorient based on public opinion. As van der Eijk and Franklin suggest, the EU is a 'sleeping giant' in the sense that issues related to integration

have the potential to upset the structure of domestic political mobilization in Europe (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004, 33).

The effect of European integration on domestic political competition has not been uniform across policy areas. Analyzing the relationship between citizen support for European monetary integration and electoral support of political parties, Geoffrey Evans and Sarah Butt showed that the Conservative Party's European policy and its position on the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) negatively affected its electoral support (2007). Similarly, Scheve found that voting behaviour in Britain and France is closely influenced by European monetary integration (Scheve 1999).

Though foreign and security policies are traditionally much less politicized compared to monetary policies in domestic politics, there is a strong possibility that integration at the European level in these sensitive domains can offer new openings for political competition. With the EU becoming more active in security and defence policies and undertaking military or humanitarian operations in distant parts of the world from Mali to Ukraine, the saliency of integration in foreign and security policies inevitably increased and thus the autonomy of political elites with respect to public opinion in shaping the direction of integration dramatically decreased. Yet, unlike issues on economic integration, the dynamics of how public attitude towards foreign policy cooperation is shaped are complicated, and therefore deserve scholarly attention. Though utilitarian calculations can have greater power in forming attitudes on matters related to economic integration due to the increased visibility and effect of such policies on citizens' lives, in foreign policy cooperation, citizens usually lack the necessary information, including on technical issues. This practical problem of 'bounded rationality'¹ can lead to two consequences: One, individuals form their opinion on foreign policy cooperation by transferring their opinion about visible facets of integration such as economic integration (Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson 1998). Two, without a clear guideline and a ready cost-benefit calculus, individuals form their opinion based on an appropriate course of action derived from the identity they have constructed for themselves.

Identities are both a function of an actor's self-understanding and his/her interactions with others. They create a sense of commonness among the groups of individuals, according to which they form an 'imagined community' based on a particularistic identity component and define an 'other' which does not share the characteristics of this identity. As such, social identities have internal and external dimensions: The internal dimension refers to the set of norms, values and discourses that creates and holds the social group

¹ Unlike the perfect rationality models that assume that individuals are fully informed, perfectly logical and pursue maximum utility, the model of bounded rationality starts with the assumption that the rationality of individuals is limited by imperfect information, finite time and cognitive deficiencies. As such, decision-making is usually a process of satisficing -eliminating the existing alternatives until an acceptable threshold is found- rather than optimization, which is finding the best alternative available. See for a detailed discussion on bounded rationality Gigerenzer and Selten 2002.

together (Smith 1991) while the external dimension concerns the self-placement of this community relative to similar entities and other actors (Banchoff 1997, 12).

Identities are not acquired automatically. The construction of the practices and discourses that form an identity are attained through a process of identification and the most influential source of identification is “the self-generated subjective identifications that individuals make spontaneously” (Suny 2001). Self-identification can be linked to emotional attachments and subjective preferences which have a basis in primordial categories such as race or religion. Self-identifications can also have an ideational basis; the discursive context in which actors find themselves and the narratives that shape their perceptions, understandings of the world, and behavioral codes and values could drive them to identify themselves as a part of a particular group. Finally, self-identification can stem from utilitarian calculations, albeit seldomly. The actors can adopt an identity with the belief that this identity will enhance one’s (or the group’s) utility. Conversely, in cases where the actors fear the loss of individual or group resources as a result of identification with another collective, the identity in question would be resisted (McLaren 2006, 49).

Drawing from these insights, we postulate that, as a critical part of community building processes, the public's self-identification with Europe, how they construct their self-held images and how they situate themselves and other actors within the framework of European integration has an important effect on their willingness to transfer some national sovereignty to the supranational level. Accordingly, the masses with higher levels of European and EU identification should be expected to be more likely to support supranational cooperation. A more positive identification with Europe and the European Union will promote the notion of we-ness and the belief of belonging to the same whole. It will generate the perception that it is not necessarily a zero-sum game between Brussels and the national capital but that both parties can benefit from the transfer of competencies to the supranational level. A negative identification with Europe, by contrast, will cause the masses to restrict the inclusive concept of ‘we-ness’ to only those sharing the same national affinity, strengthening the feeling that some of the national sovereign rights are ‘surrendered’ to the ‘others’, those sitting at a distant capital that do not share the same identity as ‘us’ (Koenig-Archibugi 2004, 146). Given this, intergovernmentalism, instead of supranationalism, will be the expected choice of institutional structure since it will protect the veto power for cases which cannot be effectively addressed by those ‘foreign’ communities. The reluctance to consent to the transfer of authority to a supranational entity will be particularly strong in foreign and defence policies as these policy areas touch on core aspects of the notion of national sovereignty.

Although scientific inquiries that test the relationship between identity and European integration on foreign and security policies are few and scattered (e.g. Schoen 2008), there is a rich literature that problematizes identities and self-identification as a source of individual attitude towards European integration as a general political objective. In a


notable example, Lauren McLaren (2002) argued that preferences for European integration are not only shaped by cost-benefit calculus or cognitive mobilization, but more so by antipathy or sympathy towards other cultures. Similarly, in various studies, scholars found that stronger national attachments and pride usually result in negative support for European integration (Christin and Trechsel 2002, Carey 2002) and specific common policy areas (Kaltenthaler and Anderson 2001). As Carey notes, the stronger an individual's attachment to his/her nation, the less likely it will be for that individual to consent to measures that can reduce the nation state's control of politics (Carey 2002, 391). Borrowing from Deutsch, Carey also elaborates on the notion of terminal community, the highest political entity an individual owes allegiance to (Carey 2002, 391, see also Deutsch 1966). For individuals who believe in the existence of a European identity and consider the EU their terminal community, the Union has the legitimate authority to formulate policies. For those who take their nation-states as their terminal communities, on the other hand, the EU's growing role in policy-making processes would be considered unjustified and an attack on the national community.

As opposed to ideational factors, the alternative and dominant line of theories to explain individual attitude towards integration originates from the rationalist, *homo economicus* voter model. The main assumption of this utilitarian school is that citizens' evaluations of the economic costs and benefits of integration both for themselves and for the group they are a part of form the basis of their opinion towards Europe (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998a; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1995). Accordingly, it is suggested, support for integration is dependent on the material benefits obtained by the country in general and the citizen in particular (Gabel and Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998b). As an example of the former, examining the effects of macroeconomic factors, inflation, unemployment and growth, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) concluded that national economic performance and benefits acquired under membership are correlated with popular support for the Union, though this correlation has significantly weakened since Maastricht. Studies of the latter group, however, abound. From early on, scholars working on public attitudes towards Europe theorized that those who directly benefit from integration show higher levels of support for integration. European economic integration and market liberalization benefit those with higher levels of human capital while, at the same time, negatively affect unskilled labour due to the increased mobility of capital vis-à-vis labour (Rodrik 1997). The mobility of capital also pressurizes high tax countries to finance welfare programs, whose main beneficiaries are unskilled segments of the labour force (Huber and Stephens 2001). All these factors support the conclusion that those with higher levels of education, professional skills and income are more likely to support European integration whereas those without these attributes are more likely to be against.

2. Research design and operationalization

The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the stronger the popular self-identification with Europe, the more supportive of supranational action in foreign and security policies states will be. The intermediary mechanism which links self-identification at the individual level with state positions at the national level is public opinion. Therefore, this paper makes two related assumptions: First, state support for supranational integration in foreign and security policies derives from public support for supranational integration in those policy areas. Second, public support for supranational integration in foreign and security policies derives from individual self-identification with Europe. Figure 1 illustrates the causal mechanism offered in this paper.

Figure 1: Effect of European identification on government support for supranationalism



The statistical analysis used to test these hypotheses is based on two different models.

Model I tests the effect of European identification on support for joint decision-making in foreign and defence policies at the individual level. The control variables incorporated in Model I are perception of benefits from membership, general support for EU membership, trust in Americans/the United States, left-right positioning, education, age and income. Relying on individual data involving categorical dependent variables, fixed effects logit regression is adopted.

Model II tests the effect of European identification on state positions towards further supranationalism relying on country-level variables. Twelve member states are included in the analysis for Maastricht and fifteen member states are included for the Amsterdam and Constitutional treaties. European identification at the aggregate level is juxtaposed against several control variables, including citizen perception of benefits from

membership, national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), inflation, trust in Americans/the United States and support for joint decision-making in foreign and defence policies. In this model, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is adopted.

2.1. Dependent and intervening variables

The dependent variable of this study, government preferences for supranational cooperation on foreign and security policies, is operationalized by an analysis of governments' positions on proposals to enhance the supranational character of cooperation in these policy domains during the series of Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) convened prior to the three major treaty reforms: Maastricht Treaty, Amsterdam Treaty, and Constitutional Treaty².

In the three IGCs preceding those treaties, three sets of items were addressed and intensely negotiated to increase supranational EU competences, causing divergent responses between the more integration-minded states and the sovereign-minded ones. Though there were considerable overlaps across IGCs, such as enhanced use of the QMV in the foreign policy pillar, several of the items on the agenda were unique to specific reform waves. Below are the three sets of reform proposals on the agenda of each IGC:

Maastricht

- 1- Introducing more QMV for decisions of principle.
- 2- Introducing more QMV for decisions of implementation.
- 3- Increasing the powers of the European Commission in foreign policy-making.
- 4- Bringing foreign policy cooperation under the Community pillar, 'tree model' vs. 'temple'-pillar structure.
- 5- Adopting a common defence clause.

Amsterdam

- 1- Introducing more QMV for decisions of principle.
- 2- Introducing more QMV for decisions of implementation.
- 3- Increasing the powers of the European Commission in CFSP.
- 4- Increasing the powers of the European Parliament in CFSP.
- 5- Establishing new supranational institutions at the EU level regarding CFSP.
- 6- Integration of the WEU to the EU.

² Though the Constitutional Treaty never came into force following the rejections raised by the French and Dutch referendums, due to the fact that the core changes incorporated into the foreign and security policy sections of the Constitutional Treaty were preserved in the Treaty of Lisbon (e.g. a permanent presidency system, extensive use of QMV and further use of enhanced cooperation mechanisms, the newly created post of the Foreign High Representative by merging two previously separate posts - the European Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative of the CFSP), the negotiations of the Lisbon process are excluded from the analysis.

Constitutional

- 1- Introducing more QMV on CFSP and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
- 2- Institutionalizing the posts of Presidency of the European Council and Ministry for Foreign Affairs in a supranational format.
- 3- Effective utilization of ‘enhanced cooperation’ mechanisms in CFSP and ESDP.
- 4- Adopting a mutual assistance clause.
- 5- Establishing new supranational institutions at the EU level regarding CFSP and ESDP.

Data on state preferences which compiles official memorandums, public statements and position papers were acquired using three different sources. Laursen and Vanhoonacker’s book *The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union: institutional reforms, new policies, and international identity of the European Community* provides a collection of official documents supplemented by detailed discussions on state positions. Another set of white papers issued by member states during the preparation stage of the Amsterdam Treaty was accessed through *The European Union Constitution & CIDEL Project* hosted by the University of Zaragoza³. Finally, for the Constitutional Treaty, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Watch Reports prepared by officially supported representatives of member states and published by FORNET, a network of research and teaching on European Foreign Policy funded by the European Commission's Fifth Framework Programme, are utilized⁴.

Once member governments’ responses to these three sets of proposals in three IGCs are assessed, a supranationality score is created. To construct this index, each fully supportive position is given 2 points while no support is assigned -1 points. Additionally, two intermediary positions are defined: The first comprises states which had conditions for an affirmative vote and/or expressed certain reservations, though without ceasing support for the proposal. On position papers and official memorandums, states which explicitly expressed a condition in exchange for a favourable vote or announced a theoretical support provided certain conditions were met are coded under this category. This ‘reluctant/conditional yes position’ is coded 1 point. There are also states which, albeit not strongly critical of the proposal, had certain reservations large enough to prevent them from supporting it. Compared to a no-support position which is laden with the words ‘red-lines’ or ‘oppositions’ without any given justification, states under this

³ The database of The European Union Constitution & CIDEL Project hosted by the University of Zaragoza is available online at: <http://www.proyectos.cchs.csic.es/euroconstitution/Home.htm>, 10.01.2015.

⁴ All reports and the Fonet database are available online at LSE Fonet Archive: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/centresandunits/EFPU/FORNETarchive.aspx>, 10.01.2015.

category are expected to vocalize their doubts that lead to opposition and therefore opens up the possibility for further negotiations. This position is labeled 'reluctant/skeptical' and coded 0. No available information is also coded 0. The unequivocal and concise nature of position papers issued by governments prior to IGCs minimizes errors or validity problems resulting from the coding process, particularly in relation to intermediary categories.

One caveat is necessary regarding state positions. As a natural part of ongoing negotiations, governments have time and again changed their positions on some items. One example is the British opposition to permanent structured cooperation during the negotiations of the Constitutional Treaty which shifted to conditional support in the aftermath of the Franco-British-German trilateral talks in November of 2003. This paper, however, only takes the initial positions into consideration before any bargaining process began. Given the fact that the three EU conferences under study did not only deal with foreign and defence policies, there is the possibility that elite positions on foreign and defence policies might be some byproducts of elite decision-making concerning other policy domains. Although, as Michael Smith notes (2004, 24), room for issue linkages and securing package deals is very limited within the institutional structure of CFSP, during negotiations, state elites can strategically attempt to link policy domains for substantive reasons or by log-rolling. In this process, state positions on foreign and defence policy integration might in fact stem from factors other than domestic support. By deriving state positions from official documents issued before the IGCs began, this possible distortion and validity problem is eliminated (see Appendix I for the respective tables which present states' positions on each of the three IGCs and the correlated supranationality scores).

The intervening variable of this study is public support for joint decision-making in foreign and security policies. Public opinion data in the form of Eurobarometers (EB), which are large-scale surveys gathered by the European Commission twice a year in member and candidate countries, are utilized to measure support for joint decision-making. In an attempt to present a longitudinal analysis, three EB surveys, each conducted during the peak of treaty negotiations, are analyzed: EB 35 published in June 1991, EB 46 published in May 1997, and EB 58 published in December 2002.

The relevant question in these Eurobarometers asks respondents whether they support national or joint decision-making with Europe on a wide range of policy areas, including foreign policy and defence. For an aggregate level analysis, the number of respondents who chose the European level as the preferred area of decision-making is subtracted from the number of those who chose the national level, for each country and for each policy area. For the individual level analysis, those in favour of joint decision-making are coded 1, while those against are coded 0.

2.2. Independent variables

The explanatory variable tested is the level of European identification. In democratic systems, public opinion data can provide critical insights into self-categorization and the level of belonging to Europe (Banchoff 1999). Thus, two versions of an EB question and the relevant data are processed to measure the independent variable. The first version asks: “Do you ever think of yourself as not only [nationality], but also European? Does this happen often, sometimes or never?” This version was regularly posed to respondents until 1992, when it was replaced with the second version: “In the near future, do you see yourself as: [nationality] only; [nationality] and European; European and [nationality]; or European only?”

In Model I, based on individual data, the standard EB coding scheme is followed and the answer of ‘[nationality] only’ is coded 1, ‘[nationality] and European’ 2, ‘European and [nationality]’ 3 and ‘European only’ 4. In Model II, averaged levels of self-identification with Europe are used as a proxy for collective identity. Based on aggregate data in order to operationalize this model, an index is created for both versions of the EB question. For version 1, the answers ‘never’ are coded 0, ‘sometimes’ coded 1 and ‘often’ coded 2. For version 2, the answers ‘European only’ are coded 3, ‘European and [nationality]’ 2, ‘[nationality] and European’ 1 and finally ‘[nationality] only’ 0. In both versions, the European identification scores are computed by taking the average across respondents.

2.3. Control variables

A set of control variables is added to the models to test the validity of competing explanations. As suggested, indicators of economy can influence individuals to process information on economic conditions to form a positive opinion on European integration. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) suggested that inflation and intra-EU export balances are explanatory factors in aggregate levels of support for the EU, but not so much EU budget returns, GDP or unemployment. Therefore, inflation is added to the country-level analysis as a measure of national economic performance. Inflation data for each year of investigation (1991, 1996 and 2002) has been acquired from the OECD Data Bank. At the individual level of analysis, household income is included as an objective economic indicator.

Economic variables can provide citizens rough evaluations with which to form a positive or negative posture towards European integration in general, but foreign and security policy cooperation is a different animal. Applying the insights of the rationalist model, a control variable tested in both Model I and II is citizen perception of the utility of EC/EU membership for one’s nation. It is assumed that as citizens find membership in the

interest of his/her polity, s/he would be rationally inclined to support deepening integration. The relevant question in the EB surveys asks respondents if they agree that their country has on average benefited from being a member of the European Community/Union. In Model I, standard EB coding is applied. In Model II, the percentage of negative responses is subtracted from the percentage of affirmative responses.

Since cooperation in “high politics” is a sensitive issue for states with more at stake, previous alliances and the country’s positioning towards the United States in particular can be an important factor in government willingness to contribute to the attempts to create a collective security power at the EU level. It might be expected that traditionally Atlanticist members and their citizens would be more reluctant to transfer some of their competences to Brussels, which in time could turn out to be a challenger to the US as a security provider (Cornish and Edwards 2001). By the same token, members who hold long-lasting distrust towards the other side of the Atlantic would display more enthusiasm in such efforts. Thus, individual and aggregate attitudes towards the US are incorporated into the models. In EB 35 and 46, this variable is captured by the relevant question which asks respondents how much trust s/he has in Americans. Because that question is not asked in EB 58, another question which asks whether the respondent believes the US plays “a positive”, “a negative” or “neither a positive nor a negative” role for peace in the world is utilized for our purposes. In Model I, standard EB coding is followed. In Model II, means are calculated by applying the coefficients 4, 3, 2 and 1 respectively to the various answer frequencies.

Another control variable added to Model II is state capabilities. From a realist perspective, major powers would be more reluctant to join in any foreign policy cooperation if they believe they already have the necessary resources and capabilities to pursue an independent foreign policy. Even if they are set on cooperation, realists would expect the cooperative mechanism to be of an intergovernmental character, since states with higher capabilities should not see any need to renounce their autonomy and give up some of their sovereign rights in favour of a supranational institution. Smaller states, by contrast, would support such institutionalization to increase their own influence in world affairs when the EU acts as a unit and to shackle the hands of stronger states that could pose a threat to them in the future (Koenig-Archibugi 2004, 145). Even though what exactly constitutes state power is an open question in the literature, a rough indicator is sheer GDP figures. Consequently, GDP figures obtained from the OECD are included in the Model.

The final three control variables at the individual level of analysis are citizen partisanship, age and education. Several studies have found that citizens' support for integration closely follows the position they place themselves on the left-right axis and the parties they support (e.g. Franklin, Marsh and Wlezien 1994; Franklin, van der Eijk and Marsh 1995, Gabel 1998a). In general, it is assumed that those on the right are more positively disposed towards European integration than those on the left (Hooghe and Marks 2005), though extreme right-wing supporters are usually among the staunchest critics (Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries 2007). Previous research has also pointed to two positive effects of education on public opinion. First, higher levels of education help individuals develop cognitive skills to process information related to integration and grasp it with ease (Inglehart 1970). Second, higher levels of education could result in greater human capital which will increase the likelihood that the recipient will be a net beneficiary of integration (Gabel and Palmer 1995). Finally, it is reported that age has a negative effect on support for European integration. For these three variables, no recoding or regrouping is applied and standard EB coding is followed.

One last control variable incorporated in Model I is support for European integration. It would be expected that those who are already in favour of European integration as a general political ideal would be supportive of joint decision-making regardless of the issue area. To extract the statistical effect of European identification on support for joint decision-making independent of support for European integration, the EB question which asks respondents whether they think EC/EU membership is "a good thing", "a bad thing" or "neither good or bad" is utilized.

3. Findings and discussion

The application of Model I reveals that at the individual level, three factors are statistically significant at $p < 0.01$ in all three Eurobarometers for both foreign policy and defence: European identification, the perceived benefits for one's country from membership, and support for membership. This means those with higher levels of European identification, those who believe their country has benefitted from membership and those who evaluate EU membership positively are more likely to support joint decision-making in both foreign policy and defence. The fact that the significance is consistently verified in all six cases increases the validity of our findings.

Table 1: Model I (Results of Fixed Effect Logit Regression)

	EB 58	EB 46	EB 35	EB 58	EB 46	EB 35
EU Identific.	0.41*** (0.04)	0.29*** (0.04)	0.22*** (0.04)	0.33*** (0.05)	0.24*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)
Benefits	0.30*** (0.07)	0.27*** (0.07)	0.40*** (0.07)	0.29*** (0.08)	0.39*** (0.07)	0.58*** (0.08)
Support for EU membership	-0.46*** (0.05)	-0.51*** (0.05)	-0.25*** (0.04)	-0.51*** (0.05)	-0.47*** (0.04)	-0.27*** (0.05)
Trust in US	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.04)
Left-Right	-0.03** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Education	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.03** (0.01)
Age	0.03* (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
Income	0.08*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Country Fixed Effects?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Number of Countries	15	15	12	15	15	12
N	7267	7655	6291	7146	7541	6158
Log likelihood	-4209.86	-4180.36	-4021.37	-3672.68	-3933.98	-3242.26

DV: Support for Joint Decision Making in Defence (first three columns)
and Foreign Policy (last three columns).

Robust standard errors clustered by countries are in parentheses.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Several conclusions could be drawn from these results: First, the hypothesis that expects a positive relation between individual European identification and support for joint decision-making in foreign and security policies is strongly supported. Building on the findings of studies which found a positive relationship between European identity and support for European integration, this study provides evidence that self-identification with Europe is equally significant in shaping attitudes towards foreign and security policies. Controlling the support for EU membership in our analysis allows us to conclude that this relationship is refined from the general support for the integration process. This means European identification has a discrete and statistically significant effect on support for supranational decision-making in these specific policy areas.

The subjective evaluation of membership in the EU appears to be another significant factor in citizen support for joint decision-making. Accordingly, individuals who think their country has benefitted from membership and believe that EU membership is a “good thing” also display greater enthusiasm for joint decision-making. Although our model does not allow us to extract the criteria according to which individuals evaluate the perceived benefits or how they reach the conclusion that the EU is a “good thing”, this result could be taken as support for rational voter arguments.

Another statistically significant effect is the level of trust in the United States. The negative coefficients and the strongly significant confidence intervals tell us that individuals who have a lower opinion of Americans/the US are more supportive of joint decision-making in foreign and security policy, providing evidence that the Atlanticists vs. Europeanists divide is real and effective in forming opinions, at least in citizens’ minds. In EB 35 and 46, which asked respondents how much they trust Americans, this result is more concrete, particularly in foreign policy. In EB 58, our conclusion is less convincing and we can assume that the different question used for analysis is responsible for this. Accordingly, in EB 58, those who believe that the US plays a negative role in maintaining peace in the world are only slightly more supportive of joint decision-making in defence.

Considering the effects of economic variables, the model reveals only weak statistical relationships. As suggested, it is well accepted that those with lower incomes and lower human capital may be adversely affected by integration and are thus more likely to oppose European integration. Yet, in our model in EB 46 and 58, we observe a strongly significant effect only for joint decision-making in defence. Though positive feelings towards integration in more visible and salient areas such as the economy can be transferred to shape citizens’ opinion on other issue areas, our finding suggests that economic considerations may not easily apply to foreign and security policies. Still, given that the relationship between income and support for joint decision-making is strengthened in each survey under investigation, one can speculate that the divide in socio-economic conditions may hamper efforts to deepen cooperation in foreign and security policies in the future.

Model I also indicated some ambiguous impacts of age and left-right positioning on support for joint decision-making. Among the six cases, in EB 35 and 46 in foreign policy and in EB 58 in defence, age was found to be statistically significant, albeit to differing degrees. Similarly, in EB 58 in defence, the left-right positioning was found to be statistically significant. Yet, the small value of coefficients and the inconsistency in the direction of impact prevents us from drawing definite conclusions from this analysis. However crudely, the weakness of the left-right positioning on public attitude also provides support for the argument that the cueing effect of parties on the public on the integration of foreign and security policies is limited at best. Instead of top-down, bottom-up connections seem to be more salient in those issue areas. This conclusion also increases the theoretical validity of our second model, which assumes that the EU identification of the public, i.e., the bottom, indeed makes an impact on state behaviour, i.e., the top.

Table 2: Model II (Results of OLS Regression)

Model II.a

DV: Supranationalism Score

	Constitutional	Amsterdam	Maastricht
EU Identific.	0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (1.00)	-0.04 (0.03)
Joint Defense	0.08*** (0.26)	0.14** (0.05)	0.13*** (0.02)
GDP	1.85 (8.26)	-2.08 (2.35)	3.65** (1.34)
Trust in US	-12.46*** (2.47)	1.56 (6.19)	-7.35*** (1.76)
Inflation	-1.06 (0.92)	0.47 (1.21)	0.29** (0.10)
Benefits	-0.35 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.14*** (0.03)
Constant	28.46*** (6.08)	0.52 (20.30)	18.64** (6.25)
N	15	15	12
R-squared	0.91	0.71	0.95

(Table continues on next page)

Model II.b

DV: Supranationalism Score

	Constitutional	Amsterdam	Maastricht
EU Identific.	0.07 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.08)	0.03 (0.06)
Joint FP	0.10 (0.07)	0.35*** (0.08)	0.13 (0.09)
GDP	5.89 (1.21)	-4.45* (2.10)	4.02 (3.51)
Trust in US	-11.48** (3.49)	1.10 (4.90)	-3.50 (4.41)
Inflation	-1.39 (1.31)	0.73 (0.97)	-0.15 (0.29)
Benefits	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.12** (0.05)	0.13 (0.09)
Constant	19.91** (7.67)	-9.08 (16.17)	-2.95 (14.88)
N	15	15	12
R-squared	0.83	0.81	0.67

Model II.c

DV: Supranationalism Score

	Constitutional	Amsterdam	Maastricht
Joint FP	0.07 (0.04)	0.25** (0.10)	-0.07 (0.05)
Joint Defense	0.08*** (0.02)	0.05 (0.05)	0.14*** (0.03)
GDP	-5.08 (7.95)	-4.13* (1.97)	4.54** (1.40)
Trust in US	-11.59*** (2.35)	1.95 (4.69)	-7.80*** (1.91)
Inflation	-1.63* (0.72)	0.84 (0.90)	-0.39** (0.13)
Benefits	-0.03** (0.03)	-0.11** (0.05)	0.15*** (0.04)
Constant	29.00*** (5.17)	-9.53 (14.72)	19.75** (6.88)
N	15	15	12
R-squared	0.92	0.83	0.95

Standard errors are in parentheses.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In Model II, based on country-level data, a series of OLS analyses were conducted using different configurations by including and excluding the variables EU identification and support for joint decision-making in foreign policy and in defence, respectively. The results reveal high degrees of overlap between public support for joint decision-making in foreign and defence policies and state support for supranationalism in these policy areas. For a long time, foreign and security policies were believed to be free from public input, yet our model shows that in all three treaties, voter representativeness is positive and statistically significant. That means during the IGCs on treaty reforms, governments took positions which closely correlated with collective opinions. Furthermore, even though Maastricht is considered a turning point in the sense that from that period on, the public became a significant factor in the equilibrium of European integration, our model indicates that even during the IGC on Political Union which paved the way for Maastricht, the positions of the representative bodies at the nation-state level largely corresponded to the preferences of the electorate.

The congruence between public opinion and state positions is particularly strong in the supranationalization of defence policies. This means the more supportive an electorate is of joint decision-making in defence, the greater willingness a state displays in transferring sovereignty to the European Union in foreign and defence policies. Defence and security concern the very core aspects of sovereignty. The rather concrete security discourses embedded in European order as well as risk-averse electorates do not leave much maneuvering room for states to introduce new security policies and engage in risky endeavors without the fear of being punished in elections. Therefore, public support at home for joint decision-making, particularly in defence, becomes a must for governments to take a more supranational position in the IGCs. Given that, governments with a healthy level of public support at home for joint decision-making, such as Belgium, would be expected to have a greater margin for allowing further compromises to its sovereignty, while governments with shaky public support, such as the UK, tend to adopt a much stricter position and not allow any concessions to supranational agents.


Model II indicates that at the aggregate level, the effect of European identification is not of statistical significance for any of the treaty negotiations. However, given the strong significance of EU identification on support for joint decision-making at the individual level and the high degrees of correlation between the two variables at the aggregate level, this was rather unsurprising. With regards to alternative explanations, our analysis found that neither state power in the form of GDP nor objective economic indicators in the form of inflation have any effect on the outcome variable. Two variables that seem to have some statistical significance are expected benefits from membership and trust in the United States. In terms of benefits, the regression coefficients are small, statistical significance varies from insignificance to only $p < 0.05$, and its sign is negative in two IGCs but positive in the third. As it stands, contrary to our expectations, in the

Amsterdam and Constitutional treaties, those governments whose constituencies believe their country has benefitted from membership were less supportive of more supranationalism in foreign policy and defence. Even though a more robust check that includes a variable on policy-makers' perception of benefits from foreign and defence policy cooperation is needed for a proper interpretation, this finding presents an apparent contradiction with the expectations of utilitarian approaches. In contrast to other policy areas, the public frequently uses simpler guidelines in foreign policy to reach judgments on the remote actors, issues and events which are the ingredients of foreign affairs (Holsti 1996, 164). Although our model confirms public opinion drives governments in a particular direction, given the complex nature of foreign policy cooperation, states may not be willing to be cued by rather ambivalent public perception of benefits in their orientation towards supranationalism.

Trust in the US does not have a considerable effect on state positions in Maastricht and Amsterdam, yet our analysis reveals that during the negotiation process of the Constitutional Treaty, it was a highly significant factor in shaping support for supranationalism. Member states whose constituencies are critical of US policies in ensuring peace were significantly more likely to support supranational integration in foreign policy and defence. The most likely factor responsible for this result is the divide created by 9/11 across Europe. Crystallized with the Letter of the Eight in January 2003 and followed by the Vilnius Letter in February 2003⁵, there were fundamental differences of opinion between more federalist-oriented EU members, led by Germany and France, and the Atlanticists, led by the UK, on a number of issues ranging from how to conduct a war on terrorism through the utility of preemptive strikes to the precedence of international law. For Atlanticists, a tightly institutionalized European defence pillar would only help undermine NATO and thus would never be consented to, whereas for Europeanists, a Europe which relies on the United States for its security would never be able to rise as a global power, particularly given the apparent unbridgeable differences in views.

⁵ The Letter of Eight was signed on January 30, 2003 by the heads of state of five EU members - Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom - along with three Central European countries which were to join the European Union in 2004. The letter expressed an open declaration of support for the American position on Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's violations of a UN resolution and indirect support for a future American intervention. Soon after, on February 6, 2003, the Vilnius Group comprising Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania and Slovakia announced the Vilnius Letter, another declaration of support for the US ambition of overthrowing Hussein.

Figure 2: Effect of European Identification on government support for supranationalism –results



Based on the findings of two models, Figure 4 sketches the mechanisms of how public identification with the broader entity of Europe affects the integrationist preference of member states in selected issue areas. At sufficient levels of belonging to Europe, joint decision-making in the areas of foreign and defence policies, which touch on the most sensitive aspects of sovereignty, is no longer approached by fear and distress by citizens. By contrast, if individual self-categorization is restricted to one's national identities, citizens are highly reluctant to transfer the locus of decision-making to Brussels. Governments usually engage in a two-level negotiation game, one at the domestic level with other political parties and interest groups and the other at the international level with other member states (Putnam 1988). If they aspire to be reelected, paying close attention to public opinion, particularly on increasingly salient European integration, becomes an integral part of political competition. Therefore, once public opinion is established in either direction through election mechanisms, it helps to consolidate the limits of the framework in which the government can bargain during the IGCs.

Conclusion

This paper aimed to explain the varying levels of European Union member state support for supranational cooperation in foreign and defence policies during the course of negotiations prior to the three major EU treaties –Maastricht, Amsterdam and Constitutional. Drawing from the premises of ideational approaches, it is suggested that European identification by the public has a significant effect on state positions when consenting to the transfer of sovereignty to supranational agents. Accordingly, states with greater levels of public identification with Europe are expected to value supranational integration not only for the tangible benefits that such cooperation would provide, but also as a normative good. For those states, the transfer of authority from national to the supranational level would be regarded as the ‘right’ thing to do, since Europe would be considered as ‘us’, and not as just a collection of different states and societies sharing common borders. Where national and European identities “mesh and blend into each other”, European and national levels would be considered merely different layers of the same polity such that making critical foreign and security policy decisions at the supranational level would appear just as proper as making them at the national level (Risse 2005, 296).

To investigate the dynamic relationship between European identification and state support over the course of the three treaty negotiations, this paper tested two interrelated hypotheses through fixed logit and ordinary least squares regression models based on individual and country-level data. After a thorough statistical analysis, it is concluded that at the individual level, self-identification with Europe along with the perception of benefits from membership and trust in Americans/the United States, emerge as strongly important factors in integrationist preference. As predicted, as the degree of self-identification with Europe increases, the level of support for joint decision-making increases among citizens. At the country level, it was revealed that public attitude on sovereignty pooling in foreign and defence policies has a significant impact on states’ attitude towards supranational integration, indicating a high level of government responsiveness. Using the two models in tandem helped us reach the conclusion that higher levels of European identification lead to greater support for joint decision-making and this integrationist preference at the individual level drives state policies towards further supranationalism through election mechanisms.

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Appendix I

Table 3: State positions during the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union

Countries	QMV on principles	QMV on implementation	Increased powers for EC	'Tree Model'	Common Defence	Supranationality Score
Belgium	Reluctant yes	Yes	Reluctant yes	Yes	Yes	8
Denmark	No	No	Reluctant yes	No	No	-3
France	Reluctant	Reluctant yes	Reluctant	No	Yes	2
Germany	Reluctant	Reluctant yes	Reluctant yes	Reluctant yes	Yes	5
Greece	No	N.A.	Reluctant	Reluctant yes	Yes	2
Ireland	No	No	Yes	N.A.	Reluctant	0
Italy	No	Yes	Yes	Reluctant	Yes	5
Luxemburg	N.A.	N.A.	Yes	Reluctant	Yes	4
Netherlands	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	7
Portugal	No	Reluctant	Yes	N.A.	No	0
Spain	Reluctant	Reluctant yes	Yes	Reluctant yes	Reluctant yes	5
UK	No	No	Reluctant	No	No	-4

Table 4: State positions during the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference

Countries	QMV on principles	QMV on implementation	Increased powers for EC	Increased powers for EP	New Supranational Bodies	Integration of WEU	Supranationality Score
Austria	Reluctant yes	Reluctant yes	Yes	Reluctant	Reluctant	Reluctant yes	5
Belgium	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	12
Denmark	No	Reluctant	No	N.A.	No	No	-4
Finland	No	Reluctant yes	No	No	No	Reluctant yes	-2
France	No	Yes	No	No	Reluctant yes	Yes	-2
Germany	Reluctant yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Reluctant yes	Yes	10
Greece	No	No	Reluctant yes	Yes	Reluctant	Reluctant yes	2
Ireland	No	Yes	No	No	Reluctant	Reluctant	-1
Italy	Reluctant yes	Yes	Reluctant	Yes	Yes	Yes	9
Luxemburg	Reluctant yes	Yes	Yes	N.A.	Reluctant yes	Yes	8
Netherlands	Reluctant yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Reluctant yes	Reluctant yes	9
Portugal	Reluctant	Reluctant yes	No	No	Reluctant	No	-2
Spain	Reluctant yes	Reluctant yes	Yes	Reluctant yes	Reluctant yes	Reluctant yes	7
Sweden	Reluctant	Reluctant	Reluctant	N.A.	No	N.A.	-1
UK	No	No	No	No	No	No	-6

Table 5: State positions during the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference

Countries	More QMV	Supranational Foreign Policy Posts	Stronger 'Enhanced Cooperation'	Mutual Assistance Clause	New Supranational Bodies	Supranationality Score
Austria	Yes	Yes	Reluctant yes	Reluctant yes	Reluctant yes	7
Belgium	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	10
Denmark	Reluctant yes	Reluctant	Reluctant	No	reluctant yes	1
Finland	Reluctant yes	Reluctant	No	Reluctant	Reluctant yes	1
France	Reluctant	Reluctant yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	7
Germany	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	10
Greece	Reluctant yes	Yes	Reluctant yes	Yes	Yes	8
Ireland	No	Reluctant	No	No	Reluctant	-3
Italy	Yes	Yes	Yes	Reluctant yes	Reluctant yes	8
Luxemburg	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	10
Netherlands	Yes	Yes	Reluctant yes	Reluctant yes	Yes	8
Portugal	No	Reluctant yes	Reluctant	Reluctant yes	Reluctant yes	2
Spain	Reluctant yes	Yes	Yes	Reluctant yes	Yes	8
Sweden	Reluctant	Reluctant	Reluctant	Reluctant yes	Reluctant yes	2
UK	No	Reluctant	No	Reluctant yes	Reluctant yes	0

Appendix II

Variable Measurements, Origin and Descriptive Statistics									
MODEL I									
EB35	Variable ⁶	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	CODEBOOK		
	SUPPORT FOR DECISION-MAKING IN DEFENCE	12488	1.516.816	.4997371	1	2	1	Decided By Natl Govt	
							2	Decided Jointly in EC	
							.d	DK	
							.n		
Q34: "For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?"									
	SUPPORT FOR DECISION-MAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY	11994	1.749.041	.4335829	1	2	1	Decided By Natl Govt	
							2	Decided Jointly in EC	
							.d	DK	
							.n		
Q34: "For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the European Union?"									
	EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	12731	2.263.373	.770219	1	3	1		
							2	Sometimes	
							3	Never	

⁶ Please find the corresponding question below each variable.

							.d	DK	
Q13: "Do you ever think of yourself as not only [nationality], but also European? Does this happen often, sometimes or never?"									
	BENEFITS: EC MEMBERSHIP - COUNTRY	11184	1.216.381	.4117951	1	2	1	Benefited	
							2	Not Benefited	
							.d	DK	
							.n		
Q19: "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?"									
	LEFT RIGHT PLACEMENT	10968	5.333.151	2.029.658	1	10			
	AGE RECODED - 6 CATEGORIES	13120	3.298.857	1.70312	1	6	1	15-24 years	
							2	25-34 years	
							3	35-44 years	
							4	45-54 years	
	EDUCATION	12943	4.707.332	3.220.546	1	10		1	
								3	16 Years
								5	18 Years
								9	22 Years and Older
	INCOME: HH QUARTILES (HARMONISED)	9996	2.498.199	1.134.522	1	4	1	+ + Highest	
							2	+	
							3	-	

							4	-- Lowest	
	SUPPORT FOR EC MEMBERSHIP	12547	1.38575	.7478633	1	3	1	A Good Thing	
							2	A Bad Thing	
							3	Neither Nor	
							.d	DK	
Q18: Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is...?									
	TRUST IN US	12301	2.233.396	.8954683	1	4	1	Lot of trust	
							2	Some trust	
							3	Not very much trust	
Q7: I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust or no trust at all ?									
EB46									
	SUPPORT FOR DECISION-MAKING IN DEFENCE	15389	1.470.661	.4991547	1	2	1	NAT GOVERNMENT	
							2	EUROPEAN UNION	
							.a		
							.d	DK	
	SUPPORT FOR DECISION-MAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY	14977	1.712.159	.4527719	1	2	1	NAT GOVERNMENT	
							2	EUROPEAN UNION	
							.a		
							.d	DK	
	EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	15834	1.639.131	.7824738	1	4	1	(NATIONALITY) only	

							2	(NATIONALITY) and European	
							3	European and (NATIONALITY)	
							4	European only	
Q10: In the near future, do you see yourself as: [nationality] only; [nationality] and European; European and [nationality]; or European only?"									
	BENEFITS: EC MEMBERSHIP - COUNTRY	13131	1.407.204	.4913322	1	2	1	Benefited	
							2	Not benefited	
							.a		
							.d	DK	
	LEFT RIGHT PLACEMENT	13485	5.177.011	2.013.461	1	10			
	AGE RECODED - 6 CATEGORIES	16248	3.370.015	1.68804	1	6	1	15-24 years	
							2	25-34 years	
							3	35-44 years	
							4	45-54 years	
							5	55-64 years	
	EDUCATION	16248	2.607.441	2.499.532	6	98	14		
							16		
							19		
							23		
	INCOME: HH QUARTILES (HARMONISED)	12081	2.499.048	1.108.077	1	4	1	--	
							2	-	
							3	+	
							4	++	

	SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP	15049	1.652.734	.771088	1	3	1	Good thing	
							2	Neither good nor bad (questionnaire code 3)	
							3	Bad thing (questionnaire code 2)	
	TRUST IN US	14764	2.318.206	.9035693	1	4	1	Lot of trust	
							2	Some trust	
							3	Not very much trust	
EB58									
	SUPPORT FOR DECISION-MAKING IN DEFENCE	15389	1.45669	.4981369	1	2	Numeric	Label	
							1	(NATIONALITY) government	
							2	Jointly within European Union	
							.d	DK	
	SUPPORT FOR DECISION-MAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY	15012	1.74607	.4352726	1	2	1	(NATIONALITY) government	
							2	Jointly within European Union	
							.d	DK	
	EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	15737	1.708.267	.7220321	1	4	1	(NATIONALITY) only	
							2	(NATIONALITY) and European	
							3	European and (NATIONALITY)	
							4	European only	

Q32: In the near future, do you see yourself as: [nationality] only; [nationality] and European; European and [nationality]; or European only?									
	BENEFITS: EC MEMBERSHIP - COUNTRY	13120	1.329.116	.46991	1	2	1	Benefited	
							2	Not benefited	
							.d	DK	
	LEFT RIGHT PLACEMENT	12986	5.216.695	1.958.055	1	10			
	INCOME: HH QUARTILES (HARMONISED)	10763	2.450.804	1.12624	1	4	1	-- (Lowest income quartile)	
							2	- (Next to Lowest income quartile)	
							3	+ (Next to Highest income)	
	EDUCATION	16062	2.625.395	2.500.107	6	98			
	AGE RECODED - 6 CATEGORIES	16074	3.52476	1.720.981	1	6	1	15-24 years	
							2	25-34 years	
							3	35-44 years	
							4	45-54 years	
							5	55-64 years	
	SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP	15219	1.520.271	.6955587	1	3	1	Good thing	
							2	Neither good nor bad (questionnaire code 3)	
							3	Bad thing (questionnaire code 2)	
	TRUST IN US	15080	1.827.785	.6802549	1	3	1	Positive	
							2	Negative	
							3	Neither positive nor	

								negative	
Q48: In your opinion, would you say that the United States tends to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role regarding ...?									

MODEL II							
	Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	CODING
	SUPRANATIONALISM	42	3,761905	4,761684	-6	12	See the text for the construction of supranationalism index
	EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATION	42	70,11905	18,83588	42	123	For the EB 35, the answers 'never' are coded 0, 'sometimes' coded 1 and 'often' coded 2. For the EBs 46 and 58, the answers 'European only' are coded 3, 'European and [nationality]' 2, '[nationality] and European' 1 and finally '[nationality] only' 0. The index scores are computed by taking the average across respondents.
	EU JOINT DEFENSE	42	4,095238	32,47799	-56	86	Percentage of 'jointly with the EU' responses in related EB questions is subtracted from the percentage of 'national only' responses.
	EU JOINT FP	42	-43,5952	17,94852	-70	-6	Percentage of 'jointly with the EU' responses in related EB questions is subtracted from the percentage of 'national only' responses
	GDP	42	564141,3	606658,4	11589,44	2199870	In US\$
	TRUST IN US	42	2,416416	0,523997	1,375	3,2	Means are calculated by applying the coefficients 4, 3, 2 and 1 respectively to the answer codes in related EB questions.
	INFLATION	42	3,55	3,546503	0,5	20,4	
	EU MEMBERSHIP-BENEFITS	42	31	29,45853	-39	81	Percentage of negative responses in related EB questions is subtracted from the percentage of positive responses.